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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
EXPERIENCING DISPLACEMENT AND STATELESSNESS:  
FORCED MIGRANTS IN ANSE-À-PITRES, HAITI 
  
In 2013, the Dominican state ruled to uphold a 2010 constitutional amendment that 
stripped thousands of Dominicans of Haitian origin of their citizenship and forced them 
to leave the country during summer 2015. About 2,200 of these people became displaced 
in Anse-à-Pitres, where most took up residence in temporary camps. I use the term forced 
migrants or displaced persons interchangeably to refer to these people. Many endure 
challenges in meeting their daily survival needs in Haiti, a country with extreme poverty, 
considerable political instability, and still in the process of rebuilding itself from the 
devastating earthquake of 2010. Drawing on fourteen months of ethnographic field- work 
in Anse-à-Pitres, I examine how these displaced people, in the face of statelessness and 
amid their precarious social and economic conditions, create survival strategies by 
drawing upon everyday labor mobility and informal economic activities within and across 
their communities. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the involvement of these displaced 
people in community life through socio-economic practices attests to a sense of belonging 
and produces a form of substantive citizenship in their absence of legal citizenship. This 
kind of substantive citizenship is also shaped by the ability of the displaced people to re- 
define life goals, participate in local meetings with the local state and organizations on 
the ground, and challenge systems of power that seek to impose their choices upon them. 
In this dissertation, I argue against construing the displaced people as hopeless by focusing 
on the forms of power and agency that they exercise in and over their lives, which make 
them agents of their self-development. 
KEYWORDS: forced migrants, border, informal economy, mobility, substantive citizenship 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2015, thousands of undocumented Haitian migrants and Dominicans born of 
undocumented Haitian descent were forced to leave the Dominican Republic. They 
arrived in Haiti where most still currently live in makeshift camps in the border region 
between the two countries. This displaced population is diverse in age because members 
of this population are from several different generations. The oldest members of this 
population were born in the 1940s-50s, with the youngest ones born in the 1990s. 
However, regardless of age, all members of this population are equally affected by the 
decision of the Dominican state to uphold a 2010 constitutional amendment that revoked 
birthright citizenship to children of undocumented Haitians. Drawing on fourteen months 
of ethnographic fieldwork with this group of people in the Dominican-Haitian border 
town of Anse-à-Pitres (Figure 1), my dissertation ethnographically examines how 
members of this displaced population, in the face of statelessness and amid their 
precarious social and economic conditions, create substantive citizenship by mobilizing 
resources within and across their communities. 
While doing preliminary research fieldwork with members of the Haitian community in 
Chicago in the summer of 2015, news about a series of events that involved Haitians in 
the Dominican Republic started to spread through local and international news media. 
Haitian and Dominican newspapers reported the killing and disappearance of Haitians, 
and the displacement1 of thousands of Dominican-Haitians and undocumented Haitian 
 
1 In 1994, the World Bank estimated that 10 million people per year were displaced in developing countries 
by development programs, producing 100 million people displaced per decade (Cernea 1994; Cernea and 
Maldonado 2018). This raises important issues of human rights, and causes the impoverishment of 
populations that are often already marginal or poor. Cernea contends that, if not mitigated by policies and 
approaches that restore oustees to their previous living standards, displacements tend to lead to 
2  
migrants. Those events garnered my attention while I was in the United States and 
motivated me to conduct research with Dominicans of Haitian origin and undocumented 
Haitian migrants displaced in Anse-à-Pitres in order to investigate their everyday 
experiences. 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 1 Anse-à-Pitres: a small Haitian city located on the Haitian-Dominican border 
and close to the Dominican city, Pedernales]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
impoverishment by processes that include marginalization, food insecurity, and social disintegration. 
Completely abandoned by the Haitian state and the Dominican state who displaced them and considering 
the fundamental challenges they are facing in their daily lives, forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres have 
experienced all these issues. 
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Among the events reported in the local and international media was the lynching 
and hanging in February 2015 of a Haitian known by the nickname “Tulie,” described as 
a young man who worked shining shoes around the area of a park. His body was found 
hanged in a park in Santiago (the second largest city of the Dominican Republic) with his 
hands and feet bound. (Huffington Post 2015). 
According to most news reports, the Tulie’s lynching was committed by a crowd 
of Dominicans--portrayed as a nationalist group—which sought the deportation of 
Haitians (Danto 2015) and which saw mob justice as necessary in light of the perceived 
incompetency of local authorities in judicial matters (Liberato 2015). Following the 
lynching, an attorney with the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights 
declared: “frankly it is all too reminiscent of shameful denials of southern officials during 
the decades of terror lynchings perpetrated against African Americans here at home 
(HuffPost Latino Voices 2015).” Even though lynching Haitians in the Dominican 
Republic may not be considered a routine (Perloff 2000) as it was in the case of African 
Americans in the late 19
th
 century, Tulie was not the first Haitian lynching victim in the 
Dominican Republic. Back in 2009, the lynching of another Haitian named Carlos 
Nerilus led the Haitian government to call its ambassador from the Dominican Republic 
amid tensions between the two countries (Rosario 2009). 
This public and outrageous crime committed against these Haitians was the 
precursor of a violent storm to come: Dominican civilians and soldiers made constant 
verbal and physical threats to people of Haitian descent including intimidation and 
breaking into the homes of Haitians in an attempt to force them to leave the Dominican 
Republic. These actions are part of a form of structural violence, which Galtung (1969 
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cited by Simmons 2010) refers to as those social structures—economic, political, 
religious, and cultural—that prevent individuals and groups from realizing their full 
potential. This structural violence is based on a historically political divide between Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic that led to an anti-Haitian sentiment called anti- 
Haitianismo, conceived of as a manifestation of the long-term evolution of racial 
prejudices, the selective interpretation of historical facts, and the creation of a nationalist 
Dominican “false consciousness” (Simmons 2010; Sagas 2000). Anti-haitianismo was 
created and perpetuated by the Trujillo regime, which appropriated it as a state ideology 
in the creation of Dominican nationhood in the 1930s (Sagas 2000). 
Such blatant and long established patterns of anti-Haitian discrimination 
transpired in 2010, when the Dominican state adopted a new migration law called la 
sentencia that revoked birthright citizenship to children of Haitian origin. This law 
changed a constitutional provision that had been in force since 1929 and that recognized 
the jus soli according to which all children who were born on Dominican soil, except 
children of people in transit, automatically acquired Dominican nationality. This change 
left thousands of Dominican-Haitians stateless. Indeed, in 2015, thousands of these 
stateless people, along with other undocumented Haitian migrants were forced to leave 
the country, where many became displaced in the Haitian-Dominican border region. 
During the months of June and July, 2015, an estimated 2,203 forced migrants arrived in 
the border town of Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. In this region, they took up residence in six 
camps: Parc Cadeau 1 and 2, Tête-à-l’Eau, Fond-Jeanette, Maletchipe, and Savanne 
Galata (GARR et al. 2016). Haiti is a country with extreme poverty and considerable 
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political instability; thus, this population of forced migrants has had to try to find ways to 
make a living and many endure challenges in meeting their daily survival needs. 
Indeed, Haiti’s constant economic and political instability is rooted in historical 
and structural factors that are both external and internal. For more than two centuries, the 
country’s children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren continued to be largely 
dominated and terrorized by tyrants and military juntas from within the country and by 
occupying superpowers from outside (Leiderman 2002). In 1915, after Haiti’s failure in 
redeeming its debts to US business, the U.S. invaded the country (Middleton 2010: 34). 
The U.S. controlled the country’s finances, putting the Haitian unique national bank 
under the control of the national bank of New York (Pamphile 2001). At the same time as 
the U.S. invasion of Haiti, Americans were also settling in the Dominican Republic and 
Cuba. However, investments were eight times less valuable in Haiti than in the 
Dominican Republic and a hundred times less valuable than in Cuba (Audébert 2004), 
which pushed many Haitians to migrate. Between 1925 and 1926, about 23,000 Haitians 
were working in Cuba and by the 1930s this number had increased to around 80, 000 
(Souffrant 1974). 
Haiti has also been affected by structural problems, including dictatorship and a 
series of coup d’états; from 1957 to 1986 the country was submitted to twenty-nine years 
of dictatorship by François Duvalier and his son Jean Claude Duvalier. During these 
twenty-nine years of governance of the Duvalier regime, at least 200 million dollars were 
transferred to the Duvalier private accounts in Switzerland while the population was 
living in extreme poverty (Stepick 1982). In addition, the country has experienced many 
coup d’états including those against Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 and 2004, keeping 
6  
the country in almost perpetual violence and instability. In 2010, an earthquake added the 
chaos of a natural disaster to this sustained period of political instability, creating a 
window of exciting opportunities for NGOs. 
In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, which claimed the lives of more than 
230,000 and left more than one million homeless (Theodore and Dupont 2012), Haiti 
simply became the “republic of NGOs” (Johnson 2011). This produced what is 
conceived of as disaster capitalism: using people’s suffering as an instrument to 
accumulate financial and political capital. Donors favored NGOs over the Haitian 
government, giving many NGOs the power to coordinate and distribute humanitarian aid 
to the victims of the 2010 earthquake. This collaboration is reminiscent of Haitian 
professor Jean-Anile Louis-Juste’s definition of NGOs as government bodies: i.e., 
another category of government, which is mingled directly with the “international 
community,” but acts locally (Louis-Juste quoted by Schuller 2010). The Haitian 
government received only 1% of the emergency aid sent to Haiti (Schuller and Morales 
2012: 57), which seems to corroborate Buss’s argument that donors will fund everything 
in Haiti except democratization, governance, and public sector reform (Buss 2008:5). As 
Moore stated, “The sovereignty of life within Haiti became de-politicized, 
internationalized, and negotiable” (Moore 2012: 113). In 2015, therefore, impoverished 
forced migrants entered a country where many millions of people were already living in 
similar precarious conditions. However, the precariousness of these forced migrants is 
not only created by the conditions of the country to which they migrate, but also by their 
condition of “statelessness” and a feeling of being foreign in a country that many have 
never seen before. 
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I aim to accomplish several things in this introduction. First, I describe the 
research site and the methodological approach to the study. Second, I address the 
challenges faced by the forced migrants in their experience of displacement and 
statelessness, their livelihood strategy, and their capacity of agency. Finally, I examine 
how they build an alternative form of citizenship conceived of as substantive citizenship. 
 
1.1 Contextualization and theoretical contribution 
 
There is an ample literature documenting discrimination against Haitians living 
and working in the Dominican Republic (Simmons 2010: 10-11). Simmons (2010) 
describes the terrible experience of and discriminatory practices against Haitian 
agricultural workers on Dominican bateys2. Simmons (2009) and Derby (1994) evoke the 
racial practices rooted in anti-Haitianism created by Truijillo. Sagas (2000) also shows 
that Dominican elites—in particular historians—contribute to maintaining an anti-Haitian 
ideology through a process of “national engineering” that consists of legitimizing 
traditions and shaping national culture (Sagas 2000: 5). The facts that wrap identity- 
formation and nation-building run high in the process of exclusion in the Dominican 
Republic and the extension of violence against Haitians. While this literature helps us 
understand the root causes of the displacement and statelessness of people of Haitian 
backgrounds in the Dominican Republic, I argue that, by crossing an international border, 
the interpretation of these displaced people’s lives and their constant shifting between the 
boundaries of two nation-states needs to be contextualized within a larger theoretical 
 
2 Bateys are shantytown communities that have developed around sugar plantations, and they are known to 
have some of the worst living and working conditions in the country: no potable water, no electricity, no 
means of waste disposal, constant surveillance and policing by Dominican authorities, endemic diseases 
such as dengue, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and malaria to name a few (Simmons 2010:11) 
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frame. To develop this argument, I engage several lines of theory such as border and 
labor mobility, informal economy, and substantive citizenship in order to craft a socio- 
cultural analysis that leads not only to an understanding of people’s experience of 
displacement and statelessness, but also of their self-determination to cope, fight back, 
and survive (Cornell 1997). This dissertation contributes to anthropological studies of 
border, mobility, informal economy, and citizenship in several important ways. 
First, borders are generally defined as instruments that empower the state, which 
can employ “coercive efforts to build a nation-state by excluding outsiders and to 
distinguish between members and unacceptable residents of the territory” (Fassin 2011: 
214 citing Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). In the context of Haitian migrants, both borders 
and boundaries played a significant role in forcing and keeping them out of the 
Dominican Republic. I refer to the border as the physical delimitation that resulted from 
agreements between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and that is secured by the 
Dominican state’s legal measures, such as the establishment of checkpoints and soldiers 
to control the flux of undocumented Haitian migrants. By boundaries, I mean forms of 
social constructs establishing racial differences and producing distinct cultural identities 
(Fassin 2011) that lead to the marginalization and exclusion of people. In the Dominican 
Republic, these boundaries take the form of prejudice and discrimination against 
Haitians, and spatial and social segregation of Haitian agricultural workers (Simmons 
2010) that finally led to their exclusion. Border crossers such as the forced migrants 
going to Pedernales are not only threatened by the enforcement of legal procedures in the 
Dominican Republic, but also by the multiplication of illegal practices of border guards, 
who are deployed by the central Dominican state. These officials replace migration 
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officers in the regulation of people and transform the border into a window of 
opportunities that allow them to generate income illegally. I call this misuse of power 
conferred to these officials “border power” to describe how state power has been turned 
into an instrument used by official to accomplish personal goals. The border power 
between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales has two components: soldiers acting as migration 
officers and the implementation of corrupt practices. By examining the border as a space 
of daily actions and the exercise of power relations, my dissertation contributes to 
understanding the border as both a bridge and a barrier, but also as a site for the exercise 
of agency and power. This agency and power is expressed in the capacity of the forced 
migrants to use communication networks and to articulate notions of time and space as 
strategies that enable border crossings. 
The second theoretical line is mobility, which has been imposed upon the forced 
migrants struggling to maintain stability in their lives since their displacement in Anse-à- 
Pitres (Mason et al 2011). The forced migrants are part of a large-scale movement of 
people, flow of goods, capital, and objects across the world—what Sheller & Urry (2006) 
consider to be the ‘new mobilities’ paradigm. All categories of people—including 
tourists, workers, and migrants—are involved in these mobilities (Sheller, Urry, and 
Hannam 2006). Their movements are enabled by infrastructural and institutional 
moorings (Sheller, Urry, and Hannam 2006) which provide these people with strategic 
advantages (Alan Smart 1999) for the creation of multiple interlocking networks of social 
relationships (Levitt, Schiller 2000). When it comes to forced migrants caught in transit 
between states (Gill, Caletrio, Mason 2011), these migrants do not all possess the 
necessary infrastructural and institutional resources to facilitate their movements. Under 
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the myriad of constraints and uncertainty surrounding them, these displaced people are 
forced into everyday labor mobility in the hope of remaking their lives. In this sense, 
mobility has a double meaning for them. It involves both forms of agency, but also 
reflects a lack of choice or autonomy. My dissertation contributes to theoretical 
conversations that see mobility as an expression of “power to” and agency. It describes 
the capacity of the displaced people to act with the purpose to change their lives. 
The third theoretical foundation is the informal economy. The informal sector 
remains the ultimate resource for these forced migrants to create opportunities and 
livelihoods. Their informal economic practices include selling goods (sometimes these 
include second-hand clothes retrieved from the garbage) at the local market, selling their 
labor, collecting pieces of tree branches to sell or with which to make charcoal, and 
performing domestic labor. In addition, the Service Jesuite aux Migrants (SJM) has 
provided some forced migrants, particularly women, with a microcredit loan in order for 
them to create their own small business. My perspective on microcredit loans is based on 
their impact on social economic processes beyond the immediate project environments, 
instead of on quantitative indicators (Fernando 2006). This allows an examination of how 
microcredit helps people improve themselves, but also of the role these loans play in 
people’s social transformative capacities (Fernando 2006). Informal activities undertaken 
by forced migrants, I suggest, allow them to build their self-reliance and reduce their 
dependency on NGOs—whose aims often deviate from those of local communities’ 
interests due to their need for accountability to their donors (Schuller 2010). Indeed, 
Schuller points out accountability as one of the problems of NGOs operating in Haiti. He 
contends that these NGOs show a strong commitment towards their donors while
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ignoring local communities, a process he terms “trickle-down imperialism.” I perceive 
the forced migrants reliance on informal economic practices in order to create survival 
strategies as modes of resilience that express agency and a sense of individual 
responsibility (Freeman 2014) in a country with limited resources, high unemployment, 
and political instability. My dissertation broadens our understanding of the informal 
economy not simply as a means of income generation, but also as a source of motivation 
that endows the displaced people with courage and endurance, expressed in a mentality 
animated by local expressions such as m’ap degaje m, or ti degaje (literally, “I am doing 
a little something”) that help them survive and keep going. This way of perceiving the 
informal economy as something more than just income contributes to the conception 
developed by economic anthropologists of economics as not simply about market or non- 
market institutions as in the debate opposing formalists and substantivists, but as 
something that also includes the dimension of human culture and the behavior of 
individuals (Cliggett and Wilk 2007). The engagement of these people in practices to 
improve their lives describes their desires and aspirations to be better, but also illustrates 
the gestation of a form of citizenship, which, in the absence of their legal citizenship, I 
conceptualize as substantive. 
Finally, the forced migrants created an organization to help them acquire visibility 
and make their voices heard. This organization, the Organization for the Defense of the 
Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres (ODRA), plays a significant role in substantive citizenship 
making by allowing the forced migrants to assert their human rights. Without legal 
citizenship, this substantive citizenship takes shape through their social dynamics in 
organizing themselves, the sense of belonging that they earn from their residency in 
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Anse-à-Pitres, and the recognition they receive from organizations that have negotiated 
with them. In this way, following Miller (2000), the stateless people contribute to shaping 
the direction of their communities in Anse-à-Pitres, which then displaces the role of the 
state as the sole guarantor of citizenship. From an anthropological perspective, they build 
substantive citizenship, which takes into account not only their collective actions, but also 
their personal experience in their communities, which the legal conception of citizenship 
does not account for (Greenhouse 2011: 262). My dissertation suggests an understanding 
of substantive citizenship as part of the forced migrants’ initiatives to enact changes in 
their lives in a community where they are marginalized, and as something that is 
differentiated due to the inequalities created by the organizations on the ground and the 
local state in their assistance to and relationship with the forced migrants. 
 
1.2 The research and the fieldsite 
 
I learned about Anse-à-Pitres, a small city located in the south-east of Haiti, 
during my years in primary school. At that time, I could hardly locate it on the map and 
did not know its significance as a southeastern border town conceived of as a potential 
site for tourist development. I later came to be aware of this place more profoundly 
through the social and political events that aggravated the relations between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic in 2015, and that led to the displacement of hundreds of Dominican- 
Haitians and undocumented Haitian migrants to the area. Anse-à-Pitres is located on the 
border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It has a surface area of 185.19 km
2
 
and a population of about 23,500, as of the 2005 census (Mairie de Anse-à-Pitres 2008)3. 
The downtown area is only 3 km
2
 and is inhabited by people who have travelled there 
3 This was the demographic data available at the City Hall during my research in 2016 
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from different parts of Haiti. Anse-à-Pitres attracts the interest of people from other 
regions of the country due to the access to the Dominican Replublic that it affords them, 
and because of the opportunity for the development of commercial activities along the 
border, particularly the commerce of second-hand clothes. Generally, after being bought 
in the Dominican Republic, the merchandise crosses the border in Anse-à-Pitres to be 
stored, sorted, and packed on trucks to be carried to other Haitian cities such as Jacmel 
and Port-au-Prince. Like Ouanaminthe, Belladère, and Fonds-Parisien, Anse-à-Pitres is 
one of the official crossing points, on land, to the Dominican Republic. It is separated 
from its Dominican sister city Pedernales by the Pedernales River, over which a small 
footbridge facilitates access to the binational market located on the Dominican side of the 
border. Because of the poor infrastructures that connect Anse-à-Pitres with other main 
Haitian cities such as Port-au-Prince—the capital of the country— Anse-à-Pitres remains 
isolated and rarely benefits from state investment. 
Anse-à-Pitres (Figure 2) is characteristic of remote Haitian areas where the state 
has only a marginal presence and provides few public services (Schwartz 2009). The city 
is about seven hours by bus from Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti. The bus (a Toyota 
Land Cruiser with its seats rearranged as a mini-bus) from Port-au-Prince takes 
passengers to Thiottes, the final destination, an area about two hours by motorcycle from 
Anse-à-Pitres. This means that, for my trip, after getting off the bus in Thiottes, I had to 
take a motorcycle to complete my trip to Anse-à-Pitres, where I arrived in the middle of 
the night in early September 2016. My travel to Anse-à-Pitres was endangered by the 
poor state of infrastructure in the area. The road is rocky, with cliffs on both sides all 
along the route. The bus was swinging and shaking passengers; in the absence of a 
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seatbelt I directed my head towards the roof to prevent the shaking movement from 
happening. Despite the turbulence, the other passengers were very quiet and were joking 
as though it was a normal routine for travel in the area. I tried to be relaxed and to keep 
my feet still on the floor, but deep down I was scared and remained attentive to each jolt 
of the bus. Travelling in these conditions is extremely risky and perilous. People from the 
area complain about the passivity of the state in building or even maintaining 
infrastructure; the safety of passengers is not a state priority. I lived in Anse-à-Pitres for 
about a year and a half; I had to take the risk of travelling on that road every time I had to 
run errands in Port-au-Prince. However, I was a bird of passage. For hundreds of people 
who live in the area, this risk is a part of their everyday life as they have to travel 
frequently for their basic needs. The damaged state of the infrastructure explains the 
marginalization of many regions of the country, including Anse-à-Pitres, which, all the 
same, remains a dynamic city. 
 • 
• 
.• .... 
• 
. 
 
 
,. :. FONDS-VERRET ..
•
 
.. 
.. 
.. 
•• 
.... 
,-· ......... 
..• • • • • • Savane Zombi 
 
,•' 
 
 
,.'
,
 
_,
,
 
• 
RD-112 ,. 
,.
 
Thiotte Mare Blanche 
..
 
. RD-4021 
' 
Corail  
2e 
Bois:.cl'Onne 
 
 
PEDERNALES 
THIOTTE
..
 D.R. 
 
 
 
-- . 
•
•
--• 
• , 
.. .. 
ANSE-A-PITRES .
,.
. 
.. 
 
• 
..
 
 
 
RD-112 
 ,. 
,.
 
 1ere Boucan Guillaume 
.. 
 
 
 
 
Carribean Sea 
 
 3km 
2 m i 
.• 
 
16  
[Figure 2 Anse-à-Pitres and surrounded areas]. 
 
 
Despite its isolation from the rest of the country, the city of Anse-à-Pitres enjoys a 
vibrant nightlife animated by disc jockeys playing music at nightclubs, hotels, and in 
open-air bars. The public includes mostly local residents but a few Dominicans also cross 
the border to join with the leisure activities, which are an occasion for people to meet and 
socialize while enjoying Haitian and Dominican songs of various rhythms such as konpa, 
meringue, bachata, and Creole rap songs. The musical diversity reflects the border culture 
and aims to attract an equally diverse audience; for example, younger people tend to be 
interested in rap songs and are open to foreign music such as the Dominican meringue 
and bachata. More importantly, though, this musical atmosphere is essential to the city’s 
economic life, as many people go out at night to sell their products such as alcoholic and 
natural drinks, sodas, and fritay4. This nightlife usually finishes around 1:00 or 2:00 AM, 
but it sometimes end with verbal and physical violence. Very often, while I was sleeping 
in the middle of the night, I heard people yelling, insulting each other copiously, and 
throwing stones. 
Anse-à-Pitres, as with other border towns, experiences a two-way flow of both 
goods and people; i.e., goods and people going to the Dominican Republic and goods and 
people coming back from the Dominican Republic. Cockfighting provides one example 
of this flow. The economic and social dynamics of the city of Anse-à-Pitres are reflected 
in the practice of cockfighting; Dominican gamblers cross the border every week to 
participate. This activity usually takes place twice a week and displays moments of 
 
4 Fritay is a special Haitian dish made of fried plantains, meat, and salad 
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passion for the participants. Engagement in this event can be understood through the lens 
of Geertz’s cultural and economic interpretation of cockfighting. Geertz (1973) showed 
that cockfighting is a social and cultural process, but also he showed that it was a source 
of public revenue in precolonial Balinese states. In fact, the participation of the two 
peoples—Haitian and Dominican—in this event is part of a cultural construction between 
them, but also symbolizes the conflicts that exist between them. For instance, Wucker 
(1999) described cockfighting as an important aspect of Dominicans and Haitians’ daily 
life on the island, Hispaniola. At the same time, he explained that this does not prevent 
the two peoples from sharing a history of violence and, like two roosters, they fight, 
disputing over border issues. Overall, cockfighting remains an economic activity for both 
the organizers and the Dominican and Haitian participants. Generally, the forced 
migrants do not participate in the city’s cultural activities; among other things they lack 
the economic resources needed to participate and are isolated from the downtown area of 
Anse-à-Pitres. 
1.2.1 The camps: structure and navigation of the place 
 
The majority of forced migrants arrived in Anse-à-Pitres in June 2015. They 
include old and young families with children, and singles (both men and women)— 
basically, everyone, because no-one was spared when they were forced out of the 
Dominican Republic. Based on my conversations with the forced migrants, very few had 
existing contacts with people in Anse-à-Pitres. This made it difficult for many to find a 
place to stay after they were forced to cross the border to Haiti or were deported by 
Dominican authorities at the official gate, a journey that was far from pleasant in its own 
right. The camps (Figure 3) remained the only viable option for them upon their arrival 
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in Anse-à-Pitres, and the forced migrants have spread through different camps on the 
border: Tête-à-l’Eau, Fonds-Jeannette, Parc Cadeau #1, Parc Cadeau 32, Maletchipe, and 
Tête Source. 
 
 
[Figure 3 A typical configuration of the camps with no infrastucture.] 
19  
The camps are linked to downtown Anse-à-Pitres by a dusty and stony road 
frequented mostly by motorcycles. Some residents were able to access the border market, 
but they were still isolated from the larger Anse-à-Pitres community.  Like the whole 
city, the residents of the camps have no electricity. A Puerto-Rican group called AMAR 
gave those forced migrants living in Parc Cadeau #1 a generator after an activity in the 
camp. However, only a very few people had a light bulb in their small houses, which 
were made only of straw and cardboard. This same camp also held an open-air school for 
children, although the school operated poorly because of the lack of both funding and 
material support. Water is the only resource to which people have access because they 
can get it from a relatively nearby source in the Pedernales River. As one woman 
explained, “The water source is not far. This is where people get drinkable water. The 
river is close and it is where they go to do laundry.” It only remains for them to filter the 
water by adding water purification tablets called aquatabs; however, some people do not 
always purify the water because they do not have aquatabs. Aid organizations used to 
give the forced migrants the ingredients to purify the water upon their arrival, but now the 
forced migrants must get the aquatabs themselves. Apart from water, the camps are 
completely destitute. Even though some organizations have placed prefabricated toilets in 
the camps, these toilets are insufficient. Josemar, a man in his thirties from the camp of 
Parc Cadeau #1, said: “The toilets are almost full. So we need new ones in the camp.” 
While touring the camp with Josemar for the first time, I observed into a large, open-air 
hole in the middle of the camp that constitutes a danger for children playing nearby. 
Josemar told me that the hole was dug by an organization in order to build a toilet for 
residents, but the members of the organization never came back to finish it. 
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This case exemplifies how organizations progressively withdrew from helping the 
forced migrants, who were ultimately left on their own. The forced migrants would 
mention the names of some of the organizations that used to assist them, such as Groupe 
d’Appui aux Réfugiés et aux Rapatriés (GARR), Heart to Heart, or even the United 
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). However, during my research, all these 
organizations almost disappeared. This withdrawal may be because NGOs and agencies 
do not often have defined goals beyond their immediate projects. The absence of any 
good infrastructure at the camps is a reflection of a group of displaced people who are 
marginalized and the withdrawal of the state from ensuring the well-being of its people. 
The consequences of this state abandonment are noteworthy, as forced migrants 
are vulnerable to exploitation and there are attempts to profit from their precarity. That is 
why many forced migrants seem to be reluctant to give their names to outsiders. For 
instance, during a visit to Parc Cadeau #2, I was surrounded by a small group of people 
who were curious about what I was doing at the camp. Having an outsider such as myself 
among them creates both hope and disappointment; because of the lack of support from 
the state and their marginalization, the forced migrants hope that my presence means that 
someone (or even an organization) may be interested in them, but they also experience 
disappointment because they are mistrustful towards those who pretend to help them. 
This was evidenced in one man’s words: “It was only GARR that helped us. Some people 
came, took our names, and made money out of migrants. For example, a director is being 
paid for the schooling of our children but our children are not even accepted at his school. 
Even though people are taking our names, we are hesitant because we were too often a 
victim. There are always things coming for us but we don’t get them. People are being 
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paid in our name but we don’t get anything.” This discomfort towards outsiders is not 
unique to forced migrants. Trust is often, if not always, a concern for displaced people in 
all parts of the world, as they are subject to manipulation and exploitation from others. As 
Knudsen and Valentine (1995) argue, “In the life of a refugee, trust is overwhelmed by 
mistrust, besieged by suspicion, and relentlessly undermined by caprice.” This may help 
explain forced migrants’ paranoiac attitude towards outsiders. 
1.2.2 Methodological approach 
 
My ethnography of these displaced persons involved fourteen months of 
participant observation, one-on-one interviews, informal conversations, and focus groups. 
These displaced people include undocumented Haitian migrants and Dominicans of 
Haitian descent. They are a diverse population of both genders and all ages since no one 
was spared from being forced from the Dominican Republic. These people have one 
thing in common: they were materially dispossessed after having been forcibly removed 
from their homes in the Dominican Republic, leaving behind all their belongings behind. 
Between January and March 2016, about one year after the displaced persons occupied 
the camps, the intervention of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) led to 
the relocation of more than 200 migrants in the town of Anse-à-Pitres only, but far from 
stabilizing their lives, this relocation only seems to create more precarity and uncertainty 
about their future. In an environment where the migrants lack almost all basic resources 
and do not have control over their own destiny, forced migrants are simply “existing not 
living” (Koch 2015). 
Everyone in the displaced population is subject to this uncertain and insecure 
 
situation. They all have to go through this painful experience. For instance, Fredo, a 
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young Haitian-Dominican man, was forced out of his own country of birth to enter 
Haiti—a new country where he did not know anybody—after his father died and he was 
forced to separate from his mother, who stayed in the Dominican Republic. He is having 
a nightmarish life in Anse-à-Pitres where he is suffering hunger, an ever-present situation 
that cannot be easily escaped from in his mind. His trembling voice expressed his reality, 
“We are eating the dust. There is no work. I bought a cup of salt and I suck a grain every 
morning. That is life here. You don’t have any help here.” As Fredo’s words suggest, he 
is not alone in this experience; most were experiencing tremendous challenges in meeting 
their basic survival needs and finding ways to make a living in the camps. The population 
of Anse-à-Pitres suffers from poverty, a lack of opportunities for young people, who do 
not have any institution of higher education to pursue their studies after secondary 
schools, a documentation crisis that sees many people effectively stateless, and women 
who are subject to domestic violence. For the most part, the forced migrants are unable to 
acquire wage work in the formal economy because of the lack of documentation and 
formal jobs in Anse-à-Pitres. As a result, the forced migrants had to develop informal 
economic activities and continued to go back to the Dominican Republic to do odd jobs. 
I conceive of my ethnographic fieldwork with these displaced persons as a 
descent into the ordinary (Fassin 2013), one that embraces the precarious reality of these 
people’s everyday lives in Anse-à-Pitres. I was both an insider and an outsider, a 
positionality which is not fixed, but processual as every anthropologist exhibits a 
"multiplex subjectivity" with many shifting identifications (Rosaldo 1989; Narayan 
1993). On the one hand, I am a native Haitian; I grew up in a poor family, and have faced 
considerable obstacles in getting an education, securing livelihoods, and seeking out a 
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better life for myself. In this sense, I was able to relate my family experience to the kinds 
of everyday challenges the group of displaced people were facing, as well as the daunting 
experience of settling into and adapting to new environments. On the other hand, as 
someone who has attended foreign universities and lived abroad in both France and the 
U.S., my cartography of the daily reality of Anse-à-Pitres was distinct from the one that 
might be drawn by the forced migrants, who are experiencing various kinds of social and 
economic challenges such as critical poverty, statelessness, and displacement (Monroe 
2016). Establishing myself in the city of Anse-à-Pitres was a challenge as people were 
already disappointed by outsiders, who sometimes sought to exploit their suffering. I 
relied on the connections I had developed with the SJM (Service Jésuite aux Migrants) 
before going to Anse-à-Pitres. 
SJM is a lay organization that works to protect the rights of undocumented 
migrants. The SJM staff in Anse-à-Pitres is composed of Haitians, including two 
promoters and many monitors, depending on the project in progress. They are all from 
the Anse-à-Pitres region except Inès, who was from another city also located in the south- 
east department of Haiti. I collaborated with the organization with which I had 
volunteered during the whole period of my research fieldwork. This relationship allowed 
me to engage with the forced migrants through participation in community-based and 
outreach activities, where I led discussion and spoke on behalf of the forced migrants. 
Knowing that I was seeking to make their voices heard led people to accept me and view 
me as a member of their community. People were very happy to talk about their 
experiences and hoped that their conversations would be brought to the attention of the 
international community. For example, when I went to participate in the meetings of 
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ODRA (Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres—a migrants’ 
organization), the president would invite me to talk so that I could inform them of SJM 
projects. People would applaud me and come to talk to me after the meeting, asking me 
to visit their homes. When I visited them at their homes people opened their doors to me, 
gave my assistant and me a chair to sit and talk to them, and offered me their food. I felt 
people’s appreciation, but they also tried to remind me of my indebtedness to them such 
as when a woman told me: “you forgot us. Longtime ago, you said you were coming but 
you never came. We are hungry.” The legitimacy that I gained from them was reinforced 
by the talks I gave about documentation and women’s and children’s rights at a series of 
events organized by the SJM in Anse-à-Pitres. 
During my fieldwork, I participated in different activities and gave talks where I 
informed people about the importance of documentation and some of the fundamental 
rights to which women and children are entitled. I argued for the integration of women 
into society and gave them advice about how they could be engaged in both the 
development of their community and their own personal development. These activities, 
organized by the SJM, brought together people from the entire population in Anse-à- 
Pitres: long-term residents, local state authorities, and the forced migrants. I found this 
collaboration with the SJM productive, as it gave me a profound insight into people’s 
lives. Many people have reacted and made comments about the reality of life in the 
community. 
In addition to my involvement with the SJM, I developed individual strategies to 
make myself accepted by people and gain access to them. In the field, I adopted a simple 
way of life that reduced visible differences in status between myself and the displaced 
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people. I developed a close relationship with people by visiting them, comforting them 
when they were sick, sharing with them, and having informal conversations with them on 
various topics including the news and common life stories. This provided me with some 
legitimacy in their community and also, as Malkki (1995) suggests, led me both to 
understand and experience what displacement and statelessness mean in their lives, 
instead of simply making them the object of my study. This was fundamental in 
conveying to me the meaning of doing ethnography in that it encouraged me to build 
relationships with my research population, interacting positively with their lives by 
placing myself in their conversations (Kingsolver 2011), listening to them, and opening 
space for them instead of imposing my own categorization upon them (Rosaldo 1993). 
The establishment of these kinds of connections between ethnographers and the research 
population is always beneficial in providing valuable insights. For example, in her 
fieldwork with Palestinian refugees in the Shatila camp, Allan (2014) lived among her 
research population for a long time in order to develop close relationships and build trust 
with them.  This cohabitation with the people helped her understand the living 
experience, values, and daily predicaments of the community. Similarly, in Anse-à-Pitres, 
I lived near the camps and with the guide of a local assistant that I hired upon my arrival, 
I performed daily visits to forced migrant’s homes, which enabled me to observe and 
participate in their activities. 
In addition, as a native anthropologist, I was able to develop a unique perspective 
that allowed me to develop cultural intuition that I conceive of as the automaticity and 
instincts I have acquired about the displaced people’s cultural values and knowledge 
through immersion and constant interaction with them. This intuition helped me grasp the 
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meaning of their cultural expressions, saying, and riddles, and also find the truth behind 
common stereotypes by sharing and experiencing the stories of their lives that were being 
told in the news. 
My ability to speak their languages, Creole and Spanish, was also helpful in order 
to connect with people more easily and quickly. Creole was the most common tool of 
communication for my interviews and other interactions with the forced migrants. Their 
mastery of Creole surprised me because many were born in the Dominican Republic. For 
instance, I met with Chana at the camp of Parc Cadeau #1. She was born in Aguas 
Negras, Dominican Republic and had spent her whole life there. However, she said: “I 
don’t speak Spanish, but sometimes when the Panyol (Dominicans) speak, I understand. 
Sometimes I can answer. Sometimes I can’t.” As this reveals, Chana speaks only basic— 
or what I would consider to be functional—Spanish. Their inability to speak Spanish 
resides in the fact that the displaced people were living far away from Dominican urban 
centers and proximous to Haitian fellows where Creole could still remain the primary 
language. While some do speak Spanish fluently, they also still speak Creole. 
Finally, while sharing their values has provided me with a kind of cultural facility and 
proficiency into their community, I consider my interpretation of their lives and their 
narratives two aspects of the same history (Lyon 2011; Wolf 1982). 
1.2.3 Participant Observation, Interviews, and Focus Groups 
 
I undertook participation observation at several sites. I participated in activities 
organized by the SJM in which I was an important actor and in ODRA meetings (the 
Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres) where I often 
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intervened, giving advice to members in their fight to make their voices heard. Also, I 
performed daily and weekly visits to migrants’ homes in downtown Anse-à-Pitres and at 
the camps. In addition, I went frequently to the border market on Fridays where I learned 
about the transactions, interactions, exchanges, and practices that enfold their daily lives 
in the area and above all connect them with the Dominican Republic. I observed and felt 
the feverish atmosphere of the market through the movement of people—loading and 
unloading goods for merchants, arguing, bargaining and purchasing a variety of local 
goods such as rice, plantains, vegetables, meat, and seafood. I witnessed motorcycle 
riders transporting people and goods, making weird noises by sounding their horns. 
During my observations, I was also able to have informal conversations with people and 
schedule appointments for semi-structured interviews with them. 
My interviewees were from different categories of adult people ages eighteen and 
above and included long-term residents in Anse-à-Pitres, representatives of the city hall, 
and forced migrants from distinct places: Anse-à-Pitres downtown, Parc Cadeau #1, Parc 
Cadeau #2, Fond-Jeannette, Tête Source, and Tête-à-l’Eau. In total, I conducted one 
hundred two (102) semi-structured interviews of which forty eight (48) were with 
females and fifty four (54) were with males, all between the ages of eighteen and seventy. 
I had the help of my local assistant, who is from Anse-à-Pitres and who already had 
experience working with the forced migrants. People generally volunteered to be 
interviewed and were not happy if they were not included. This made it both easy and 
difficult for me. On the one hand, in a context where people hardly trust outsiders, I was 
lucky they were available to me. On the other hand, some people may have felt excluded 
because I did not interview them. 
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I encountered a similar situation with the focus groups. I organized six focus 
groups (Figure 4), one in each of the places I mentioned above, but also with another 
group of people of forced migrants who received financial microcredit from the SJM. I 
tried to limit the number in each focus group to fifteen people. However, more people 
came and the final number often increased to as many as twenty-five. The focus groups 
took place in the open air, in schools, churches, and at the SJM office (for people living 
in downtown). The questions were general and included asking about their experiences 
and how they see themselves in Anse-à-Pitres. The focus groups provided the participants 
with the opportunity to talk freely about their experiences, from learning about the 
Dominican state’s decision to remove them from the country to their current way of life 
in Anse-à-Pitres. I avoided asking them specific questions related to their feelings about 
their forced displacement so that I did not traumatize or offend them. 
 
 
[Figure 4 Focus group in Parc Cadeau #2]. 
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1.3 Livelihood, agency 
Despite the multiple stresses and forms of hardship—vulnerability, limited 
financial opportunities (Koch 2015), and visible and invisible post-traumatic stress 
(Vincanne et al. 2009)—that members of displaced populations endure, my own 
conceptual standpoint in my research is one that argues against construing these forced 
migrants as hopeless. Forced migrants work hard to make a living in Anse-à-Pitres. They 
undertake informal economic activities in order to develop coping and survival strategies. 
These activities include gathering and selling wood, selling second-hand clothes, and 
starting small businesses. Through such activities, members of this displaced population 
generate sources of income, however meager they are, to help them sustain their lives in 
Anse-à-Pitres. For instance, Lidor went to the Dominican Republic in 1980 and was 
displaced in Anse-à-Pitres in 2015. Even though he was experiencing hardship, Lidor did 
not want to be dependent on humanitarian aid. He said: “I don’t get any job from 
organizations or the state. I use my ten fingers to work. If I find wood, I make charcoal. I 
see people in line fighting for food. I wouldn’t do that. If they give me, I say thank you.” 
Like many people Lidor, tries to be self-reliant. The informal economy appears to be the 
best alternative for forced migrants to develop this self-reliance and resilience. Their 
personal practices and modes of participation in the informal economy are prevalent 
throughout the poorer countries in the Caribbean. Browne (2004) refers to these informal 
practices as ‘Creole economics’; they offer possibilities for the building of autonomy in 
the face of people’s inability to work in the formal economy. 
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Even though forced migrants are largely fighting alone to create livelihoods, some 
of them obtained a small loan from the SJM to run a small business through a micro- 
credit program. Their small businesses were sometimes worth less than $20 USD. For 
instance, when I visited the camps, I saw some people hang a bag in front of their tent; 
the bag contained some products such as candies, detergent, and soaps, and this was their 
business. The strategies used by the forced migrants in order to create livelihoods 
demonstrate that they are fighters and believe in change and improvement. Their attitude 
is similar to that of other refugees and displaced people in the world. For example, Indra 
(2000), in her study of forced migrants in rural Bangladesh, explains how the poor 
develop innovative strategies such as selling goods from their houses and growing 
vegetables on patches of land in order to survive in a context of severe economic, social 
and political disenfranchisement. Similarly, Stepick (1990) demonstrates how Haitian 
refugees who arrived in South Florida during the 1970s and 1980s developed a richly 
varied range of adaptations in the informal sector in order to survive. Through economic 
activities such as dressmaking and tailoring, petty commerce, food preparation, childcare, 
transportation, and the like, these refugees managed to make ends meet. Even though the 
income generated from these activities was meager and, in fact placed them very close to 
the US poverty line, Stepick (1990) describes how they constituted a mode of livelihood 
and a mechanism by which these new migrants avoided seeking welfare assistance. This 
is a way for these people to prove that they are not just displaced, but people with ideals 
working hard to make do in order to maintain themselves (Senior 1991). The strategies 
employed by the displaced people in order not to succumb to the poverty that plagues 
their environment are supported by the sense they make of their lives and their culture. 
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Their courage to survive and fight is embedded in local cultural values, which describe 
the agentive mentality of these people. They are animated by a philosophy of life that 
pushes them to act with tactics that exceed the boundaries of the legal and the formal. 
Going to the Dominican Republic illegally is seriously discouraged by Dominicans, who 
are taking drastic measures to stop the illegal crossing of migrants. Forced migrants know 
the risks, but they consider that their actions are motivated by a good cause. This 
mentality is expressed by a common expression in Haitian larger society degaje pa peche, 
which basically means: “working off the books is not a sin,” and which approximately 
implies a Machiavellian method of “the end justifies the means.” Thus, we need to 
question the aim of these people’s projects before calling into question their strategies. In 
this sense, degaje pa peche aims to show that using the informal sector to make a living 
or illegally crossing the border—the unique strategies available to them—to create 
livelihoods is a good cause that eclipses the forbidden, the formal, and the legal. 
Although the informal economy is generally understood as the result of practices that 
take place outside formal institutions and that escape state control, they consider this 
infringement of legality and formalities a way to take back from the Dominican Republic 
what they have built through their labor. The meaning of the expression degaje pa peche 
approaches the concept of debrouillardism as described by Browne (2004) to show how 
the informal practices of these people to create ways of life are tinged with savvy and 
smartness. Their strategies resonate with the practices of the slave underground 
economies that included working their own gardens and trading articles sometimes taken 
from the plantations in order to meet families’ needs. The historian Forret (2004) has 
demonstrated that slaves were involved in the underground economy by developing 
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unlawful trades with poor whites in the antebellum Carolinas. According to Forret, the 
slaves traded products that included poultry, corn, and pigs while they sought 
commodities such as liquor, shoes, blankets, and rugs from poor whites. In a colonial 
system that oppressed people from every aspect of their human lives, slaves were 
required to develop such survival strategies in order to reduce their dependency on 
miserly food rationing provided by colonizers. For instance, slaves were able to survive 
by taking advantage of the small amount of time they were given to garden and undertake 
food collecting activities and marketing (Handler and Wallman 2014: 448). For the 
forced migrants, most of their informal economic practices take place beyond the border. 
 
1.4 Labor mobility or the unsettled experience of life 
 
The daily labor mobility of the forced migrants is reflected in Manolo’s unsettled 
life. Manolo had already lived at the camp of Tête Source for two years when I met him 
in 2016. His life means closing his eyes in Haiti with the sunset and opening them in the 
Dominican Republic before sunrise. He said, “It is in the Dominican Republic I am 
living. I almost know nothing about Haiti. Every morning I get up at 6 a.m. and 
sometimes as early as 3 a.m. to go to put in a day of work in the Dominican Republic.” 
Tête Source, a peripheral area of the city of Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, is so close to 
Pedernales, Dominican Republic that it is difficult to separate the two cities. During my 
first visit to Tête Source, people were pointing to a small tree that was supposed to serve 
as the Dominican-Haitian border, which means that Pedernales is visible through 
Manolo’s window. Pedernales is a region with a green landscape, in contrast with a great 
part of Anse-à-Pitres that seems to be a desert because the biggest trees have been cut 
down for charcoal and commercial logging. Pedernales serves as the breadbasket for 
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many forced migrants who return to the Dominican Republic to sell their labor. In 
Pedernales, most work as sharecroppers or daily laborers on the agricultural fields located 
in the mountainous regions. 
As suggested by Manolo, the Dominican Republic is fundamental in the creation 
of livelihoods for the forced migrants, who contend that for every basic thing, they have 
to go to the Dominican Republic. For many of them, it is the only place they can go in 
order to scavenge for their daily bread. Even with the reinforcement of border security by 
the Dominican state, they continue to increase their trips between the two countries. Their 
dynamics, as expressed through their everyday labor mobility, demonstrate that they 
exercise agency and forms of power. This form of power resides in the capacity of the 
displaced persons to pursue purposeful goals in their lives. I refer to this power as “power 
to” (Miller and Tilley 1984), which emphasizes the ability of these people to control their 
destiny through the actions they are taking to improve their lives. My dissertation favors 
this side of power, which conditions people’s agency, over a conceptualization of power, 
as something associated with domination or control (power over) and conceived of as a 
form of power geometry that defines mobility as set up differently for diverse citizens 
(Gogia 2006 citing Massey 1994). In this sense, in my work, I am unconcerned with the 
kind of unequal relationship people have with power, but I am concerned with what 
makes people agentive and able to take actions. My approach to mobility is defined 
within this perspective of “power to” showing that labor mobility is fundamental to 
forced migrants’ creation of livelihoods, but at the same time imposed upon them because 
everyday border crossings are undertaken under the constant threats imposed by border 
securitization. In this sense, I argue that labor mobility is both an exercise of agency and 
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constraint. Among the displaced population, both men and women attest to this ability 
through drawing upon mobility to challenge marginalization, precarity, and insecurity in 
their lives. 
Among other things, the engagement of women in labor mobility challenges 
cultural constructions of them as dependent on their husbands. Indeed, women are 
generally construed as followers of their migrant husbands or as people who stay behind 
to take care of children. This cultural construction of gender roles in labor mobility tends 
not to hold, as women are increasingly as equal agents of mobility as men. For instance, 
in Latin America, Collins (1995) showed how Mexican women migrated to other parts of 
Latin America, such as Brazil and Chile in order to do agricultural work. In order to 
respond to the constraints of home responsibility, those women were engaged in labor 
mobility in the same way as men. Similarly Sanchez (2013) highlighted how a few 
“single” women, considered heads of households, became sharecroppers in a male- 
dominated system in order to supply the needed labor in Californian strawberry farms. 
This active participation of women in labor migration changes the construction of a 
patriarchal society that considers women dependent on men. To be sure, in the case of 
forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres, there exists a kind of male dominance in labor mobility 
because men tend to move more than women to go to work in the agricultural fields in 
the Dominican Republic. However, some women brave the risks and go out on their own. 
They cross the border on a daily basis to go to work in the Dominican Republic. Even 
though a very few women may accompany their husbands to the agricultural field in the 
Dominican Republic to prepare food for them, the majority go to sell their labor. The 
majority of those migrant women go to carry out domestic work at Dominicans’ homes 
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and to sell as mobile merchants in the streets and at the binational market. The 
significance of these women as agents of labor mobility in their own rights changes 
gender perspectives in a labor mobility generally considered men’s prevalence. The 
involvement of these women in labor mobility increases their agency and empowers 
them. For those left behind, their lives are equally shaped by everyday labor mobility 
because many are dependent on the bread coming from the men’s border crossings. They 
experience the same fear and stress as their husbands who have to face soldiers to go to 
work. 
 
1.5 Building citizenship 
The removal of citizenship of Dominican-Haitians was fundamental to the 
displacement of thousands of people to Haiti. The decision of the Dominican state to 
adopt a constitutional amendment that stripped thousands of people of Haitian 
backgrounds of their citizenship has gravely affected these people, who were forced to 
leave the Dominican Republic. In addition to their state of precarity, many displaced 
persons who are Dominicans of Haitian origin have also found themselves stateless in 
Anse-à-Pitres. Their statelessness or the lack of a nationality seems to have also been 
confirmed by Prime Minister Evans Paul of Haiti when he proclaimed on June 25, 2015, 
“it is about migrants [these people are migrants], mostly Dominicans. They are, for the 
most part, children born in the Dominican Republic and have no identification (Louis 
2015).” Legally, he meant, they are not citizens of Haiti. The inattention of the local state 
toward the displaced is a reflection of the central Haitian state, which rejects these 
people. However, this rejection seems to be more an effect of the incapacity of the state 
to support these people based on the political economic factors I have described above, 
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rather than to be a deliberate choice. In the absence of legal citizenship, I argue that these 
people build a limited form of citizenship through everyday social, cultural, and 
economic activities (Danahay and Brettell 2008). I conceive of the kind of citizenship 
that they create as substantive citizenship and it goes beyond the legal scope of 
citizenship. It is both an individual and collective making process, which is determined 
by the forced migrants’ personal engagement in improving their lives and organizing 
themselves to make their voices heard. These sorts of engagement help the displaced 
people who lost their citizenship to participate in society and construct some form of 
social life in the face of marginalization and exclusion. All displaced people in Anse-à- 
Pitres demonstrated this dynamic as someone valuable, capable of contributing to society 
like all legal citizens. 
In anthropological literature, citizenship is understood as not simply a set of rights 
and duties but as a set of practices or experiences. Anthropologists seek to displace the 
state as the sole reference in the definition of citizenship (Caglar 2004: 284) emphasizing 
the significance of individuals’ personal experience, something that the legal conception 
of citizenship does not account for (Greenhouse 2011: 262). These practices and 
experiences include how people live in their community, how they are engaged in 
personal and collective enterprises, overall, what they actually do in their daily lives 
(Lazar 2013). Therefore, marginalized people create substantive citizenship as an 
outcome of their exclusion from political and legal citizenship by claiming belonging to 
their place of residence (Vora 2013), acquiring social and civil rights (Lazar 2013). 
Forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres create substantive citizenship in ways that are different 
from many other people in the world. For example, they are different from the wealthy 
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members of the Chinese diaspora that Ong (1999) describes in her book, Flexible 
Citizenship, who can instrumentalize citizenship through flexibility and transnational 
mobility due to their economic capital and who seem to constitute a kind of stateless 
economic power (Tölölyan 1996). Forced migrants also differ from members of the 
Indian diaspora in Dubai who can work in the formal economy even if it is in the form of 
“modern-day slavery” (Vora 2013). Forced migrants, who are caught within the 
boundaries of a very poor country where they are both unrecognized and unauthorized 
(Sassen 2002) and also excluded from the formal economy, create substantive citizenship 
that can be defined in several ways. 
First, their substantive citizenship is expressed in the ways forced migrants trigger 
a set of collective actions that highlight their presence in Anse-à-Pitres. They created 
their own organization called the Organization for the Defense of the Repatriates of 
Anse-à-Pitres (ODRA). Not only does the organization define and re-define their goals as 
people who know what they want, but it also gives them visibility in the community of 
Anse-à-Pitres. 
Second, their substantive citizenship is asserted by local and international 
organizations from which they enjoy some recognition and which sit and negotiate with 
them. For instance, the IOM supported these dispossessed people during a short period 
after their displacement, providing some with the financial assistance needed to relocate 
from the camps and promising to give them money for their survival (even though the 
IOM completely withdrew from helping them while I was on the ground). The SJM also 
provided support to the displaced people, advocating for their rights. The organization 
implemented a documentation program called PwoKontram to provide stateless people 
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with a birth certificate. This effort constitutes an important step toward building legal 
citizenship for some of these people. 
Finally, substantive citizenship is also an individual making process for the 
displaced people and refers to the daily actions they undertake in the course of their lives. 
For instance, while living in Anse-à-Pitres, forced migrants continued to move to the 
Dominican Republic for multiple purposes. Some people considered themselves as still 
belonging to Dominican society even after having been in Haiti for more than one year. 
Therefore, this dual belonging, reflected in the economic opportunities that the 
Dominican Republic represents to them and the residence that Haiti grants to them, 
expresses a way that these people forge citizenship that encompasses the two different 
countries, which I conceive of as transnational substantive citizenship. This transnational 
substantive citizenship can be illustrated through Manolo’s involvement in everyday 
labor mobility. While his practices are considered a survival strategy, they show that his 
life is a construction of the in-between and that both countries play a role in defining his 
citizenship. 
 
1.6 The structure of the dissertation 
The second chapter provides a historical background of the border, particularly its 
role in connecting and disconnecting Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This 
controversial role can be explained by the relationships between the two countries that 
attest to strong economic bonds, but at the same time are fraught with violence. I also 
show how the border is both secured and porous. On one hand, the Dominican Republic 
has established its military presence and checkpoints on the border. The constellation of 
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soldiers deployed strategically to control the official crossing points places the border 
under constant surveillance. These soldiers often manipulate the border to their 
advantage, making it a site of illegality and illicit transactions, and the imposition of 
illegal taxes. I conceive this misuse of power as “border power” to describe how power is 
made into an instrument that serves illegal causes. On the other hand, the forced migrants 
find ways to circumvent soldiers and cross the border on a daily basis, making the 
Dominican Republic their backyard. This porosity is attested to by the dozens of long- 
term residents and forced migrants who claim that they go to shop and work in the 
Dominican Republic every day, without legal documents. Forced migrants rely on the 
communication networks they develop with their neighbors and a nuanced understanding 
of time and space that allows them to find the right moment to cross the border and locate 
resources in the Dominican Republic. These strategies are the product of creativity and 
smartness and have increased their agency. 
The third chapter examines how the displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres continue to 
live in continuous marginalization, as many contended that they did not have legal 
documents. They are the victims of the incapacity of the state to integrate its members 
into society. During an informational session on documentation organized by the SJM, 
the registrar in Anse-à-Pitres deplored the bad working conditions at the civil registry. He 
maintained that the state did not provide the required documents so that the clerks could 
fulfill their duties. As a result, they could not respond to people’s needs for multiple birth 
certificates. It should be noted that all the social categories of the population in Anse-à- 
Pitres are victims of the malfunction of the registry. The civil status—which is the state 
institution in charge of delivering identity documents to people—is deficient and operates 
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just like the state, which is inefficient and absent. The inefficiency of the state is 
illustrated, for example, by the delivery of invalid birth certificates to people. This creates 
an exciting window for racketeers, who extort people who want to have legal documents. 
The absence of the state appears in its incapacity to document people, leaving a vacuum 
to be filled by organizations. For instance, the Service Jésuite aux Migrants (SJM) leaped 
to the rescue of the civil registry in Anse-à-Pitres by implementing a program of 
documentation called PwoKontram that aimed to provide a limited number of forced 
migrants and their children with a birth certificate. The program helps some stateless 
people re-establish their identity and assign them Haitian nationality. However, SJM 
cannot replace the state, which excludes and marginalizes its own people, handicapping 
them so far as their full participation in society is concerned in comparison to other legal 
citizens. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the role of forced migrants as agents of their own 
survival and self-development in the absence of state support and the limited help 
provided by organizations working on the ground. The displaced people exercise 
important forms of agency by undertaking informal economic practices such as selling 
their labor, gathering wood to sell, doing domestic work, and turning themselves into 
mobile merchants that allow them to generate a little income. These informal economic 
activities are intertwined with colonial history and are embedded in larger Haitian 
cultural context in the way it shapes their economic behavior. In particular, when 
comparing the motivation of the forced migrants in undertaking their informal economic 
activities, there are some similarities between their practices and the slave-based 
economies. The displaced people and enslaved people’s informal economic practices 
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show how these groups of people exercise forms of agency in and over their lives, but 
this economic enterprise does not free them from a world of economic and social 
inequalities. Furthermore, the combativeness of the forced migrants is stimulated by 
Haitian culture through a mentality of debrouillardism and moral values such as degaje 
pa peche anchored in a philosophy of life that motivates them to take actions when it 
comes to creating livelihoods. 
The fifth chapter argues that despite statelessness, illegality, and infrastructural 
and institutional constraints, forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres exercise power over their 
lives by relying on everyday labor mobility as a resource. Despite the risks of 
imprisonment and death that border crossings entail, forced migrants go to Pedernales on 
a daily basis to sell their labor in the Dominican Republic. These labor mobilities 
undertaken by both men and women are an attempt to create livelihoods. They are 
constitutive of power in that they show the capacity of the forced migrants to act in the 
world with the aim of building and rebuilding their lives. Drawing on Miller and Tilley 
(1984), I refer to this form of power as “power to” to distinguish forced migrants’ 
exercise of power drawn upon everyday mobility from power associated with domination 
and coercion. 
Finally, in the last chapter, I argue that the stateless people create a kind of 
substantive citizenship that fills in the gap left by the absence of legal citizenship and that 
allows them to participate in community activities and exercise forms of agency in a 
context where they are highly constrained to act legally, politically and economically. 
There are several ways they try to build this form of substantive citizenship that 
emphasize belonging and community involvement, and that go beyond the legal category 
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and bureaucratic considerations. These are: 1) creating their own local organization 
(ODRA), 2) participating in local meetings with the city hall 3) participating in 
organizations on the ground, and 4) resisting systems of power such as when they 
opposed a program of relocation by the SJM. Because their practices take place in both 
Haiti, where they seek to re-settle, and the Dominican Republic where they go on a daily 
basis for labor purpose, their lives remain a continuum between these two countries, so 
they are transnational substantive citizens. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE BORDER AS A SITE OF SOCIAL MEANING AND AGENCY 
 
I was in Tête-Source to meet with some forced migrants. Tête-Source is one of 
the most remote localities of Anse-à-Pitres and sits 10 to 20 meters from the Dominican- 
Haitian border. During his interview with me, François, a resident of the area, explained, 
I am from Tête Source. I came here three years ago. I have my sister in 
Saint Domingue. I go to the Dominican Republic. It is not far. I cross the line 
around Altagracia. I always enter those areas to look for casual work. I go to put 
in a day of work in the Dominican Republic regularly even though they 
(Dominican soldiers) are mistreating and humiliating us. 
François’ involvement in border crossings is typical for many labor migrants around the 
world who take advantage of the porosity of borders to look for job opportunities. What 
is specific about François and almost all forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres who go to the 
Dominican Republic, and which is not obvious to everyone in François’ statement, is that 
border crossing is not only about fearing Dominican soldiers (who have the monopoly of 
the legitimate means of violence, and who also are the incarnation of a kind of “border 
power” that works to perpetuate the Dominican state ideology) but also about fearing 
Dominican civilians, who participate in policing the movement of Haitian migrants 
across the border. The ability of these forced migrants to persist in crossing the border— 
despite all the forces that threaten, frighten, and kill—to make border crossing into a way 
of life is an expression of agency and power. Following Dobres and Robb (2000), I 
understand agency as the carrying out of actions by the forced migrants to accomplish 
intentional goals in their lives. This agency attests to their credible power to make 
decisions on their own. 
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In this chapter, I examine how the Dominican-Haitian border (Figure 5) serves as 
both a bridge and a barrier (Ortiz-Gonzalez 2004) for displaced people in Anse-à- Pitres, 
Haiti, who engage in everyday border crossing practices as a survival strategy. The 
border holds multiple functions in the relationships between the two peoples, especially 
socially and economically. The border area is host to a vibrant formal and informal 
economy upon which residents of border cities rely. From 1993 to 2002, for example, 
border trade accounted for a reduction in poverty on a scale of 12 to 18 percent in border 
cities where free open markets take place (Coupeau, 2008). While the border plays a 
central role in the maintenance of socio-economic relations between Haitian and 
Dominican people, at the same it constitutes a barrier between them. The Dominican 
state, in particular, has taken steps towards securing the border in order to control the flux 
of Haitian migrants. I argue that the enforcement of border security by the Dominican 
state to control waves of migrants transgressing the territory produces “illegal migrants” 
(Fassim 2011), but, at the same time and paradoxically, this makes the border a space in 
which agency and power are exercised by these “illegal people.” This agency and power 
are expressed by forced migrants’ development of various strategies, including relying on 
communication networks, time, and space, that allow them to circumvent border officials, 
reduce the risks of crossing, and succeed in their daily border jumping practices. 
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[Figure 5 People from Anse-à-Pitres crossing a small bridge on the Pedernales River that 
serves as the border between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales]. 
 
 
In the first section of the chapter, I examine how Haitians and Dominicans have been 
connected through the border that represents a dynamic place of social and economic 
exchange between the two peoples. At the same time, I demonstrate how the border 
embodies violence and enmity between the two countries, which are rooted in the 
building of Dominican nationhood and identity. 
Second, I demonstrate how border officials deployed by the Dominican state are 
sometimes involved in illegal practices and negotiations with crossers that are part of 
what I consider a form of border power. 
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Third, I show the risks that crossing the border entails for the forced migrants. In 
addition to border guards, forced migrants must also face Dominican civilians who scare 
and threaten them, making the border a barrier and their crossing into Pedernales a highly 
dangerous adventure. 
Finally, I examine how forced migrants exercise forms of power and agency by 
adopting strategies that allow them to minimize risks in crossing the border. Their 
capacity in using resources that include communication networks, space, and time to 
carry out their intentional goals increases their visibility, power, and agency. 
 
2.1 Historiography of the border 
 
The current border experiences of Dominican and Haitian people need to be 
contextualized within a historical framework that explains their historically evolving 
relationships. The border is best understood as one that has had different economic, 
cultural, social, and political meanings in different historical eras. 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic share the same island, Hispaniola, but have two 
distinct colonial experiences. Hispaniola used to be a Spanish island during the colonial 
period, with the arrival of Christopher Columbus, but in a 1697 treaty, Spain conceded 
the western part to France, forming the colony that is now Haiti, and retained the eastern 
part, which is now the Dominican Republic. The two countries are separated by a land 
border with four juxtaposed Haitian-Dominican towns that are official entry points for 
migration and traffic. The four Haitian border towns are coupled with four Dominican 
sister cities: Malpasse (western Haiti)/Jimani (Dominican Republic), Anse-à-Pitres 
(southeast Haiti) /Pedernales (Dominican Republic), Belladères (central Haiti) /Elias 
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Pinas (Dominican Republic), and Ouanaminthe (northeast Haiti)/Dajabon (Dominican 
Republic). 
Historically, the border has been porous in another way: the movement of 
Haitians across the border was entirely undocumented before 1915 (Martinez 1999: 66). 
During the U.S. occupation of 1916-1924, an effective national police was created, but 
clandestine entrance at the frontier was still common. According to Martinez (1999: 69), 
“law enforcers were spread thinly across the countryside and held tenuous control at most 
over the rural populace. The central authorities were hard pressed even to collect duties 
on the Haitian frontier, let alone keep tabs on immigrants entering Dominican territory” 
(Martinez citing Baud 1993: 49-56). Border control became a priority when a national 
guard was created and more importantly with the accession of the Dominican dictator 
Trujillo to power after the US occupation, where the “establishment of the national guard 
made policing the movements of Afro Caribbean immigrants a practical possibility” 
(Martinez 1999:69). Since the early 20
th
 century, Haitians have been migrating to the 
Dominican Republic to work in agriculture, tourism, the sugar industry, and the 
construction sector (Wooding and Mosley-Williams 2004; Mariner 2002). The migration 
of Haitian workers to the Dominican Republic was a prosperous enterprise that profited 
the two countries. For instance, in the 1950-60s, there existed a series of annual contracts 
between the Dominican and Haitian governments to recruit Haitians to go to work as 
seasonal laborers in Dominican sugar cane fields. This migration “by contract” has 
ranged from 10,000 to 14,000 per year (Grasmuck 1982: 369). In 2015, of the 8,000 to 
10,000 sugar cane workers in the Dominican Republic, the majority were Haitian 
immigrants (Kanaar 2015). 
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Following Derby (1994), before the Dominican Republic developed 
infrastructure, Dominican provinces were not integrated into Dominican towns but 
maintained networks of commerce with Haitian urban centers inherited from the colonial 
period. Therefore, border markets have been an economic mainstay for the region’s 
residents since the colonial era and were closely tied to large commercial hubs in Haiti as 
a result of the relatively sparse settlement—and thus infrastructure—of the western part 
of the Spanish colony (Mallon 2018:339). 
Therefore, for a long time, Haiti and the Dominican Republic have been 
connected through the border that was sometimes unregulated (such as before 1915), and 
sometimes regulated by the Dominican state. This relationship between the two countries, 
however, is also fraught with violence and discord. For instance, from 1822 to 1844, the 
Haitian president Jean Pierre Boyer governed the entire island, until the Dominican 
Republic obtained its independence from Haiti in 1884. This twenty-two-year occupation 
by the Haitian army has been long remembered in Dominican history as “the Haitian 
Domination” (Vergne 2005) and used to promote anti-Haitianismo sentiment (i.e., anti- 
Haitianism), which reinforces both borders and boundaries (Fassin 2011). This sentiment 
is also provoked by the wave of Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic, a kind of 
ideology that appears in the discourse of the Dominican president Mejia, who once spoke 
about a “peaceful invasion of Haitians” (Martin et al. 2006). In addition, anti-Haitianism 
consists of making Haitians the scapegoats of an economically weakened Dominican 
society and also politically, a situation evoked by Sagas (2000) by maintaining that “it is 
a political strategy that has worked before, to distract the people from other issues and 
rally the troops”. This anti-Haitianism is apparent in the refusal of legal citizenship to 
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Haitian children born in the Dominican Republic (Simmons 2010), which aims to keep 
Haitians away from the country, and in the expression of racial prejudices such as seeing 
blackness as incompatible to Dominicanness (Simmons 2009). These kinds of racial 
discrimination are at work in housing, where sex workers are forced to cluster together 
and rent their own houses in Haitian neighborhoods, and in the sex industry where 
Dominican women distance themselves from their poor, dark-skinned Haitian neighbors 
(Brennan 20004: 36). Tracing the historiography of the Dominican-Haitian border, by 
referring to Moya Pons (2010), the historian Paulino (2016) summarizes the history of the 
border in terms of three significant cycles or periods that describe how the border has 
been established from its creation to the role it plays today. 
The first cycle includes the history of the border during the colonial period, where 
it served to set the limit between France and Spain, who shared the island, Hispaniola 
(1700s-1800s). The second is the history of the political border, which is the period 
where the two countries—Haiti and the Dominican Republic—implemented treaties to 
settle an official demarcation and territorial boundaries (1874-1936). This is the period 
where the Dominican dictator, Rafael Trujillo, declared war on Haitians who lived 
around the border. An estimated 15,000 to 35,000 Haitians were tracked down and 
executed by the Dominican regime (Clammer et al 2012) in 1937. The border was turned 
into a wall of blood (Paulino 2016: 9), as “the blood of innocent Haitians flowed freely 
into the water and transformed the border from a place that had once been a refuge from 
persecution and slavery into a memory to forget, to flee” (Wucker 1999). 
The third cycle, according to Moya Pons, is the social border, which began in the 
aftermath of the massacre, and particularly after Trujillo’s assassination, where 
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“Dominican scholars move beyond issues of territorial boundaries, directing themselves 
to new themes such as racial prejudice, economic domination, political class relations and 
Haitian presence” (Paulino 2016: 7). The social boundaries that Moya Pons refers to are 
the embodiment of Haitian immigrants’ racialization within Dominican territory. This 
process is manifest in the process that excludes Haitians from the nation-state, through 
both the definition of Dominican identity in opposition to Haitians (Howard 2001) and 
their removal from the country in 2015. This cycle appears to be a continuation of the 
anti-Haitianism that Trujillo forged in the front line of his politics of governance. Paulino 
(2016: 7) extends his reflection of the post-massacre period to what he calls la 
dominicanizacion de la frontera (dominicanization of the border), highlighting the aim of 
the Dominican Republic to institutionally and ideologically distance Dominican border 
residents and the nation from their Haitian neighbors, who are unwelcome to the country 
(Orenstein 1995). 
After the cholera outbreak that hit Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, 
the Dominican Republic has reinforced its border security against Haitians who sought to 
cross the border, considering them impure and dangerous (Mallon 2018). As reports of 
cholera in Haiti surfaced in October 2010, the Dominican Republic deployed 1,500 
soldiers alongside hundreds of public health professionals to the border between the two 
countries (Mallon 2018: 339). Health surveillance has been enacted in a way that 
restricted immigration, conflating the spread of disease with the movement of people 
across the border, and pathologizing Haitian bodies (Mallon: 340). Simmons (2010), in 
previous contexts, demonstrated that health was always used by the Dominican state as 
an instrument with which to establish boundaries in Dominican society; Haitian workers 
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were geographically marginalized, did not have access to hospitals and clinics, and were 
forced to work without protection, which increased their vulnerability. In this way, the 
body of Haitian people is not only considered a threat to the border, but it is also 
expandable (Agamben cited by Zigon 2011), as it is instrumentalized by the Dominican 
state to enact its power and sovereignty (Foucault 1977). The “danger” mapped onto 
Haitian bodies by Dominican identity politics conflates race with epidemiological 
pollution, identifying the border spaces of economic exchange as a threat to Dominican 
nation building (Mallon 2018: 342). 
The Dominican state’s effort to control or simply “own the border” (Ortiz- 
Gonzalez 2004) and make it a barrier to undocumented Haitian migrants seems to find its 
support from Dominican civilians—who take part in a campaign of exclusion of Haitian 
migrants—and border guards—who are in charge of regulating the flow of migrants. 
First, border residents, particularly Dominican civilians, have usurped state power and 
threatened Haitian border residents. Similar scenarios, where civilians illegally intimidate 
and persecute border crossers, were underlined by Oscar (2006: 4), who contends that “in 
many cases, zealous citizens have, on their own, undertaken unlawful incursions intended 
to detach possessions of neighboring countries.” This is what happened in the Dominican 
Republic in 2018. After a seeming calm between the two peoples following the migration 
crisis of 2015, a resurgence of hatred resurfaced when a group of Dominican extremists 
from the region of Pedernales took to the street to ask Haitian residents to leave the city. 
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The state was forced to intervene by reinforcing military presence and police in that 
province5. 
Second, I conceive of the power exercised by border officials as border power. 
 
This border power is the exercise of power by border officials to control border crossers, 
but they also work to legalize the illegal or render the legal illegal. Specifically, isolation, 
weak institutions, and lax administration can lead to a deviation from the norms of 
interior zones and a development of institutional patterns and interests quite separate 
from those of the centers of power (Oscar 2006). I do not consider the illegal practices on 
the Dominican-Haitian border a separate institutional pattern as suggested by Oscar 
(2006), but these practices do illustrate the definition of power as a multishifting strategy 
(Foucault 1981) which actors can exercise according to their desire to accomplish 
specific goals. 
 
2.2 Border power 
I define border power as a discrete kind of power exercised by border officials to 
regulate both crossers’ lives and the flow of goods. Border power is an 
instrumentalization of power by officials. This border power can take different forms. On 
the Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales border, border power includes soldiers acting as agents 
of migration, and enacting corrupt practices, during which they channel state power for 
independent interests. While officials deployed at the border are generally expected to 
take legal enforcement action according to state and international policy, border power 
deviates from legality in order to produce illegality. The zone of illegality and opacity 
5 https://rtvc.radiotelevisioncaraibes.com/diaspora/ultimatum-dun-groupe-dextremistes-dominicains-aux- 
haitiens-residant-pedernales.html 
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produced by border power is characterized by the intervention of soldiers in the role of 
migration officers and by corruption that includes bribing, trafficking, smuggling, and the 
like. The role of soldiers as migration officers is linked with the structure at the border. 
For example, when someone is crossing the border from Anse-à-Pitres to Pedernales, 
they must go directly through the soldiers at a checkpoint, instead of migration officers. 
This means that soldiers are conferred all the power with which to fulfill all related tasks. 
Their total power erases the authority of any migration agents. The other way that border 
power is exercised is through the il-legalization of the legal and the legalization of the 
illegal. 
The il-legalization of the legal consists of border officials taking advantage of the 
power conferred upon them and using that power to serve illegal causes. In order to 
facilitate the border officials in the exercise of border power and obtain people’s consent, 
officials often put a legal face on the illegal and the illegitimate, a process that seems to 
be at work at the Dominican customs point on the border between Pedernales and Anse- 
à-Pitres. During a conversation at the SJM office with Berard, who has monitored the 
movement of people on the border, Berard explained to me how Haitians in Anse-à-Pitres 
have an illegal tax imposed upon them by Dominican border officials when they make 
their passports in the Dominican Republic. He said: 
Dominican authorities at the gate seize their passport and ask them 
(Haitians) to pay 25,000 pesos at the customs contending that the passport made 
in the Dominican Republic is not good. They claim that this money will be used 
to legalize the passport. Usually, Haitians pay $100 USD for the passport. From 
the $100, $20 will go to racketeers. In reality, the passport costs only $ 20. 
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I am not familiar with the procedure of making passports in the Dominican 
Republic, but this knowledge has educated me. While it is generally said that borders are 
corridors of opportunities for border residents who can maintain some freedom of 
movement across and around them (Flynn 1997) or benefit from economic activities, the 
borders may also become corridors of opportunity for state delegated officials. By 
focusing too much on border crossers, we often forget about the agency of the border 
officials (Chalfin 2001) and how they exercise their power to make the border 
impermeable. 
Chalfin (133-134) argues that “the agency of border officials is often portrayed as 
vulnerable to two sorts of compromise, where on the one hand, state agents' public 
responsibilities are shown to be subverted by personal interests and assimilation into 
border communities (Chalfin 2001 citing MacGaffey et al. 1991; Maliyamkono and 
Bagachwa 1990) or, on the other hand, the autonomy of border agents is compromised by 
the imperatives of ruling individuals and groups (Chalfin 2001 citing Reno 1998). 
Similarly, border agents on the Dominican-Haitian border are motivated by personal 
interests. However, I did not notice any significant interactions between Dominican 
agents and Haitians crossing the border that could be interpreted as compromising border 
power. The imposition of soldiers’ power does not favor any kind of amiability between 
these state representatives and migrants. In this way, the exercise of border power works 
to reinforce the border as a barrier. 
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2.3 The border as the site that unites and divides 
During my research, I traveled frequently to the border market in order to shop, 
but also to observe the back and forth movement of people between Anse-à-Pitres and 
Pedernales and their interactions. People cross from Anse-à-Pitres and as far as Jacmel, a 
distant city in the southeast department of Haiti, in order to join the market place. 
According to Horst and Taylor (2014: 158), Anse-à-Pitres was a popular place to cross 
into the Dominican Republic after the earthquake of January 2010, as hundreds of 
Haitians entered the region to seek refuge with their relatives in Pedernales and other 
parts of the Dominican Republic. Even though people do not need documents to access 
the border market located on the Dominican side, Dominican soldiers are present and 
sometimes check people at the gate. For example, one day while Makdo—a friend who 
worked at the SJM—and I were moving towards the entry gate of the market, a 
Dominican soldier asked him for his ID. According to both local people and the city hall, 
this contradicts the existing agreement between Dominican and Haitian authorities 
according to which Haitians can go as far as the Dominican city of Pedernales without a 
Dominican visa or even a passport during market days. The market is fundamental to the 
connection of the two cities and attracts both Haitian and Dominican merchants and 
buyers. While a diversity of goods is displayed on the trestles and the bare floor, these 
products are mostly Dominican, because Dominican authorities forbid Haitians to enter 
with their products in order to prevent competition with Dominican sellers. Haitian 
merchants or retailers are then only able to buy and resell Dominican products. During 
market days, many people are turning around, buying, bargaining, selling, and talking to 
each other. The market smells of good, cooked food. It is a warm atmosphere, with 
people unloading trucks full of plantains, yams, tubers, vegetables, and fruits. All around 
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are merchants of second-hand clothes, staple products, and seafood. On both sides of the 
border, there are currency traders and motorbike taxi drivers sound their horns while 
waiting outside for their client-passengers. In this way, the border is a key site through 
which both people and goods flow, connecting Pedernales and Anse-à-Pitres. From this 
one perspective, the border is permeable. 
The role of the border in bridging the economic life of the two peoples can be 
seen, for example, in Mirta’s frequent border crossings to the city of Pedernales. Mirta is 
a woman in her late twenties who gave birth to a child at a hospital in the Dominican 
Republic, like many women who cross the border in order to give birth in the Dominican 
Republic because of the poor access to healthcare in Anse-à-Pitres. The same agreement 
that authorizes Haitians to go to Pedernales without a visa, allows pregnant women to go 
to the hospital for regular checkups until they give birth. However, these women cannot 
register their children in the Dominican Republic because, like children of diplomats or 
tourists, they fall into the category of people in transit. Even though, according to earlier 
versions of the Constitution, legal interpretation has long restricted the category of 
"foreigners in transit" to persons in the country for less than 10 days, since the 1990s, 
many Dominican civil registrars have refused to register the children of Haitian parents 
born in the Dominican Republic (Amnesty International 2015: 6). In 2010, a 
constitutional amendment officially put an end to the birthright citizenship of children of 
Haitian descent. Therefore, Mirta could not register her daughter, born in Pedernales, at a 
Dominican registry. 
After delivery, Mirta wanted to eat a particular type of hot soup to energize her 
body. For such a soup, she needed the head of a goat, which she had to buy at a 
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Dominican slaughterhouse. She called her father, a well-known man in his late sixties 
who owns a cockfight in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, and sent him to get the goat head. In 
less than one hour, her father was back with the goat meat. Usually, in a week, Mirta 
would make up to three to four trips to the Dominican Republic. She would go for this 
special luxurious head of goat, for her baby milk, and for bags to wrap the ice to sell in 
Anse-à-Pitres. Mirta’s frequent crossings attest to how the border connects Anse-à-Pitres 
and Pedernales, but also reflect the greater need of people in Anse-à-Pitres to travel than 
Dominicans, due to their isolation from other Haitian town centers and a range of other 
social and economic factors (Heather et al. 2014: 158). 
For the most part, Haitians cross the border to go to Pedernales for a variety 
of reasons that range from going to work, to buy, and to access services that are not 
offered in Haiti. In fact, with the Dominican state becoming the facilitator of global flows 
of capital during the last decades which has opened the country to foreign investments 
(Gregory 2014), the Dominican Republic has reached a higher standard of living, enjoys 
a better developed and more robust economy, and has access to better services in 
comparison to Haiti. This explains why Haitians cross the border, which is in stark 
contrast to Dominicans, who cross into Haiti for entertainment; Dominicans cross to 
Anse-à-Pitres in order to go to clubs and cockfights in which they are significant 
stakeholders. Generally, these Dominicans enter the Haitian side of the border at the 
official gate without having to show any legal document. According to the inspector of 
migration—a Haitian whose office is on the border—Dominicans are allowed through the 
entry gate even without an identity document because they are simply considered as 
gwògman (drinkers) (Joseph 2018). In Anse-à-Pitres, although those Dominican crossers 
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are not too many, their presence in the city was visible at the bars that constantly play 
Dominican music in order to please them. Also, at least twice a week, Dominicans cross 
the border to participate in cockfights with Haitians. The socio-economic and cultural 
relationships that develop between the two peoples show that the border can sometimes 
be less a boundary dividing them into two nations than a bridge linking them in mutual 
interdependence (Flynn 1997). Flynn has demonstrated how the border can become a 
deeply placed stable identity, a way in which locals define themselves and their 
relationships to others. On the Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales border, this border culture 
has developed through cockfighting. However, as Alvarez (1995) argues, the notion of a 
border culture either glosses over or essentializes traits and behaviors and obliterates the 
actual border problems. Indeed, there exist multiple internal boundaries among the two 
peoples including experiences of racism, anti-Haitianism, and exclusion from the global 
economy; these are at the root of many conflicts that loom large in their history and that 
continue to occur in recent years. In this way, the Pedernales River that the two peoples 
share both joins and divides at the same time, explaining the complexity of border social 
relationships (Grimson 2002). Therefore, the border is also a place that has born witness 
to the violent history that has divided the two countries and its peoples. 
Today, the border is secured by Dominican soldiers, who are present on the four 
official crossing points, including the border of Pedernales-Anse-à-Pitres, where 
Dominican border guards known as CESFRONT watch official checkpoints and patrol 
unofficial points to look for illegal migrants, who live off everyday border crossings. 
These measures of security aim to scare forced migrants who are very much dependent 
on crossing the border for creating livelihoods. Sanika has lived all her life in the 
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Dominican Republic, having been brought to the Dominican Republic by her mother 
when she was a child. Now, displaced in Anse-à-Pitres, a new country to her, Sanika is 
having a difficult life with four children to feed. Her border crossings to gather wood in 
the Dominican Republic are stressful, as she has to deal with border security and soldiers. 
Sanika said: “I don’t feel good at all. I have four children I am in charge of. I don’t have 
any support.  Sometimes I go to the Dominican Republic to look for small charcoal 
wood. They (Dominican soldiers) ran after me. I used to run and hide up to three days in 
the forest.” Crossing the border is crucial to Sanika’s survival since her displacement 
from the Dominican Republic. Precarity, insecurity, and uncertainty in Anse-à-Pitres 
force her to face the danger of crossing the border illegally to go to work in the 
Dominican Republic. Forced migrants’ daily back and forth movements to Pedernales for 
their basic needs only increase their stressful experiences and dangerous relationship to 
the border. 
Generally, crossing borders has always been a risky enterprise, where violence 
has become naturalized and embodied. As Dorsey and Barriga (2010) argue, ‘‘Borders 
everywhere attract violence, violence prompts fences, and eventually fences can mutate 
into walls’ (citing Charles N. Bowden’s 2007). The idea of the border as a barrier is 
inevitable, as states feel threatened by the waves of people entering their territory. The 
modern state has engaged a plethora of technologies and employed special officials to 
monitor the border in order to reduce transgression and control the flux of illegal 
migrants. With the rapid increase in migration, where thousands of people are 
continuously fleeing their countries and braving the sea in search of security, Europe, for 
example, has adopted drastic measures ranging from sea patrols and advanced 
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surveillance machinery to fencing in order to keep migrants out (Andersson 2014). 
Similarly, since the mid-1990s, the United States has reinforced its border with Mexico 
by militarizing the border, more than doubling the U.S. Border Patrol budget and 
personnel, building a security wall, and introducing other technologies to deter migration 
(Cornelius, 2001; Whitaker, 2009 cited by Kyoko and David 2012: 167). This border 
militarization has led to grave consequences for crossers such as deaths, torture, 
imprisonment, family separations, and the like. Yoko and David (2012) have underlined 
a sad revelation about the regime of violence on the US-Mexico border that has led to the 
loss of many lives. According to them, “U.S. government agencies, academic researchers, 
and nongovernmental organizations concur that the death count is in the thousands and 
that estimates based on recovered bodies consistently undercount the actual number of 
deaths (167).” This account is frightening, when considering the millions of people who 
are forced to cross borders. Moving across border is risky. The forced migrants are not 
exempt from the danger and risks created by crossing the Haitian-Dominican border. 
 
2.4 Crossing the border: the risks of mobility 
 
Many forced migrants have chosen to stay in Anse-à-Pitres, in part so that they 
can take advantage of the border proximity, as it gives easy access to the region of 
Pedernales, Dominican Republic. Among other things, the border deserves attention 
because of its role in both preventing mobilities and affording new potentials (Richardson 
2013). While the Dominican-Haitian border has generally been considered porous due to 
the lack of documentation of people moving across it (Martinez 1999), since the 1990s, 
with the creation of the National Guard, the Dominican state has taken steps towards 
securing the border and has made it a space of constant surveillance and regulation 
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(Gogia 2006 citing Verstraete 2001). Furthermore, for forced migrants, crossing the 
border is not simply about fearing the state, but also fearing violence from Dominicans 
more generally. Despite the militarization of the border by the Dominican state at official 
crossing points and the threat of Dominican civilians to make the border inaccessible to 
illegal migrants, forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres develop strategies to cross into 
Pedernales, Dominican Republic. 
Generally, forced migrants living in the different camps in Anse-à-Pitres are close 
to the Haitian-Dominican border. For example, for those who live in the city center of 
Anse-à-Pitres, the border is a ten-to- fifteen minute walk. The camps of Maletchipe, Parc 
Cadeau 1, and Parc Cadeau 2 are in the peripheral areas of the town of Anse-à-Pitres and 
are also located close to the border, which is demarcated by the Pedernales River. This is 
where the forced migrants get fresh water. The other camps of Tête-à-l’Eau, Tête Source, 
and Fonds Jeannette, are in the remotest areas of the town of Anse-à-Pitres, but close to 
the Dominican-Haitian border. These peripheral areas are closer to the region of 
Pedernales than to the city of Anse-à-Pitres. Living close to the border means a lot to 
forced migrants because they continue to see the Dominican Republic as the land that can 
offer them the opportunities that Haiti does not. However, the deployment of Dominican 
soldiers along the border and the establishment of checkpoints at entry gates aim to limit, 
regulate, and anticipate the movement of the forced migrants (Richardson 2013; Hannan, 
Sheller, and Urry 2006). Crossing the border entails severe risks for them that can include 
death, imprisonment, or deportation. For instance, when Emile, a young man in his mid- 
twenties, decided to go to the Dominican Republic, he felt sick with fear. Yet, Emile was 
born in the Dominican Republic. Like many other young Dominican-Haitians, he never 
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got a Dominican identity card. In the camp of Parc Cadeau #1, where he lives in a small 
tent made of wood, cardboard, straw, and pieces of clothes, a return to the Dominican 
Republic to look for small, odd jobs seemed inevitable to him; his future in the camp in 
Anse-à-Pitres is unclear and uncertain because the land does not belong to him, and he 
may face eviction anytime. However, crossing the border is no easy task for him because 
of the soldiers patrolling the border. He had already been apprehended by these soldiers, 
an incident that he described to me during an interview at the camp: 
“I went to make a small charcoal in the bush where everybody seeks to 
make a life, making small charcoal to get food to eat, and me, bad luck for me, the 
soldiers took me; they attacked me. They went to Pedernales with me. I spent 
eight days in prison. After the eight days of jail, they made me pay 2,000 pesos. I 
didn’t have the 2000 pesos. It was friends who contributed to giving the money so 
that they released me.” 
Emile not only served time in jail, but he was also fined. These are the kinds of 
punishment that people are incurring, which can also be aggravated by Dominican 
“extremists,” who sometimes clash with them. 
Dominican civilians also contribute to perpetuating this fear. According to the 
forced migrants, in 2015, many members of the Dominican population threatened them 
and forced them to leave the country in massive numbers. Even after their departure from 
the Dominican Republic, forced migrants continue to be the target of Dominicans who 
may insult the forced migrants and violently attack them when they try to cross the 
border. When Emile returned to the Dominican Republic just a few months after he was 
forced to leave, he was surprised. The place that he used to call home was no longer 
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ready to welcome him back. He has simply become a black sheep. Not only did he face 
soldiers who arrested him, he also experienced fear of and violence from Dominican 
citizens, as he explained, 
They (Dominicans) always threaten me. I went to work there. I was 
passing by, a Dominican called me while I didn’t do anything wrong. He said: 
people from Anse-à-Pitres must not go up there because those people are used to 
stealing our things. I say: you can’t tell me something like this. How many things 
have you already put somewhere and they told you I was the one who took them? 
At the same moment, he threw me a machete. I had a machete in my hand. I 
spared his machete. He threw me another one, I spared it. Then I went to him and 
I threw him a machete too. By seeing that I could injure him, he moved away. 
Like many other undocumented migrants, Emile was able to cross the border by avoiding 
the soldiers who were watching the entry and the exit points. This strategy is commonly 
used by clandestine migrants, who often follow several devious paths that avoid official 
checkpoints in the border zone (Musoni 2016). However, Emile not only has to escape 
state officials, but also civilians, who are unofficially also a part of the surveillance 
apparatus of the Dominican-Haitian border. 
The multifaceted nature of the border as both a bridge and a barrier that 
characterizes fear embodied by Dominican soldiers and civilians, and the symbolic 
violent history that continues to haunt people’s minds, makes the border both a terrain of 
danger and agency. The danger for the forced migrants is based on the fact that corporeal 
mobility remains the greatest means available to them to cross the border. Such physical 
mobility puts them at risk crossing the border because of Dominican soldiers’ 
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surveillance and civilians’ potential threat. The agency is reflected in their ability to 
concoct strategies that include drawing on communication networks, time, and space to 
challenge both institutionalized and noninstitutionalized border forces. 
 
2.5 The Communicational, Temporal, and Spatial Dimension (CTS) in border 
crossings as resources for agency and power 
 
Thanks to an array of resources available to them, migrants residing in the global 
north are able to undertake activities that connect them with people and places across 
borders without necessarily having to move (Louie 2000). Despite their lack of 
technology, the forced migrants develop strategies that include sharing information 
among members of their groups and using space and time to facilitate their border 
crossings. This section is a description of the strategies that shape and enable the forced 
migrants’ transnational mobility, that is, their movements across the Dominican-Haitian 
border. 
First, being informed plays a significant role in guiding and enabling the forced 
migrants’ transnational mobility. As Louie (2000) argues, the creation of social networks 
across borders is essential to migrant’s practices. The networks that allow migrants to 
connect with people and their homeland can be part of both local and global circuits 
(Smart 1999). Forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres lack a constituted global network. 
Information about the danger that crossing the border may entail is locally constituted 
and generally spread by word of mouth between group members. Through verbal 
networks, friends may advise each other against crossing the border at a specific time. 
When I met Willy, a man in his forties who arrived in Tête-à-l’Eau in 2015, he was 
worried about the risks of crossing the border everyday to go to work. During my visit, he 
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stayed in Anse-à-Pitres and he explained to me why he did not go to the Dominican 
Republic: “I don’t go to St Domingue because of information I got from people; 
sometimes they (fellows) tell us to sit down here, to not go out. Therefore, we stay here.” 
Willy was informed by friends about the potential threat of crossing the border. When 
spreading information to alert someone about the threat of crossing the border, people 
also tell each other stories about people who were caught in the Dominican Republic and 
their horrific experiences. Therefore fellows constitute a great resource despite the lack of 
access to technologies. While I was in Anse-à-Pitres, many forced migrants said that they 
did not even have a phone. 
Like communication networks, knowledge of time and location help coordinate 
movement. For instance, Cresswell (2006) suggests that movement is made up of time 
and space and that any consideration of movement that does not take time into account is 
missing an important facet. Therefore, people’s everyday mobility is imbued with a 
relationship to time (Munn 1992). In the context of my work, time is shaped by 
Malinoskian functionalism that views time as a means to coordinate activities (Munn 
1992). Malinowski’s view of culture is rooted in utilitarianism, a theory according to 
which every feature of any people past and present must be explained in relation to the 
biological needs of individual human beings (Radcliffe‐Brown 1949). I refer to this 
utilitarian aspect to show how forced migrants rely on time to coordinate their border 
 
activities. In this context, time is not simply a system in which events come in succession, 
but functions as a system that directs and shapes forced migrants’ daily practices. For 
instance, Evans Pritchard relied on time to explain "social activities" or the "relation 
between activities" (Munn 1992), in particular the daily movements of cattle and seasonal 
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passages between villages and camps. In the same way, forced migrants use time as a 
safety net to coordinate their movements across borders. 
Forced migrants know when soldiers are not in service and when it is the right 
time for them to cross to the Dominican Republic to undertake their activities. Although 
soldiers do not have a constant presence on the unofficial points of the border, there are 
times they patrol the mountainous regions where most forced migrants go to work. If 
someone is unlucky enough to find themselves in the wrong place and time, they risk 
being apprehended by Dominican soldiers. Therefore, forced migrants get up early at 
dawn to cross the border, predicting that the soldiers will not be around so early in the 
day. Knowing the right time to cross the border is a concern for Melinord, who has been 
displaced in Tête-à-l’Eau since 2015 and whose precarious family life obliged him to turn 
towards the Dominican Republic. He explained: “sometimes, it is in the Dominican 
Republic we go to make small charcoal to improve our lives. Soldiers are watching us. 
We can’t go all the time.” As a result of the soldiers’ surveillance of the border, Mélinord 
often stays in Anse-à-Pitres in order to avoid crossing the border at an inappropriate time. 
Sometimes, forced migrants must wait days for the best time to cross, especially after 
rumors had spread or they had been informed from fellows of people who have been 
apprehended in the forests by soldiers. Therefore, time shapes and guides the forced 
migrants’ border crossings, and together with space, it constitutes two fundamental axes 
around which their everyday mobility revolves (Cresswell 2006). 
Third, in addition to communication and time, forced migrants use space to enable 
them in their mobility through their conception of Pedernales, a Dominican Region, as a 
continuous space of the Haitian border town of Anse-à-Pitres. This way of 
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conceptualizing place allows them to mentally insert and project themselves in spaces 
that are geographically imagined even before traversing them. Through this kind of 
geographical imagination, the forced migrants have become less place-based and place- 
bound (Daniels 1992), making Pedernales simply their next door. Taking advantage of 
this proximity, people from Anse-à-Pitres go to Pedernales for healthcare services and 
even school. This continuity is expressed in how people talk about the border and how in 
particular, they perceive the region of Pedernales as a continuous space of Anse-à-Pitres. 
As a matter of fact, in their narratives, forced migrants reframed Pedernales as a 
continuous space of Anse-à-Pitres than a discontinuous one, which appeared in the way 
they interchanged the names of places. In the Dominican Republic, the majority of forced 
migrants were living in poor, mountainous, and peripheral areas of Pedernales such as 
Avila, Mencía, Aguas Negras, Los Arroyos and others. A number of forced migrants I 
had conversations with perceived these areas as distinct from St Domingue. In fact, St 
Domingue, is the Spanish equivalent of Santo Domingo. Informally, Haitians refer to the 
Dominican Republic as Saint Domingue and use the name of Santo Domingo to officially 
refer to the capital of the Dominican Republic. Many forced migrants use Saint 
Domingue and the Dominican Republic as two distinct places, where Saint Domingue is 
seen as just the other side of the border or simply as in juxtaposition with Anse-à-Pitres. 
For example, Alina, a young woman who was born in the Dominican Republic, 
maintained that she was not in Saint Domingue during an interview: “I wasn’t in Saint 
Domingue. I was in a mountain on the other side of the border.” Another woman, Tisia, 
when talking about her migration history from Haiti to the Dominican Republic, 
maintained that: “I come from Croix-des-Bouquets, Haiti. I crossed to the Dominican 
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Republic. From the Dominican Republic, I went to St Domingue.” In the first story, 
Alina’s statement expresses a form of geographical continuity when she vaguely situated 
where she was living as the other side of the border without referring to the Dominican 
Republic. It means to her that the place was so close. The place she refers to is one of the 
peripheral areas of the region of Pedernales where the majority of migrants were 
working. Tisia’s statement expresses a form of discontinuity between the Dominican 
Republic and Saint Domingue as if they were two different countries. Yet, the two places 
refer to the same country. These border narratives are sometimes confusing and require 
geographical and historical knowledge from audiences in order to understand where 
people stand when they talk about space. However, these narratives broaden our 
understanding of place as something that is not so much fixed (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 
2006), but something that is a center of meaning (Cresswell, 2006) and that can be 
culturally constructed by people (Coe 2011). The conception of continuous space rooted 
in people’s stories expresses an appropriation of space. Also the forced migrants rely on 
their visual knowledge of Pedernales in order to avoid soldiers and cross the border 
strategically. 
Indeed, the sense of geographical knowledge of Pedernales is an asset in 
strategically crossing the border in that it helped forced migrants locate resources and 
reconfigure the visual space. Mobility is fraught with risks, so sometimes, the forced 
migrants need to run away when soldiers are around and watching the border. Not 
knowing the space can be dangerous as they can be forced to surrender and be trapped. 
Forced migrants know how to navigate the mountains in order to be at the right place 
during their transnational endeavors. The way they define and redefine space illustrates 
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how we are forced to alter, sometimes in quite radical ways, how people represent the 
world to themselves (Levitt, Schiller 2004). This re-configuration of space according to 
people’s desire reflects in Kannèl’s strategies to cross the border. As an undocumented 
migrant, going to the Dominican Republic cannot be more perilous for him, but his 
knowledge of the space plays an important role in helping him succeed in his move and 
circumvent Dominican soldiers. Kannèl explained his strategies crossing the border: 
“I have a sister who lives in the Dominican Republic. I always go to see 
her, but you know, I don’t have papers. When I am going, when I get in front of 
the barracks, sometimes they let me pass. Other times, when they don’t want to let 
people cross, I pass behind under the bush. There is a speed bump; once you pass 
under it, you appear on a street. They won’t make me return because I appear on 
the other street.” 
 
The technique used by Kannèl, juggling different reference points to cross to Pedernales 
and recreate space for himself, corroborates Cresswell (2006)’s idea according to which 
moving people are agents in the production of time and space. The new space of crossing 
created by Kannèl is a transnational space that goes beyond the borders connecting the 
two countries. The previous experiences of the displaced people living in Pedernales 
helped them develop a good sense of the place and time, which allows them to speculate 
about when soldiers are patrolling the border and where they are in the mountains. Those 
previous experiences are stored in their memory, recalled, and reused at any given 
moment. As Boyarin (1994) suggests, memory becomes the principal medium through 
which the forced migrants manipulate time-space. 
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Other migrants use the Pedernales River as a reference point to cross to the city of 
Pedernales. I was in the office of SJM with Makdo, Josie, Inès, and Zamy. The latter, 
Zamy, has sisters in Pedernales. He does not have legal documents to go to the 
Dominican Republic, but by exploring the notion of space, he found a way to go to his 
sisters’ house almost every afternoon in Pedernales, which is within a twenty minute 
walk from Anse-à-Pitres. He went sometimes to spend time with his sisters and took the 
opportunity to charge his phone. Like Kannèl, he was capable of juggling with space. 
Zamy usually went to take a bath in the river—which serves as the border between the 
two countries—with Dominicans and merged with them. As a “light-skinned man,” he 
was invisible to Dominican soldiers. This allowed him to cross to Pedernales once he 
finished his bath in the Pedernales River. Each time forced migrants create a small space 
within a larger space beyond the border, they challenge imposed fixity by inventing and 
reinventing transnational space, which takes shape with the movement of these people 
across the border and their agency to produce and reproduce transnational structures. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Finally, an understanding of the event of 2015 that resulted in the displacement of 
thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent needs to be contextualized within the history 
of the Haitian-Dominican border that informs of the connection and disconnection 
between the two peoples and their practices. In fact, the border has played a significant 
role in building social and economic relationships between the two peoples. However, the 
connecting role of the border is limited, as the Dominican state seeks to own the border, 
keeping Haitians out. In complicity with Dominican civilians, the state has secured the 
border, making it a barrier to Haitian migrants. Galemba (2013:276) argues that “at 
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borders, states may be both present and absent—in terms of providing services and 
responding to citizens (Donnan and Wilson 1999).” In the exercise of border policing on 
the Anse-à-Pitres border, the Haitian state is totally absent, which gives the Dominican 
state the power to impose its domination at the border. Despite the risks that crossing the 
border involved, the forced migrants employed many tactics that enabled their mobility 
and challenged Dominican surveillance and border power. Their ability in shifting 
strategies to brave the danger of crossing is constitutive of power and agency, but this 
does not erase the need for documentation to cross the border, something that many 
people in Anse-à-Pitres lack. 
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CHAPTER 3: DOCUMENTATION AND ID PAPER: THE MATERIALITY OF 
DISPLACED PEOPLE’S LIVES 
 
“I was born in Abila (Dominican Republic). I don’t have a cédula. When I 
was a child, I think they (my parents) could do it for me but because of their lack 
of intelligence, they didn’t. Now it is harder, people can’t register their children. 
In the past, it was possible to do it but they didn’t do it for me. My mother and my 
father are Haitian. The fact that I don’t have an ID paper; I can’t live on 
Dominican land.” 
In this statement, Manchina expresses her regret for not having a Dominican identity. As 
she was born in the Dominican Republic, according to the law of jus soli, which was in 
force in the country at the time she was born or until 2010, she had the right to have a 
birth certificate. She blames her parents for her stateless situation. Even though parents 
have to be held responsible for providing their children with legal documents, Haitian 
parents faced many challenges when registering their children at a Dominican registry. 
The absence of a legal document has cost her the right to reside in the Dominican 
Republic. Manchina is simply an example of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian origin 
who became excluded on the basis of documentation. 
This chapter examines how the displaced people have continued to experience 
forms of statelessness in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, as most are living without legal documents, 
which contributes to marginalizing them. These newly displaced people to Anse-à-Pitres 
are living in a state of civil death. By civil death, I refer to the incapacity of these people 
to enjoy civil and political rights in society in the same way as legal citizens. As a result, 
they are marginalized and isolated from the larger Anse-à-Pitres community. I argue that 
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the absence of legal documentation contributes to marginalizing the displaced people, 
excluding them from society, leaving them in a state of civil death that constitutes a 
barrier to the enjoyment of civil and political rights. The lack of a legal document that 
confers them Haitian nationality attests to the absence and laxity of the Haitian state in 
guaranteeing and protecting the rights of its subjects. 
Generally, the invention of a documenting system forms a well constituted 
bureaucracy that guarantees administrative control and the construction of subjects, 
objects, and socialities (Hull 2012: 253). Documenting individual identity allows modern 
governments to control their populations by rendering them legible (Caplan and Torpey 
2001). According to Torpey (2000), documenting people gives the state the monopoly of 
the legitimate means of movement, endowing the state with the capacity to embrace its 
own citizens in order to extract from them the resources they need to reproduce 
themselves over time (Torpey 2000). On the other hand, people who are documented are 
not only controlled by the state, but they are also endowed with some kind of 
empowerment that allows them to exercise political and civil rights in society i.e., engage 
in society as full members. In this chapter, I am focusing on specific forms of 
documentation that includes birth certificates, passports, and ID cards, which can be 
conceived of as technologies of identification that enable states to make their subjects 
“legible”— an operation that is essential to modern, democratic state-making (Reddy 
2005: 255-256 citing Scott et al.). These kinds of identity document are fundamental to 
modern society in most of its aspects and institutions, including government, 
employment, education, health, transportation, recreation, social life, property ownership 
and legal defense. 
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Documentation allows the state to accomplish multiple goals that include labeling 
individuals both on its territory and abroad, distinguishing them from outsiders, and 
regulating their movements inside and across the boundary of the nation-state. On the one 
hand, identity papers force the state objectively to recognize and comprehend people’s 
existence (Kaufmann 2004). As such, people who hold identity documents can benefit 
from access and communication with the state and institutions that are extensions of the 
state (Abrams 2006). On the other hand, documented identity is central to the process of 
subjectification, where identity itself becomes akin to paper or material, constantly 
shifting into and out of reach—but also capable of being possessed, moved, disregarded, 
stored away, and dissolved (Bolker 2018: 319). Through this process of subjectification, 
man’s existence is directed and controlled by central agencies (319), hereby, the state. 
These ideologies based on processes of subjectification that are central to documentation 
can help us to understand the relations between stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres and the 
Haitian state. First, by not giving these people ID papers, the state frees itself from all 
kinds of responsibilities towards these people. Second, as a result of this gap, the 
displaced people become more subjects of themselves than of the state. This lack of 
documentation prevents these people from making their identity corporeal (Bolker 2018: 
324) i.e., physically visible to the state. In Anse-à-Pitres, many displaced people remain 
stateless, as they did not possess any document that granted them Haitian citizenship. I 
suggest that their lack of legal identity is attributable to the absence and laxity of the 
Haitian state that fails in its state-ness, leaving a gap that fill by designing programs to 
document people in Anse-à-Pitres. 
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In this chapter, first, I discuss the legal context that led to the statelessness of 
Dominicans of Haitian descent and their displacement to Haiti. Through documentation, 
the Dominican state concocted a mode of governance that helped it identify and de- 
identify people on its territory including people of Haitian backgrounds that were stripped 
of their citizenship. 
Second, I show that the civil registry, which is the institution responsible for the 
delivery of birth certificates, is confronted with a series of structural problems because 
the state neglects the institution and does not fund it. This lack of attention to the civil 
status in local areas is also the consequence of the politics of former Haitian leaders that 
aimed to favor urban development over rural. 
Third, with the support of CRS (Catholic Relief Service) and USDOL (US 
Department of Labor), the SJM has implemented a program of documentation called 
PwoKontram (literally Protecting People’s Work Conditions), which helped some 
vulnerable people, such as undocumented forced migrant families, to secure birth 
certificates. This step towards re-establishing identity papers for these people confers 
them citizenship or quasi-citizenship, but also fills in the gap left by the state. 
Fourth, I examine how the absence of legal documentation contributes to the 
marginalization of the forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres. Their condition of statelessness 
constitutes an impediment to their social, economic, and political participation in society 
in the same way as legal citizens. 
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3.1 Becoming stateless and displaced 
In 2010, the Dominican state officially upheld a constitutional amendment that 
revoked birthright citizenship to children of undocumented Haitians (Hazel 2014). This 
new migration law was followed by a decision of the Dominican Constitutional Court in 
2013 after Juliana Deguis Pierre—a Dominican born of undocumented Haitian parents, 
who was denied a Dominican ID in 2008—filed a complaint to the court for 
discrimination. In 2013, the Dominican Constitutional Court decided against her and 
made the sentence, called “la sentencia,” retroactive to 1929 (Mahoney and Nolan 2015). 
This retroactivity means that not only did this decision (known as decision 168-13) 
remove the citizenship of Haitian children born at the moment it was adopted, but the 
Dominican state also decided to apply this law against those who were born of 
undocumented parents who had entered the country since 1929 (Andreopoulos and Arat 
2014). This decision made thousands of Dominicans born of Haitian parents stateless. 
Dominican-Haitians, even those who were part of families that had resided in the country 
for many generations, were no longer considered Dominican by the state. Being stateless 
means that they were not legally authorized to participate in Dominican society such as to 
vote, attend schools at a certain level, or work. There was a delay in the application of the 
law due to protests by the Haitian government and human rights organizations, but it was 
finally implemented in 2015. According to Amnesty International (2015: 6), “a large 
number of these people consider the Dominican Republic as their country, since they 
were born there and lived there all their life. Often, they have no connection with Haiti, 
have never been there, and can barely speak the language. Many of them are the children 
or grandchildren of people who are also born on Dominican soil. For these families, the 
Dominican Republic has been their homeland for generations.” 
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The Dominican state made documentation a mode of governance, whereby 
documenting serves as a strategy to exclude Dominican-Haitians from Dominican 
citizenship. It is by referring to the Dominican constitution that one may understand how 
documentation has been used not simply as an instrument of bureaucratic organizations, 
rules, ideologies, knowledge, practices, and subjectivities (Hull 2012: 253), but also as an 
instrument of privilege and exclusion (Huffman 2013). As De Genova (2002 cited by 
Reeves 2013) suggests, as an anthropologist I do not pretend to become a legal historian 
in examining the statelessness of Dominican-Haitians in relation to Dominican law, but I 
believe that the knowledge of the legal context allows me to apprehend prior moments 
and movements (Coutin and Yngvesson 2006) that are at the root of these people’s 
statelessness. In fact, for many decades, the Dominican Republic has recognized jus soli, 
which gave the opportunity to anyone born on Dominican soil, except children of people 
in transit such as tourists or diplomats, to be entitled with birthright citizenship. This 
principle was consecrated by Dominican constitution in its article 11, “all persons born in 
the territory of the Dominican Republic” are Dominican citizens (Human Rights Watch 
2002). However, children born of Haitian parents have been the object of discrimination 
and were not automatically recognized as citizens of the country although their right to 
citizenship was clearly stipulated by the law. They had to satisfy a number of 
requirements, which is a complex process. When a child is born, Haitian parents need to 
obtain a paper that identifies the date and location of the birth of their children from the 
hospital’s maternity ward or visit a civil registry to obtain a birth certificate. The registry 
requires maternity papers or an affidavit to prove the birth in the country, both of which 
are difficult for applicants to find. In addition, at the registry, parents are expected to 
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show proof of Dominican citizenship, which officials sometimes reject, presuming that a 
child’s parents are Haitian because they are black. Therefore, many Dominican-Haitians 
could not obtain a Dominican identity document. This means that the majority of these 
people of Haitian origin were stateless and, according to the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, were living in a state of permanent illegality (Human Rights Watch 
2002). Dominican-Haitians found themselves in the same category as people in transit 
who include children of foreign diplomats or of foreigners who were in transit in the 
Dominican Republic at the time of birth (22). Those discriminatory practices have been 
institutionalized and in 2004, a new immigration law was promulgated, officially treating 
temporary foreign workers and undocumented migrant workers as "in transit (Amnesty 
International 2015: 6)," which put an end to any possibility for Haitian parents to register 
their children born in Dominican territory acquiring Dominican nationality. The refusal 
of legal status to Dominican-Haitians forced them out of the Dominican Republic. 
Between 2015 and 2016, hundreds of these people arrived in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti where 
they expect to be provided with an identity document and conferred Haitian nationality. 
In Haiti, they need to go through the civil registry, which is the main state institution in 
charge of delivering basic legal documents. 
 
3.2 The Haitian civil registry in Anse-à-Pitres 
 
We cannot talk about documentation in Anse-à-Pitres without talking about the 
civil registry, which is in charge of registering people, providing them with birth, death, 
and marriage certificates. Generally, the civil registry plays a significant role in the 
control of populations in a nation-state. For instance, since 1972, the legislative assembly 
of France showed its interest in regulating its citizens’ civil status by adopting a decree 
79  
that stated that “[t]he legislative authority will establish for all inhabitants, without 
distinction, the manner in which births, marriages, and deaths will be certified; and it will 
designate the public officials who will receive and maintain these files.” (Gérard Noiriel 
in Caplan and Torpey 2001: 28. The registration of members of the population was a 
governing strategy of the French government but also a way for an individual to become 
a member of the civil community. Therefore, the civil registry plays a significant role in 
integrating people into society. Following Noiriel (2001) today, the formalities of civil 
status are part of administrative routine and constitute the basis for the entire logic of 
modern identification practices in society. As a former French colony, Haiti has been 
greatly influenced by France in many domains including law. This can be seen with the 
creation of Haitian civil registry. Indeed, since the 1970s, Haiti has established a civil 
registry, which is evident in the Haitian civil code that requires that each commune has a 
civil registrar in office at the center of the community. The tenured civil official is 
authorized to receive birth, marriage, recognition, adoption and death certificates, and to 
make modifications or rectifications requested by a justice decision. The civil status is 
facing many challenges such as the lack of budget and personnel, which prevents it from 
responding people who want to obtain a birth certificate. This causes a great number of 
the Haitian population to live in effective statelessness. By effective statelessness, I refer 
to the type of statelessness that affects children who are living within the country but 
whose birth has never been registered (Bhabha, 2011). Indeed, a significant percentage of 
the Haitian population is not registered due to problems that are attributable to the 
dysfunction of the civil registry. 
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Bertin and Drogue (2012), volunteers at the GARR and a representative at a 
Haitian community in France respectively, allude to structural and sociological factors in 
order to explain the malfunction of the Haitian civil status. First, structurally, they discuss 
the lack of civil status offices covering the whole Haitian territory. The registrars and 
their clerks are often not qualified for the work because there is not a school they can go 
for this purpose. The choice to fill these positions is often political. In addition, there is 
no budget to fund the civil registry. This lack of funding is typical of Anse-à-Pitres, 
where there is no state investment to support the civil status. Second, they mention that 
the population often ignores the procedures and do not value or see the importance of 
identity documents. Accordingly, people are often illiterate and do not know what to do 
when the procedure to obtain a document is complicated. However, their argument that 
Haitians do not give too much importance to documentation does not match the behavior 
of people of Anse-à-Pitres toward documentation, especially the forced migrants. The 
attitude of forced migrants towards documentation suggests that they possess 
documentary literacy, which is the set of skills required to possess and store documents, 
so they can be easily accessed (Robertson 2014: 75).  For example during my home 
visits, some displaced people would pull an identification card or a small piece of paper 
that they were given by such organizations as the GARR or UNCHR that serves as 
identification out from their wallet. They preserved their identity documents. Besides the 
structural and sociological aspects mentioned by Bertin and Drogue, I see, in the 
dysfunction of the Haitian civil status, a political line adopted by Haitian political leaders 
for decades, that concentrates all efforts in the urban area while abandoning the 
countryside (Stepick 1982). This allows urban people to get a birth certificate more 
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quickly than people living in the remote areas of the country, including Anse-à-Pitres, 
that lack material support and funding. For example, the only press that provides 
materials to registries is located in Port-au-Prince, the capital. The difficulty forced 
migrants in Anse-à-Pitres faced in obtaining a birth certificate is the consequence of the 
politics of marginalization of the state towards a category of Haitian citizens. 
Trouillot (1990) gives an idea of how those political and economic choices 
worked in poor people’s lives during the Duvalier dictatorship period of 1957-1986 in 
Haiti. The Haitian peasants were politically marginalized while they were the productive 
force of the country, providing surplus to rich civil servants. Besides taxes that the 
peasants had to pay to the state, landlords could also extract additional surplus from them 
through various forms of sharecropping (Trouillot 1990: 77). This split of the Haitian 
population between urban people and peasants promoted by the former leaders after the 
independence of the country was also evidenced in the civil status. Carl Denis argues: 
“Even from the point of view of civil status, the difference is clear. The birth certificate 
and other civil status documents contain mentions defining the origin of the Haitian. The 
native has a "birth certificate (city-dweller)", the peasant a "birth certificate (peasant) 
(Pierre 2006: 12).” The politics that consisted in dividing the Haitian people into two 
categories have favored urban dwellers over marginalized peasants, who are facing 
challenges to register their birth at the civil status in many areas of the country. The 
politics of documentation makes peasants doubly marginalized: legally and socially. This 
is not without any consequence on the civil registry in Anse-à-Pitres, which works in 
poor conditions without any substantial state budget. 
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I visited the office of the civil status in downtown Anse-à-Pitres during my 
fieldwork to learn more about the challenges that it was facing and how it worked to 
provide people with legal documents. A small room in the house of the registrar was used 
for the office. When I arrived, there was a clerk working, but there were not many people 
with him. In this tiny room, there is no electricity, nor any ventilation in a tropical 
country where temperature can escalate to 90-95
0
 Fahrenheit. In the middle of the day, 
people are simply sweating. According to the civil registrar, the state does not provide 
him with the necessary means to work, such as an office to house the civil status and 
forms to do certificates. Therefore, he is using a room in his own house to house the civil 
status, because the state gives him only 500 gourdes (USD 31) to rent a location. The 
dreadful circumstances in which the registrar is working attest to the negligence of the 
state, which does not care about serving its people, and also to the lack of importance 
granted to people’s documents that can be easily lost in an insecure place. Almost 
everyone I met in Anse-à-Pitres was complaining about the inefficiency of the civil status 
in responding to their needs for identity documents. Some people possess a birth 
certificate, but they maintain that it is not registered in the national archives located in 
Port-au-Prince, which makes it difficult for them to obtain an official copy of their birth 
certificate when they need to obtain a passport, for instance. This may be one reason 
some institutions, including the French embassy, are suspicious about legal documents 
issued in Haiti (Bertin and Drogue 2012). Due to all these difficulties and administrative 
problems, many people in Anse-à-Pitres end up not having an identity document or any 
valid documentation. This makes Anse-à-Pitres a city of unregistered people, a fact that is 
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reflected in people’s stories about their challenges to obtain a birth certificate or a 
passport. 
In fact, there are two problems that people commonly face in Anse-à-Pitres when 
they want to obtain a passport. Some people do not have a birth certificate and others do 
have one, but it is not registered in the national archives, so people consider it just a piece 
of paper. In fact, an unregistered birth certificate does not have any legal standing. 
Missolo lives in Fond-Jeannette and may be considered one of the elites because he is 
one of the most educated people in the area. He guided many forced migrants to Fond- 
Jeannette after they were forced out of the Dominican Republic. As a result, all forced 
migrants in the area know him as he has continued to support them in the absence of the 
state. During a focus group, Missolo talked about his own experience when he wanted to 
get a passport. He paid about 12,500 HT gourdes (USD 208), 25 times higher than the 
normal price, for a passport that was supposed to cost him 500 HT gourdes. During a visit 
with an SJM employee, Missolo said: “I am happy you come here. In Fond-Jeannette 
only my brother and I have a birth certificate. I had to pay 12,500 HT gourdes to have a 
passport, spending much to go to Port-au-Prince.” In Anse-à-Pitres, all categories of the 
population are the victims of the lack of documentation. Among the migrant population, 
though, the absence of documentation is more blatant. 
The majority of forced migrants did not have a birth certificate at the time of my 
research in Anse-à-Pitres, between 2016 and 2017. Even though their children were born 
in the Dominican Republic, they could not register them because the Dominican state 
rules out this possibility. They could not obtain a delivery certificate from the hospital, 
which pushed many people to give birth at home. Without such a document, they were 
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not able to register their children at the Dominican local civil registry. Their fate was 
sealed when, in 2010, the Dominican state abrogated the jus soli replacing it by jus 
sanguinis (right of blood), ruled to prevent Haitian children from being registered at the 
Dominican civil status, and removed the citizenship of people of Haitian descent. In 
2014, due to pressure from human rights organizations, the Dominican Constitutional 
court that declared Dominican-Haitians stateless has ordered the National Council of 
Immigration to create a regularization plan called PNRE (National Alien Regulation 
Plan) in order to allow the stateless people to apply to re-acquire Dominican nationality. 
However, the procedure was complicated, considering that the documents required by the 
Dominican state constitute a barrier to these people who do not have any identification 
papers and the short deadline within which people had to submit applications. At the end 
of this program of regularization in 2015, organizations of Dominican and Haitian civil 
society such as GARR (Groupe d’Appui aux Réfugiés et aux Rapatriés) and CEDESO 
(Centro de Desarrollo Sostenible) simply considered it a failure by maintaining that: “We 
express our grave concern over the closing date of the National Alien Regulation Plan 
(PNRE), which leads to the acceleration of abusive and illegal deportations by 
CESFRONT's immigration agents and soldiers in the Dominican Republic (Jean Baptiste 
2015).” As a consequence, thousands of Dominicans born of Haitian descent were 
already stateless before they became displaced in Anse-à-Pitres. When adding these 
forced migrants to long-term residents without documentation a significant number of 
stateless people now live in Anse-à-Pitres. 
In 2017, after a visit in the Dominican Republic, where many thousands of people 
of Haitian backgrounds were facing a lack of documentation preventing them from 
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applying for the regulation of their status, the elected Haitian president, Jovenel Moïse, 
promised to facilitate these people’s acquisition of identity documents, particularly ID 
cards and passports. With the intervention of the president, structures were created in 
Port-au-Prince, with the hope that they would be extended to the rest of the country, in 
order to deliver identity documents. However, in reality, the documentation crisis 
persisted, as the system remains corrupt and slow to respond to peoples’ requests for 
documentation. In Anse-à-Pitres, some organizations or agencies, such as SJM and 
GARR, entered the process in order to help vulnerable people acquire documentation, 
especially birth certificates. The SJM has launched campaigns of mobilization about 
documentation, organizing meetings and focus groups to which it invited local 
representatives and representatives of the national state. However, these representatives 
failed to attend apart from some local authorities from the rural area (CASEC) who do 
not exercise any real power. The intervention of the SJM came in support to a state that 
remains passive and sluggish despite the increased number of stateless people in the 
commune after the arrival of the forced migrants. 
3.2.1 Towards supporting the civil status: SJM’s documentation project of 
PwoKontram 
 
When the forced migrants were entering Anse-à-Pitres in 2015, representatives of 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR] were present at various 
border crossings. The UNHCR workers issued papers to some families, that contained 
individual’s names and pictures of family members, but those papers did not indicate 
places of birth. The purpose was limited, but essential, namely to provide something from 
the United Nations that recognized these migrants and refugees and enabled them to 
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request replacement birth certificates from civil registrar’s offices in Haiti. Also in the 
border region, particularly in Anse-à-Pitres, the SJM, a non-profit, lay organization, 
dedicated to the realization of social work, accompanies migrants, supports them, and 
helps them resettle and re-establish their lives. 
The alarming situation of people without documents in Anse-à-Pitres has been 
taken seriously by the SJM, which, with the support of the CRS and USDOL, 
implemented a project called PwoKontram (Literally Protecting humans’ work 
conditions) to provide birth certificates to a few forced migrant families and other 
vulnerable persons in the commune of Anse-à-Pitres. To launch the project, the SJM, 
through its promoter and monitors on the ground, organized information sessions with 
local authorities, the civil registrar, representatives of local and international 
organizations, and members of the civil society of Anse-à-Pitres. It also organized three 
focus groups: one in Fond-Jeannette and two in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, during which 
people discuss the documentation issue. According to SJM agents in Anse-à-Pitres, 
PwoKontram is the continuation of a documentation project that started in 2013. At that 
time, the project worked in a specific area in Anse-à-Pitres called Bas-Réfugiés with 
people who were repatriated from the Dominican Republic. These people were given a 
birth certificate by the SJM. PwoKontram is more inclusive though. It encompasses not 
only migrants, but also vulnerable people throughout the commune of Anse-à-Pitres. SJM 
also hired more monitors and increased the number of birth certificates issued. 
PwoKontram was a continuing opportunity to prove the usefulness of SJM/SFw-Haïti’s 
accompaniment mission. Through this program, SJM used a bottom up approach, 
whereby its employees went to meet with people seeking the best way to serve them. 
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During the course of the documentation project, SJM staff met with different 
categories of the population through informational sessions and focus groups, inviting 
people to discuss how they would like SJM to assist them in the process of obtaining a 
birth certificate. People underlined many issues that result from the fact that people do 
not have documentation. For example, schoolteachers and directors, who were at an SJM 
meeting, complained that children came to register at school without any documentation. 
At a certain level of primary school, these children need at least a birth certificate in order 
to be allowed to participate in official state exams. The lack of documentation also affects 
adults of various ages. For adults, the birth certificate cost is higher, as the registrar asked 
them to pay a sum of money that covers all years since their birth to the present year. 
People at the meeting raised another problem concerning the place that people have 
chosen to obtain their birth certificates. The challenges faced by many people attempting 
to obtain birth certificates in the commune of Anse-à-Pitres has led some parents to try to 
acquire birth certificates for them and their children in other places, such as Thiottes or 
Port-au-Prince, which causes a jurisdictional problem. For instance, one man who 
participated in a focus group, declared “here (in Fond-Jeannette), people don’t have birth 
certificates. Some people go to make “a piece of paper” in Thiottes. They don’t know if it 
is registered or not. They won’t be able to have any service in Anse-à-Pitres.”As a matter 
of fact, the change of jurisdiction does not change their nationality and their belonging to 
the Haitian state, but it can affect their belonging to their local community, for example, 
if they want to vote or be elected in that place. Their participation can be contested by 
long-term residents. 
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The SJM considered people’s complaints and promised to help them acquire a 
birth certificate and probably a certificate from the national archives. However, the SJM 
national representatives recognize their limits in terms of the resources available. Even 
when discounting the thousands stateless in the border region, the United Nations 
Children’s Fund [UNICEF] estimates that approximately twenty percent of all children 
under five years of age actually born in Haiti do not have proper identification such as 
birth certificates (Joseph 2015). This failure of the state has adverse and lifelong 
consequences for Haitians, children and parents alike. Simply put, SJM feels compelled 
to provide such parents and their children the opportunity to acquire identification in the 
form of birth certificates. Children will need them to attend school in Haiti. During 
interviews, one woman explained that her children were refused admission to a Haitian 
school due to the lack of identity papers for her children. Therefore, at least by providing 
birth certificates, SJM hopes to promote migrant integration into community life in Anse- 
à-Pitres, where most of them already feel ostracized. To accomplish this, SJM 
collaborates with representatives of other local organizations such as OJIDACA 
(Organisation des Jeunes Dévoués pour l’Avancement de la Commune de l’Anse-à- 
Pitres), Espace Jeune, Kore Fanmi, and local authorities. The legal process, however, can 
be complicated. Here is a typical chain of events leading to issuance of a birth certificate 
by SJM: 
1. Registration of people’s personal information by an SJM promoter 
and monitors in Anse-à-Pitres and in the migrant camps 
2. Delivery of the registration forms to the civil registrar, the civil 
status representative in Anse-à-Pitres 
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3. Transfer of registers from the civil registrar to the public 
prosecutor’s department in Jacmel 
4. Sending of these registers by the government commissioner to the 
ministry of Justice in Port-au-Prince 
5. Consignment of these documents by the ministry of Justice to the 
national archives, which register the birth certificates 
Of note, the civil registrar of Anse-à-Pitres has publicly stated his willingness to facilitate 
and accept the issuance of birth certificates for migrants and refugees who lack them. 
Encouraged by this, SJM has opened an office in Anse-à-Pitres, from where its migration 
and human rights monitors and a promoter spread through different camps in order to 
register people and transfer the forms to the office of the civil registrar. This 
humanitarian response is all happening at the local level, without intervention or interest 
from the national government. 
This action is nonetheless happening in relatively peaceful fashion, albeit in the 
midst of serious challenges. Tens of thousands of people have escaped one hardship for 
another. Their legal marginalization is likely to continue with a lack of state intervention, 
in what some would call a state of “civil death.” Despite this, organizations such as SJM 
and its partners continue with its mission, hoping to impart the human rights spirit to 
those living in the far southeast corner of Haiti. Many of those who have crossed the 
border have already suffered identity deprivation and persecution in the Dominican 
Republic. For lack of documentation, some have been denied education, work protection 
or healthcare (Bartlett 2012, as cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, Amnesty 
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International 2007, Lozano and Wooding 2008; Wooding and Mosley-Williams 2004) or 
have been expelled from the country after being discriminated against. 
 
3.3 Statelessness and its social corollary in the lives of the displaced people 
Having a nationality has been recognized as a fundamental right under 
international law (Dembour 2015) because it is intertwined with the enjoyment of human 
rights and integration into society. Otherwise, without a nationality, people become 
stateless, which exposes them to multiple forms of vulnerability, precarity, and 
displacement. In general, statelessness is referred to as the condition of having no 
nationality or legal citizenship (Weissbrodt and Collins 2006). Following Kerber (2007), 
I argue that statelessness may be conceived not only as a status, but also as a practice, 
based on the consequences that may result from it. For instance, Agamben (1998) argues 
that the rejection of a stateless person by the state makes them an outcast, taboo, and 
dangerous in their own society. This rejection of stateless people seems to be apparent in 
Anse-à-Pitres where forced migrants are ostracized and considered the main cause of 
violence and insecurity by the Haitian state and long-term residents in Anse-à-Pitres. In 
addition, the forced migrants arrived in a country that continues to strive to get back on 
its feet after the devastating 2010 earthquake and ongoing social and political 
instabilities. 
While in Anse-à-Pitres in 2016, Hurricane Matthew hit the country and claimed 
the lives of about 1,000 Haitian people (Le Figaro 2016). Although their lives were 
spared and the hurricane damage was less extensive in comparison to the rest of the 
country, the community is still living with fear considering the fragility of their small 
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houses made of cardboard, pieces of clothes, and covered with tarpaulin; in other terms, 
the incapacity of their slums to stand when natural disasters threaten. Even if being in 
Haiti provides them a sense of freedom escaping Dominican fear and the reminiscence of 
the terror created by the Dominican dictator Trujillo with the pogrom of the 1930s, their 
lives in Haiti remain insecure and precarious. Food insecurity, poor lodging, poor access 
to drinkable water, and the inability to work due to being stateless are among all the 
issues they have to deal with in order to start a new life in Haiti. Medi’s statement , 
during a focus group at the camp of Parc Cadeau #1, describes his experience of 
displacement and the paradox of Anse-à-Pitres as a place that juxtaposes sense of 
freedom and suffering when he maintains: “We are quiet. We see that we are living well 
but there is no change. We have hunger in our stomach, morning, noon, and night.” It 
should be noted that by “living well,” Medi is referring to the sense of freedom that being 
in Anse-à-Pitres provided him, but his experience since his displacement is one of 
precarity and uncertainty. 
I use the expression: “having peace in their heart [sense of freedom] but not in 
 
their stomach [meaning hunger]”to summarize the meaning people give to their transition 
from the Dominican Republic to Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, where they continue to live in 
precarious conditions. This peace is basic and equates to the simple fact that they are not 
living with the fear of deportation. It has nothing to do with the enjoyment of social and 
economic rights in Haiti. In other words, it does not palliate their needs of being legally 
integrated into the community. Their situation reminds me of Breton and Yelvington 
(1999), who saw the emancipation of the former enslaved as a road strewn with pitfalls 
when they argued that “by the end of 19th century, if Caribbean people were indeed free, 
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everywhere they were in chains.” Those chains for displaced people correlate with 
capitalist-driven processes and the enactment of migration laws that rendered them 
stateless, but also with their conditions in Anse-à-Pitres, where both residents and the 
local state see their future as uncertain and their presence as illegitimate and flawed 
(Zayas 2015). 
The precarity6 of the people displaced in Anse-à-Pitres can be defined within the 
parameters of those structural circumstances linked with the world of neoliberal 
capitalism and the adoption of unfair laws, but also their condition of living in a state of 
civil death that prevents them from reaching human development, which is the 
satisfaction of their multidimensional well-beings. Without a legal identity or a valid 
identity that is registered in the national archives, the displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres 
liken their lives to animals, or as people who are living, but do not exist. For instance, I 
went to participated in a focus group about documentation with SJM staff in Fond- 
Jeannette, a remote place located in the periphery of Anse-à-Pitres. During the meeting, a 
man living in the area put all people’s complaints together and claimed that “Animals 
 
6 Precarity has been linked with ‘anomie, anger, anxiety, and alienation’ in the face of 
contemporary politics, what is conceived as ‘a class-in-the-making’ (Lazar and Sanchez 
2019). Allison (2013) refers to precarity as a form of suffering that is the outcome of 
being trapped by the instabilities and inequalities of neoliberal globalism. For instance, 
she shows how many Japanese accepted to do dangerous jobs that entail risks and death 
in order to take advantage of job opportunities generated by the 2011 earthquake. In 
Haiti, forced migrants find themselves in this kind of society that she describes where 
hope has turned scarce and the future has become bleak or inconceivable altogether 
(Allison 2013). The displaced people’s precarity and uncertainty can be defined 
according to circumstances that include the migration law taken by the Dominican state 
that not only displaced these people but also led to their dispossession, the absence of the 
Haitian state to care for their well-being and the political and economic choices of the 
leaders of that country that only increased inequalities and endemic poverty, their 
vulnerability to exploitation by outsiders, and the lack of opportunities in Haiti, 
particularly Anse-à-Pitres. 
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have paper, but we as people, we don’t have a birth certificate.” His statement is 
reminiscent of Gordillo (2006)’s observation, whereby he has shown how not having 
documents discriminated against Toba and Wichi, making them vulnerable to violence. 
These people simply saw themselves as animals, when they entrusted to him: "Without 
documentos, you can do nothing. That's the custom of this law. We didn't have 
documentos. They treated us like dogs.” The Haitian state proves to be lax in providing 
its citizens with ID papers. The generalized lack of documentation of people in Anse-à- 
Pitres attests to the absence of a state that cares for the wellbeing of its people, which 
consequently leads to the marginalization of a wide range of members of its population. 
Forced migrants blame the Haitian state for their state of precarious existence 
because according to them, the state does not support them. In Anse-à-Pitres, it is not 
easy to locate the state. Upon the arrival of the forced migrants in Haiti, in a discourse 
held by the former president Michel Joseph Martelly on June 2015, the state promised to 
welcome the forced migrants with dignity contending: “Haiti is ready to stand up straight 
to receive with dignity its children, our brothers (Alphonse 2015)”. However, I did not 
notice any involvement of the state with the forced migrants. In Anse-à-Pitres, there are 
two ways one may locate the state in the forced migrants’ lives. Its inefficiency creates a 
vacuum for falseness and racketeering and its absence leads to the intervention of private 
organizations that come to fill the gap. On the one hand, the inefficiency of the state can 
be located in its incapacity to deliver legal or good documents to people, who have to 
turn to a lawyer for the legality of birth certificates written by a registrar. On the other 
hand, the absence of the state is expressed in people’s narratives that show the retreat of 
the state from caring for people’s wellbeing. For instance, Anissa finished her journey in 
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the Dominican Republic when she was deported by the authorities of this country. After 
coming to Haiti, she lived with her family in Tête Source. However, those family ties do 
not constitute a network that can help her mitigate poverty. She feels that she lacks the 
support of the state as she contends: “I don’t find any support from the state. We are here; 
we are living badly. When we find something, we take it; when we don’t find anything, 
we accept. We are in our country.” By expressing her belonging to the country even 
without a legal document that can establish this identification, Anissa is demonstrating 
that she depends on a state which disappeared shortly after the displaced people have 
arrived in Anse-à-Pitres. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In Anse-à-Pitres, most forced migrants continued to live without any legal 
identity. The civil registry, which is endowed with the attribution to document people, is 
facing many structural problems including the lack of materials and state funding. The 
SJM provided the institution with some material support, but this was far from solving 
the evils that erode the civil registry. These challenges can help explain why many people 
in Anse-à-Pitres are undocumented. Drogue and Bertin (2012) contend that, 
sociologically, many Haitian people do not value documentation because they do not see 
its importance in their lives. People of Anse-à-Pitres, particularly the displaced people, 
develop a different behavior towards documentation though. As people who are crossing 
the border frequently, they consider having an identity document a door to the freedom of 
movement and job opportunities. 
95  
When seeking to understand the causes behind the generalized statelessness in 
Anse-à-Pitres, while some think that the lack of documentation is attributable to the 
parents who do not declare their children after birth or to the illiteracy problems in Haiti, 
the majority consider it to be the state’s fault. The state is represented by the civil status, 
which is the institution invested with the power to issue birth certificates. However, 
through the structural aspects I explained earlier, the state demonstrates a lot of 
deficiency in this role of documenting people. It is by referring to the weakness of the 
civil status in Anse-à-Pitres and the intervention of organizations in the lives of the 
displaced people that we may locate the state. First, people could not understand why the 
state, represented by the civil registrar, delivered birth certificates that are not good to 
thousands of people. Second, people maintain that they did not see any willingness of the 
state to contribute to the functioning of the civil state. For instance, the civil registrar of 
Anse-à-Pitres maintained that for a long time the office had been running out of materials 
such as registry forms, which should be provided by the National Press, a state-owned 
institution. According to the registrar, the state owes the National Press many million 
Haitian gourdes, which made people at a meeting ironically say “the state owes the state.” 
The incapacity of the Haitian state to meet the needs of its population forces it to 
comply with the rules of organizations that are often accountable to their donors and their 
funding state rather than to local people. For instance, SJM received funding from CRS 
and the US department of labor (USDOL) for the documentation program. While the 
SJM develops direct proximity to the local people that it is supporting, at the same time, 
it has to be accountable to its donors; this was visible to me through the visits made by 
CRS representatives in Anse-à-Pitres to obtain a report of the documentation program 
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executed by the SJM. The intervention of private organizations in matters of 
documentation is an outcome of the inefficiency of the state in making social, political 
and economic choices, including providing people with a legal identity that could help 
them integrate into society and benefit from basic services. As Bhabha (2011) suggests, 
legal identity does not guarantee a good life, but its absence is a serious impediment to it. 
As I argue in this chapter, the absence of a legal identity or a nationality puts the 
displaced and stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres in a state of civil death, that is, the 
impossibility to enjoy basic social and civil rights, which contributes to their 
marginalization. 
By exploring the materiality and the interactions between people and the state, I 
show that documentation can constitute a form of governmentality. This contributes to 
anthropological inquiry into documentation. This legal dimension of documentation can 
be expanded to a larger perspective where documentation and borders intersect to 
broaden our understanding of the interactions between people and the modern state, but 
also our understanding of how documentation governs the lives of both documented and 
undocumented people. As I discuss in the next chapter, because of the lack of legal 
documentation, many forced migrants found it necessary to seek opportunities in the 
informal economy. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE INFORMAL ECONOMIC PRACTICES OF THE FORCED 
MIGRANTS AND EMANCIPATION 
 
 
I was sitting at the SJM office helping the staff with the registration of people for 
the documentation program I described earlier. It was at that time I met Bonèl, a man in 
his late fifties, who went to the Dominican Republic in 1992. He entered Haiti during the 
mass expulsion in 2015 and took up residence at the camp of Maletchipe in Anse-à- 
Pitres. With six children, Bonèl had to work hard to start a new life. During our 
conversation, he told me: “We have a family. We can’t stay home. I need to do 
something to earn the bread to give to the children. Someone can give you 50 gourdes but 
it is not every day. You need to do something.” 
Bonèl shows the struggle the forced migrants endure just to survive from day to 
day, in spite of the poor access to resources. As an old man, Bonèl may not be able to 
work as hard as he used to in the past, but he understands the obligation to do something 
in order to not be dependent on other people. In Anse-à-Pitres, the only way he can create 
a livelihood to support his family is through the informal economy. This is the same 
desire that defines Bonèl and many forced migrants as agents of their own development, 
in the absence of support from the state and organizations. 
This chapter examines the everyday survival practices of the forced migrants. I 
argue that the displaced people exercise important forms of agency in and over their lives 
by mobilizing resources through undertaking informal economic practices instead of 
relying on the increasingly strained resources in Anse-à-Pitres. I show how using the 
informal economy as a source of survival brings meaning to the displaced people’s lives, 
and that this meaning is more valuable than the money they generate from it. The 
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meaning that these people found in the informal economy includes values and beliefs that 
infuse their everyday matter of living (Browne and Milgram 2009). 
The informal economy refers to economic activities that are not regulated by the 
state (Neve 2005) and are generally used by poor people who face barriers to their 
participation in the formal economy. While the informal economy is to be found in north 
and global south countries, it has become very important in global south countries with 
the collapse of the state (Meagher 2010). As Saskia Sassen (2014) argues, this expansion 
of the informal economy may, in some ways, be considered an outcome of diverse forms 
of expulsions in the global economy causing displacement, unemployment and 
impoverishment. The engagement of forced migrants in the informal economy can be 
understood within this context, as their expulsion from the Dominican Republic also 
excluded them from a Dominican economy driven by global capital and neoliberalism, 
which has spread throughout the global south. For instance, neoliberal measures adopted 
by the Bolivian state led to disastrous effects such as the destruction of agricultural 
production and the discontinuation of subsidy programs for farmers, which forced the 
majority of the population into poverty and unemployment. As a consequence, Bolivia 
has become home to the largest informal sector of any country in Latin America, with 
nearly 80% of employment in both rural and urban areas being in the informal economy 
(Goldstein 2016: 33). The informal sector includes activities that many people engage in 
daily, including unregulated commerce and more illicit activities such as drug dealing, 
smuggling, and prostitution (Goldstein 2016). In Haiti, the informal economy constitutes 
the main sector of activity for the majority of the population, who suffers from high 
unemployment. The informal economic practices of the forced migrants are part of the 
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Haitian informal sector. However, for the forced migrants, they take place both in and 
beyond their communities in Haiti. 
In this chapter, first, I demonstrate that colonial history has shaped forced 
migrants contemporary informal economic activities. Working on the side has been used 
by Caribbean enslaved people as a strategy to reproduce themselves and avoid being 
dependent solely on poor nutrition provided by colonizers. 
Second, I trace the economic practices of the forced migrants while they were 
living in the Dominican Republic. I refer to their past economic experiences to examine 
how they shape present dynamics. 
Third, I look at the picture of the local economy in Anse-à-Pitres, which rests 
upon fishing, commercial activities, and, to a small extent, agriculture. The deficiency of 
these sectors of activities demonstrates the lack of production in Anse-à-Pitres and 
explains why the local economy is mostly about consumption. 
Fourth, I discuss the activities the forced migrants undertake in the Dominican 
Republic, and how these activities allow them to generate sources of income that help 
them sustain their lives. 
Fifth, in the absence of state support, the SJM has intervened in the lives of the 
forced migrants, providing some development aid to them in the form of microcredit that 
consists more of a form of aid than a credit. 
Finally, I show that forced migrants’ informal economic practices are far from 
helping them achieve material well being. What really helps them survive is the meaning 
that the engagement in those activities brings to their lives. 
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4.1 Present economic behavior and colonial history 
Colonial history has shaped the present-day informal economy of Caribbean poor 
people, including the forced migrants, in particular ways. The slave-based economies in 
the Caribbean region were part of the capitalist system with the Caribbean people as 
producers for the European market, making this region an appendage of the world 
economy (Bonham 1992). In this form of global economy, the producers, in their position 
of colonized, were powerless in comparison to the wealthy consumers. They were simply 
accumulating capital for European colonizers. As a result, they did not own their labor 
and were marginalized. In order to survive, these enslaved people were forced to develop 
informal economic practices outside the plantations. For instance, Wolf (1982) suggests 
that former slaves worked personal gardens and later, following emancipation, employed 
their labor as market forces of production for their own subsistence. 
Furthermore, some scholars have documented how slaves have developed 
underground economies out of the main economic stream of the plantations in order to 
respond to their needs. Their informal economic practices included dedicating themselves 
to agricultural activities and trading that allowed them to compensate for the lack of 
support they received from the colonizers. For example, slaves developed household 
economies by devoting their free time to activities such as tending gardens, collecting 
firewood and making charcoal, repairing houses, making handicrafts, engaging in food 
collecting activities, and marketing and trading (Handler and Wallman 2014: 448). 
According to Forret (2004), many slaves diligently raised and sold their own crops, and 
tended horses and livestock throughout the antebellum South. They also traded a wide 
range of commodities stolen from their masters or produce from their gardens that 
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included chickens, turkeys, beef to poor whites, and, which helped them to acquire 
nonessential luxuries or specialty foodstuffs that were not as readily obtained on the 
plantation (790-791). 
Finally, after emancipation, white elites of the Caribbean region continued to have 
an upper hand on major economic resources. As a result of these colonial and neocolonial 
processes that made and continue to make resources the prerogative of small dominant 
groups, former enslaved tried to develop several different income sources such as 
working for wages on the plantation, or renting or squatting on small pieces of land 
which would be cultivated by the women and children, and which helped them to carve 
out new lives on their own terms (Bridget and Yelvington 1999: 6). These examples, 
rooted in colonial history, highlight the agency of marginalized people. In the same vein, 
forced migrants show combativeness and agency despite economic and social constraints, 
drawing upon informal economic practices that range from selling their labor, making 
charcoal, logging, and gardening in order to build lives of their own making in Anse-à- 
Pitres, Haiti. 
 
4.2 Economic activities back in the Dominican Republic 
During a visit to the camp of Parc Cadeau, I met with Anicia, a woman in her 
forties, who was born in Altagracias, Dominican Republic. Her father died and left her 
undocumented. She complained to me about her situation of having neither Dominican 
documentation nor a Haitian ID card. She has a deep regret that as a Dominican born, she 
could not secure a Dominican legal identity and it was because of this that she was 
deported to Anse-à-Pitres. I was interested in knowing how she made a living in such a 
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situation. We were sitting on a bench at the entrance of the camp Parc Cadeau #2 on a 
sunny day, talking. Physically, Anicia appears strong and determined even though she 
was pushed by the deep poverty in the camp. Anicia agreed that her life was not the same 
in the Dominican Republic. She remembered her life just two years from the time I met 
with her: “In the Dominican Republic, I worked at people’s houses. My husband did 
agricultural work. Sometimes, I did small commerce but it is not big thing. I used to sell 
small sweets on the street.” Without any legal document, the economic activities 
performed by Anicia and her husband were part of the informal sector. They were the 
strategies she used to provide for the family. Interestingly, her sources of income were 
diversified because of her husband who engaged in agricultural labor. Now, sitting in 
Anse-à-Pitres without undertaking any economic activity, Anicia does not feel 
comfortable. Even though she was not earning much in the Dominican Republic, she 
could have done something to “make do.” Many Haitians who were living in the 
Dominican Republic had a similar experience, where they managed to make a living 
through working off the books. 
The displaced population found in Anse-à-Pitres is composed of many young 
people in their twenties who were born in the Dominican Republic, and adult men and 
women between their thirties and sixties originating from proximate areas such as Belle- 
Anse, Thiottes, and Fonds-Verretes, who migrated to the Dominican Republic during the 
twentieth and twenty first century to work mainly in the agricultural sector. The majority 
of their labor was informal and uncontrolled, as most crossed the border without legal 
documents and integrated into the unregulated work available in the country (Wooding 
and Bridget 2004: 15). However, some migrants entered with temporary work permits, as 
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the Haitian government signed agreements with Dominican companies to recruit Haitian 
workers, among other West Indians, as a source of cheap labor. Emigration fees and 
recruiting permits became the Haitian government’s largest internal source of revenue 
(Martinez 1999). For example, in 1980 around 200,000 Haitians were permanently 
residing in the Dominican Republic, of which 70,000 were workers in various sectors, but 
especially in agricultural work (Grasmuck and Pesar 1991). This suggests that before 
being driven out of the country, forced migrants’ labor was a significant contribution to 
Dominican agriculture. This trend is confirmed by Lauren Derby (1994: 516), who 
argued that Haitians constituted the very center of economic life in the various 
Dominican border economies, which were rooted in agriculture and pastoralism. In the 
Dominican Republic, most forced migrants lived in the mountainous regions and worked 
the land and could have their own gardens even though they had to share the harvest with 
Dominican landowners. Besides this, they raised cattle and owned horses, pigs, goats and 
chickens. Therefore, the forced migrants have not always been totally dispossessed. Even 
though they earned very little, many of them attested that their life was better in the 
Dominican Republic than in Haiti. Economically, they had more opportunities as they 
could work in the agricultural sector, have small businesses, and perform domestic labor. 
They felt that they had some control over their lives and were able to take care of 
themselves and their families. 
Mina was brought to the Dominican Republic by her mother when she was a 
child. She was forced to leave the country in the summer of 2015 because of Dominican 
threat and is living in the camp of Parc Cadeau with four children. She arrived in Anse-à- 
Pitres with nothing: “I didn’t take anything. I came with nothing. The gardens I did 
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stayed down there, my old animals stayed behind; robbers took them. We came like this 
with our empty hands.” Being displaced in Haiti in such a state of material 
dispossession, her situation went from bad to worse. In the Dominican Republic, she had 
different sources of income with her husband. She told me: “In the Dominican Republic, 
I used to do commerce. My husband did agriculture.” These activities allowed the family 
to survive in the country and support themselves in the face of marginalization. 
Some forced migrants who had a family contend that, in the Dominican Republic, 
they were able to combine salaries from agricultural work and other activities. For 
instance, sometimes, the husband cultivated the earth while the wife managed a small 
business. She could sell at home or in the street as a mobile merchant. Lwiz is living at 
the camp of Tête-à-l’Eau, which is located on the Anse-à-Pitres-Pedernales border. She 
was brought to the Dominican Republic when she was only one year old by her mother, 
who went in search of a better life in the 1980s. Lwiz had spent her entire life there, from 
being raised to giving birth to her four children, before she was displaced to Anse-à- 
Pitres, Haiti in 2015. When she was living in the Dominican Republic, the family’s 
 
income came from both her selling and her husband’s agricultural labor; as she put it: 
“When I was in the Dominican Republic, my husband was working the land. Me, I was 
doing small businesses. I used to sell rice, all things, flour, and oil. I sold in wholesale.” 
She felt good about her life experience in the Dominican Republic: “We were good 
because we were working doing businesses, gardening, harvesting our peas, many 
quintals of peas. We used to get money.” Lwiz was able to diversify the household 
economy rather than depend only on agricultural work, which helped the family survive. 
105  
For Anicia and other forced migrants, living in the Dominican Republic had both 
positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, the Dominican Republic offered them 
some economic opportunities, as they could perform some informal odd jobs and raise 
cattle, but on the other hand, this country remains in their memory as one that 
marginalized, excluded, and materially dispossessed them, and that, in return, took back 
what it economically gave them. Carmelia translates this situation of the Dominican 
Republic as both positive and negative for the forced migrants. Her entire life was spent 
in the Dominican Republic and her contribution to the Dominican agricultural economy 
bears indelible prints as she had an active life working, gardening: “In the Dominican 
Republic, I used to cultivate the earth planting fruit trees. We had a big yard with 
avocado trees, coffee, and mango trees.” In this sense, in the Dominican Republic, she 
could generate some income in the margins of the formal economy. However, she was 
forced to leave on the spot. When a Dominican soldier asked her to leave, she said: “How 
should we go without any money? We gardened and it was lost.” The Dominican 
Republic represents the country that gave them something and at the same time that 
brutally dispossessed them. This dispossession is apparent through the system of 
sharecropping, which consists of working on the property Dominican owners and also 
giving the owners a fifth of the harvest. 
The conditions of the sharecropping system between workers and their 
landowners vary. If, for example, the worker bought the seed himself/herself, he/she 
could keep a great part of the harvest, but if, on the contrary, it was the landowner who 
gave the seed, the worker would obtain a very small part of the harvest after the 
landowner had retrieved their profit and the equivalent of their investment. In 2016, I met 
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Ruben, a man in his fifties, at the camp of Parc Cadeau #1. He went to the Dominican 
Republic in 2003 and was forced to return to Anse-à-Pitres in 2015. During his 12 years 
in the Dominican Republic, he worked as a sharecropper on Dominican land: “When I 
was in the Dominican Republic, I grew peas and corn. The landowner gave me the seed. 
He put everything on his notebook. During the harvest, he took off everything that he 
invested. You almost had nothing left. You only had something to eat.” In the case of 
Ruben, the landowner was the one who decided to retrieve his part of the harvest. Some 
Dominican owners did not strictly observe the one-fifth rule though. According to some 
forced migrants who worked in the system, even though they provided the seed, some 
landowners left everything to the discretion of the workers as far as the sharing of the 
harvest is concerned; the workers decided the quantity they wanted to give to the 
landowners. Anous’ Dominican boss was good because Anous could borrow money from 
him to buy the seed. However, after getting his money back from the harvest, there was 
almost nothing left for him. These kinds of unequal relationships demonstrate how it was 
hard for Haitian agricultural workers to make a profit from their own labor. Entering into 
a contract with a landowner was the only way they could have access to the land, which 
gives Dominicans total control over the labor of these workers. This control of workers’ 
labor by owners makes the Dominican Republic look a society, where the transition from 
slave labor to free wage still persisted after emancipation (Martinez 1999). This idea is 
also reinforced by the fact that the Haitian laborers were constrained to sell the harvest 
either to Dominican wholesalers, who came to pick them with their trucks, or at the 
binational market controlled by Dominicans. As Anous said, “the harvest was sold in 
Pedernales at the binational market. Dominicans also came to buy our goods with their 
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trucks. Then, we could go to the market to buy what we need.” This means that the 
Haitian workers sold their products for a cheap price to Dominican buyers and earned 
very little from their participation in agricultural labor. 
As discussed above, the displaced people explain that the Dominican Republic 
offered them economic opportunities, especially in the agricultural sector. Both men and 
women were engaged in informal economic practices that allowed them to live on a day- 
to-day basis. However, these opportunities were often eclipsed by exploitation by 
Dominican landowners and the constant fear they were going through. Despite 
everything, they did not stop to compare their lives in the Dominican Republic with their 
lives in Anse-à-Pitres, where the economic opportunities are lacking. 
 
4.3 Sector of activities and economic opportunities in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti7  
The Anse-à-Pitres local economy rests upon fishing, commercial exchange with 
the Dominican Republic, and, to a lesser extent, agriculture. 
Because of its accessible coasts, some peasants of Anse-à-Pitres are able to 
practice artisanal fishing. Requiring only low-technology such as small boats and nets, 
this activity can primarily be considered part of fishermen’s own subsistence and sales, 
whereby they feed themselves and sell the surplus at the local market. There does not 
exist an installed fishing industry in this border city, nor any sort of funding for people 
 
 
 
 
7
Anse-à-Pitres is located in the south-east of Haiti and close to Pedernales, Dominican Republic. This 
proximity facilitates commercial exchange between the two cities, which constitutes a great part of the 
local economy.  
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who undertake this activity. The fishermen work in both Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. In Anse-à-Pitres, this activity mainly takes place in an area called Récif, and to 
a much lower degree in Anse-à-Pitres downtown area. A significant number of coastal 
people of the city live on fishing. In the Dominican Republic, Haitian people in Anse-à- 
Pitres, who have the Dominican identification called cédula, or Haitians with the 
complicity of Dominican friends, can have their fishing boats registered by the 
Dominican local state. This allows them to conduct fishing activity in the Dominican sea. 
I had a conversation with a local fisherman in Anse-à-Pitres, whom I call Natan. At that 
time, he was preparing a fish trap. He said: “I work with a Dominican. I stretch out my 
fish trap in the sea and go to retrieve it after many days later. The Dominican boss shares 
the fishing harvest with me.” Despite interdiction from the Dominican state, some 
unauthorized people from Anse-à-Pitres circumvent Dominican soldiers and go to fish at 
night. According to local people, because of the implementation of fishing regulations, 
the Dominican sea is less exploited, and as a consequence, is richer in fish than the 
Haitian side, which is why it attracts Haitian fishers. Sometimes conflicts happen 
between Haitians and Dominicans. In January 2015, Dominican soldiers arrested seven 
Haitian fishermen and confiscated their boats. Haitians retaliated by closing the 
Dominican consulate in Anse-à-Pitres. The situation escalated to violence between the 
two peoples, whereby Dominican authorities prevented Haitian businessmen and women 
from crossing the border to conduct their commercial activities (GARR 2015) until they 
found an agreement. This situation affected the border economy, including fishing, that is 
vital to the two peoples. 
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Generally, local fishermen sell their products to wholesalers in Anse-à-Pitres, 
who, in turn, sell them to other cities such as Jacmel and Port-au-Prince. Dominicans also 
buy from Haitian fishermen, but they only buy the most expensive marine products such 
as lobsters, crab etc. There are very few Haitian merchants selling seafood at the 
binational market. According to Makdo, an SJM monitor, who was born and raised in 
Anse-à-Pitres, seafood is one of the many products that Dominicans forbid Haitians from 
selling at the binational market. Artisanal fishing constitutes a survival strategy for some 
peasants in Anse-à-Pitres, who sell their marine products. Even though the fishing 
activity helps local fishermen generate individual income, it does not dramatically 
strengthen the local economy due to the lack of a well-established industry and the 
regulations set by Dominicans that ban Haitian products at the binational market. 
The other sector which constitutes the backbone of the local economy is 
commercial activities with Pedernales, Dominican Republic. The binational market, 
which brings together people from the two cities of Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales, is the 
place where most of these activities take place. On a particular Monday and Friday, if 
someone is crossing the border from Haiti to the Dominican Republic to go to the 
binational market, they will encounter the following. On one’s way ahead, motorcycles 
are sounding the horn constantly, carrying bundles of merchandise for Haitian merchants 
from the market to their home in Anse-à-Pitres. In front of the gate on the Haitian side, 
many currency traders, who change Haitian gourdes and pesos, take their seat in the open 
air next to the taxi moto station. Generally, people have to change their gourdes into 
pesos to enter the market because, ironically, even Haitian merchants (with some rare 
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exceptions) do not accept the Haitian currency. A small bridge gives access to the 
Dominican side where the binational market is located. 
Of all commercial transactions, the commerce of Dominican-manufactured 
second-hand clothes called pèpè in Creole ranks first. The commerce of Pèpè (basically 
all kinds of clothes and shoes for men, women, and children) is vital to the economic life 
in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. Every week, it is possible to see trucks of second-hand clothes 
crossing the border from Pedernales to Anse-à-Pitres. Most of this merchandise goes to 
warehouse storage to be unloaded. People from Anse-à-Pitres buy pèpè from Dominican 
textile industries to resell to other places in Haiti. These pèpè, once they have arrived in 
Anse-à-Pitres, they are wrapped up and sent to be sold in other cities such as Jacmel and 
Port-au-Prince. Sellers also bring them to the binational market where both Dominicans 
and Haitians purchase them. Actually, second-hand clothes are the most imported 
products by people in Anse-à-Pitres, who also display them at the binational market. 
Third, besides fishing and commerce, agriculture is understood as one of the most 
basic economic activities of Anse-à-Pitres. However, agricultural production in Anse-à- 
Pitres and its surrounding areas is almost negligible, such that local people have to buy 
Dominican food products such as vegetables, plantains, and other tubers. Anse-à-Pitres is 
composed of plateaus and mountains. One of the biggest obstacles to agricultural 
exploitation in the area is its lack of irrigation facilities. There is one canal, that was 
drilled from the Pedernales river and that runs straight through Anse-à-Pitres downtown, 
but it is overused by people, who rely on the water for household tasks such as laundry, 
dishes, bathing etc. Practicing agriculture in the mountains requires using motors to drive 
the water up there, but local agricultural workers do not have access to this technology. 
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However, people who live close to or in the mountainous areas, such as Bois-d’Ormes, 
Fond-Jeannette, or Tête-Source practice limited agricultural activities that include the 
production of coffee, market gardens, and vegetables. Most of the land in Anse-à-Pitres, 
plateaus or mountains, is arid, and during my research it rarely rained. Therefore, laborers 
could not rely on the rain for gardening, and when it rains, like all the coastal cities in 
Haiti, the risk of flooding is high, which is not good for the harvest. In such 
circumstances, undertaking agricultural activity in Anse-à-Pitres is not a credible option 
for forced migrants. Moreover, the land does not belong to them and nothing was done by 
the local state to employ the forced migrants as a productive force, something that many 
wished for. In the end, forced migrants turned towards the Dominican Republic to do 
agricultural work and collect wood to generate some income in order to make a living 
Anse-à-Pitres. 
 
4.4 Agriculture and wood collection as sources of income 
 
Agriculture constitutes one, if not the dominant, source of income for the forced 
migrants who go to the Dominican Republic on a daily basis to work the land. The 
weight of agricultural work in maintaining most migrants’ families in Anse-à-Pitres is 
considerable. Many displaced persons maintain that if they do not put in a day’s work, 
they and their children will not eat, as many forced migrants rely on selling their labor to 
make a living. In the Dominican Republic, they can clandestinely work for Dominicans, 
who pay them in cash to avoid state regulation. The significance of these income- 
generating activities is evidenced by Canine, who stated: “here (Anse-à-Pitres), there are 
no means of livelihood. There is no way to sell a day’s work. My husband always goes to 
sell a day’s work. Our survival depends on that.” For those days of work, forced migrants 
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are often underpaid or not paid at all by Dominican bosses who know that they are 
undocumented. Mérinord, who works in the agricultural sector to make a living, explains 
this exploitation: “we are obliged to work for 125 gourdes a day to make a living. It is not 
what they were supposed to pay us because you work from 6:00 a.m. to 4 p.m.” In fact, 
not all migrants were as lucky as Mérinord to find a place to put in a day’s work, despite 
the underpayment. As a result, they ended up gathering wood or making charcoal so that 
they could earn a little something. 
Wood gathering has always been a significant survival strategy for forced 
migrants. They go to the Dominican Republic to look for dry firewood to sell to people in 
Anse-à-Pitres for cooking with or for dry-cleaning businesses. They also make charcoal 
out of the pieces of wood they have collected, which they sell to local businessmen in 
Anse-à-Pitres who export it to other cities, particularly Port-au-Prince. Many forced 
migrants maintained that they were looking for wood in the Dominican Republic when 
Dominican soldiers ran after them. For instance, Fanie was complaining to me about the 
fact that they no longer receive support from organizations. Their only alternative to this 
abandonment is to continue to take risks crossing the border. However, loggers and 
charcoal makers are warned by Dominican soldiers watching the border and the forests, 
who are capable of the worst. Fanie showed much concern about this situation, as there is 
no work in Anse-à-Pitres and going to gather pieces of wood on the Dominican side is 
risky as she said, “If your husband goes to look for a package of wood, Dominican 
soldiers run after him.” During a focus group with forced migrants in the camp of Parc 
Cadeau #2, people related the story of a man who went to make charcoal in the 
Dominican Republic, and who was apprehended by the soldiers. According to people at 
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the camp, they beat him, attached him with a rope to a truck, and pulled him. The wood 
can be sold for different prices, including 50 HT gourdes (USD 0.83) for a small package 
of wood and 750 gourdes (USD 12.50) for a sack of charcoal. For example, Kannèl often 
collected wood and sold to people in Anse-à-Pitres in order to earn some money to buy 
basic food for his family: “People from Anse-à-Pitres may need a package of wood; they 
take it. They give you 25-50 gourdes.” Recently, the migrants discovered flanbo (Figure 
6), which are dry branches that come from a Dominican tree called Cornel according to 
some local people8. In comparison to the other kinds of wood, flanbo is more expensive, 
and it constitutes a rare item that loggers look for in the Dominican Republic. 
 
 
[Figure 6 Packages of Flanbo assembled to be sold]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 I talked to different people in order to find out the exact name of the tree that flanbo comes from, but it is 
not known to them. According to some local people in Anse-à-Pitres, Dominicans call it Cornel Tree, 
something that I could not confirm though. 
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4.4.1 Flanbo in the informal economy 
Flanbo is not a piece of wood like others used for fire or charcoal. Flanbo has a name 
and it costs money. Flanbo is a dry piece of wood, which for some reason is not found in 
Haiti, but in the Dominican Republic. Almost everywhere in the camps, especially at Parc 
Cadeau #2, a package of flanbo is erected in front of each migrant’s home. At first sight, I 
thought it was forced migrants’ wood to prepare fire to cook their food. Later, I learned 
from them that it was flanbo, the new gold for wood collectors. The “considerable” price 
of flanbo and the interest of factories from Port-au-Prince in it make the flanbo the most 
wanted type of wood by the forced migrants on their trip to the Dominican forests. 
According to migrants, flanbo is used to make perfume, plywood, and a kind of oil for 
airplanes (which I could not confirm). It is recovered in the Dominican Republic, brought 
to the camp where forced migrants assembled it to sell by meters with one meter worth 
up to 3,000 HT gourdes (USD 50). With self-employment as the principal mode of 
employment in the informal sector (Breman 1996), flanbo offers some forced migrants a 
strategy to undertake an activity that is not based on wage-earning. It palliates the lack of 
formal jobs on the agricultural fields, which primarily attract the forced migrants. 
One morning, I visited the camp. I stopped by Lijan’s home. In a typical morning, 
his wife was in the kitchen and the smell of the coffee perfumed the place. Lijan was 
sitting in front of the house, neighboring three other tents, talking to friends and family 
members. He invited me and Zamy to join and gave me a seat. A while later, his wife 
brought coffee to everyone. Around us, people were cutting pieces of wood, packing and 
arranging them properly to be ready to be loaded onto trucks. In front of Lijan’s house, a 
package was already prepared. When I asked him about the gathered wood, he said that it 
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was the new business in the camp and if customs detected them, they would make their 
owners pay. 
The commercialization of flanbo involves better-off long-term residents of Anse- 
à-Pitres, who buy it from forced migrants. Therefore, in the flanbo business, the forced 
migrants can be considered simple workers located at the bottom of a hierarchy, while at 
the top are people who have direct contact with factories in Port-au-Prince to deliver the 
merchandise. At least, flanbo creates jobs for migrants who cross the border to gather it, 
truck drivers, and those who sell it to companies. Once forced migrants have arrived in 
the camp with the flanbo, they pack it for trucks to pick up. According to forced 
migrants, they are paid 2,500 to 3,000 HT gourdes per meter, a price that has very much 
increased; at the beginning it was a much lower price. Even though forced migrants 
showed that they were satisfied with their pay, flanbo is a profitable business for the 
buyers. Some buyers/sellers go to Port-au-Prince and resell it to companies in US dollars. 
The connection that the flanbo business creates between the forced migrants and people 
in the city of Anse-à-Pitres and others such as Port-au-Prince demonstrates that the 
informal sector is also part of the urban economy (Breman 1996). When considering what 
forced migrants have risked in bringing this piece of wood to Anse-à-Pitres, they are very 
much under-paid in comparison to those who bought it from them to resell to factories in 
Port-au-Prince. This dry piece of wood that used to be disregarded by Dominicans, as 
they were scattered on the ground, began to be important to Dominicans as they saw 
Haitians were recovering the wood, and clearing their environment. According to forced 
migrants, Dominican soldiers clearly warn them of the consequences if they are caught 
gathering flanbo. Some people said that the sanctions could go up to 30 months in prison. 
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People have already started to feel that, as Rita said, “Now the bush is hot (there is 
trouble). We are forced to sit down in the house because there is nothing to do.” For 
example, Likilik, a 20-year-old boy, who was born in the Dominican Republic, is now 
living in the camp of Parc Cadeau where many members of his family are also living. He 
was already caught by Dominican soldiers while going to pick off wood in the 
Dominican Republic; he explained: “they took me and put me in jail. I paid 2,000 pesos. I 
didn’t have money. Some friends collected money for me in the camp.”In downtown 
Anse-à-Pitres, one day, a man crossed the border but did not come back home. When 
people were informed, they learned that he was arrested because he went to collect 
flanbo. His wife was worried. However, one day after his arrest, he was freed. Some 
people said that he must have paid to be released. As a result of this threat, people are 
very careful when they are crossing the border with their flanbo. For instance, during a 
visit to the camp of Parc Cadeau, I ran into two men cutting their pieces of wood. They 
said that the pieces came from Pedernales and arrived in Anse-à-Pitres at night when the 
soldiers are not there, because if they are apprehended, they will spend up to thirty years 
in prison. 
The significance of wood selling as part of the informal economy has been 
demonstrated by Yadav (2018). In the examination of Gonds’ livelihoods in the Indian 
village of Mahalapur, Yadav shows how forest-based activities such as the collection of 
wood play an important role in these people’s lives. The Gonds use wood for different 
purposes including cooking, making homes and making fences in their agricultural fields 
but also for selling. Yadav contends that it is mostly woman’s job to collect forest wood 
and then sell it next day by walking 10 km to Panna town, carrying it on their foreheads. 
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Selling wood helps to keep Gonds’ cost of living low and to raise their children. Flanbo 
plays a similar role in the lives of forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres for whom flanbo 
constitutes a source of income. However, it is mostly a male activity. This may be 
explained by the risk that collecting it entails. Outside the formal economy, flanbo, like 
other pieces of wood, help the forced migrants diversify their sources of income, but at 
the same time wood collecting has the potential for severe violence and risk, which 
impedes people with limited mobility to engage in those economic practices. In addition 
to these income generating activities, in 2016, the SJM decided to provide forced 
migrants with some financial support through a microcredit program so that a few people 
can run small businesses. 
 
4.5 Starting your own small business, micro-credit allocation, economic 
independence 
 
Many poor countries, including Haiti, rely on foreign aid to stimulate their 
development. However, the efficiency of these countries in contributing to the 
improvement of poor people’s lives remains questionable, as very often, development 
money does not benefit the persons being targeted. An innovative and promising new 
direction in development that consists of making small loans, sometimes only a few 
dollars, directly to poor individuals and families, which they can invest in their own 
products or businesses (Eller 2009), has appeared since the 1970s. At the heart of this 
approach is microcredit: a way to foster self-reliant individuals rather than persons 
dependent on charity (Watanabe 2015: 470 citing Austin 2007; Robinson 2001). 
Microfinancing has become a global phenomenon in international development circles 
since the Grameen Bank launched the microcredit model into global debates about 
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poverty, aid, and the inclusion of the poor in financial markets (Schuster 2014: 564). For 
instance, according to Karim (2001), Bangladeshi NGOs have made impressive strides in 
microcredit alongside non-formal primary education, sanitation, reproductive healthcare, 
and potable water provisioning. However, microcredit has been strongly criticized by 
scholars, including anthropologists. 
Specifically, the critics call into question the goal of microcredit as a way of 
empowering poor people, especially women, who comprise the highest number of 
beneficiaries, on the view that they have restricted access to the wage labor market or are 
more responsible borrowers than men (Pitt et al. 2006). Women are also considered 
flexible in accepting informal, precarious work and juggling family obligations with 
outside economic activities (Schuster 2014 cited by Huang 2017: 607). One critique 
raised against microcredit is its attribution to a form of governmental strategy or 
‘subjection’ in so far as it aims to align the personal goals of individual women with 
those set out by economic reformers (Katherine Rankin 2001: 30). Effectively, 
microcredit is a replication of neoliberalism ideals tied with open market, accumulation, 
freedom, and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, research indicates that microcredit 
constitutes an entanglement of people into cycles of indebtedness in which individuals 
come to adhere to neoliberal principles of market entrepreneurialism and self-help, 
unmoored from social binds of relationality, and individuals are usually not better off 
than before they were indebted (Watanabe. 2015: 471). I suggest that in the case of the 
forced migrants of Anse-à-Pitres, who were granted small loans by the SJM, microcredit 
is more about providing people with a form of aid to help themselves, than it is about 
credit. In order to understand the results of microcredit in the lives of these displaced 
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people, it is important to conceive of microcredit as not just an “economic” arrangement 
(Moodie 2008) or a form of economic empowerment, but also as a form of cultural 
empowerment for people. For instance, the involvement of women in microfinance 
programs has expanded their agency in the development process with the diminishing 
role of the state (Fernando 2006). 
4.5.1 The SJM micro-credit program 
 
The SJM office, through the intermediary of its promoters and monitors in Anse- 
à-Pitres, implemented a program of financial assistance for the forced migrants by 
selecting a few of them, mostly women, to be the beneficiaries. For SJM, it was a pilot 
program that will later be extended to more people, depending on its success. Members of 
the national office of the SJM organization, headquartered in Port-au-Prince, went to 
Anse-à-Pitres to gather information about the selected forced migrants and discuss with 
them the conditions and the management of the loan. 
The SJM gave a loan that comprised between 10,000 HT gourdes (USD 166) and 
12,500 HT gourdes (USD 208) to the selected forced migrants. Each month, they had to 
give back 2,100 HT gourdes (USD 35) until they finished repaying the loan. They also 
had to give another 125 HT gourdes to a special fund, which would be saved for the 
forced migrant to use in case of emergency. With this money, many people started a 
small business or invested in agricultural work. For those who undertook a small 
business, they bought small items from shopkeepers or wholesalers and sold them at the 
binational market, in front of their house, or simply turned themselves into mobile 
merchants. Their small business is a bit of everything: from rice, bread, candies and 
cookies to detergent and soaps for laundry. Magda, who received a loan, understood that 
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she had to do something with this money, unlike some people who simply spent the 
money on their basic needs without investing it. She tried everything in order to make the 
little money progress, and so that she could pay it back: “when I owe, I can’t sleep. I 
bought small things to put in front of the house and took part in money rotation9.” Even 
though it does not help Magda make any profit, it helps her save and manage her money 
to be able to repay it on the due date. Many of the forced migrants’ small businesses are 
portable as they can carry them on their head and sell them in the street. For instance, 
while crossing to Pedernales one day, I met with Vilna. She was carrying a small basin. 
When I stopped to talk to her a while, she told me that she came from selling in 
Pedernales and now she was on her way back home. The empty basin that she carried 
under her armpit is the size of her small business. The varying activities the forced 
migrants undertake in order to meet family needs and repayments are typical of 
microloan borrowers, who invest in several different activities at once to mitigate risk, 
expand their social networks, fill income gaps, and meet microloan repayment deadlines 
(Hayes 2017: 25). Even though all borrowers do not sell the same products, they enter a 
local market full of microbusinesses, which creates an environment of hypercompetition 
among small vendors (Hayes 2017). The forced migrants use their loans to buy and resell 
mostly food products such as rice, oil, and vegetables, which already abound on the 
market. I found that that the engagement of these forced migrants in microcredit 
enterprise provides them little as income according to what they described to me during a 
focus group, but it does allow them to be dynamic in their constant search of seeking to 
offer something to themselves and their families. 
 
9 Money rotation is a system of cash to cash cycle very common in Haiti that consists of rotating money 
among a group of people until everyone receives their part. 
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Coping strategies through these economic practices are very common among poor 
Caribbean people, which Senior (1991) refers to as ‘making do,’ meaning ‘make 
something from nothing’ in order to show how women in the English-speaking 
Caribbean, for example, develop strategies to meet their needs and support their families. 
Forced migrants’ strategies are similar in that they started with almost nothing hoping 
that they could generate some income to keep them afloat in the face of their precarious 
economic conditions in Anse-à-Pitres. Manrèz is a skinny woman, who must be in her 
early 60s but still looks strong. Her example is very inspiring and motivating. Manrèz 
received a small loan from SJM. She took this money and started a small business buying 
from Haitian shop keepers and re-selling at the local market. On my walk, I already met 
Manrèz carrying a box of rice on her head and a gallon of oil in her hand. Thanks to this 
activity, she managed to pay the rent and survive. She could have made more progress, 
but the death of her brother made her spend almost everything she had. She is one of the 
rare persons who have finished paying back the money. Even in times of adversity, she 
was able to develop a kind of flexibility that helped her fulfill her family needs. 
Sometimes, these people are also lenders, as they sell their products to other people on 
credit. For instance, Simone was participating in a focus group I was organizing. She had 
many problems. IOM did not renew her rent and she was uncertain about her future in 
Anse-à-Pitres. Worse, her husband borrowed 250 HT gourdes from her loan, but ran 
away, leaving her with the debt and the children. She said: “he borrowed 250 HT gourdes 
from me leaving his card and saying that he will give me more money. Tomorrow the 
14
th
 of February will be exactly two months since he took the money. Yet I need this 
money to go to reimburse my loan.” What Simone describes typifies the reality of some 
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women who may be the bearers of credit but not its users (Karim 2001); the users of the 
credit are often none other than their husbands. Manrèz’s experience illustrates the 
courage of most female forced migrants involved in microcredit. They earned very little 
income from this microcredit enterprise, while they have to satisfy multiple needs. Above 
all, it only constitutes an activity that motivates them to keep going amid the fundamental 
challenges of everyday life. 
4.5.2 The use of the loan 
 
Many forced migrants showed that the loan was beneficial in helping them feed 
their children and survive. Duvercia was in a precarious situation and her money was 
almost entirely consumed for household needs. IOM rented a place for her, but did not 
renew the rent. Therefore, she took from the loan money to pay the rent in order to avoid 
expulsion, to pay for the children’s school, and buy food and soap: “I still owe a part of 
the money. I thought it was a gift. Each 100 gourdes profit I made out of the little money, 
the children ate them (spent for the children). I don’t have a husband. I paid 6 months of 
rent.” 
Like Duvercia, many forced migrants explained that they encountered difficulty 
reimbursing the money, as they were in need even before they got this money. Between 
paying the rent and children’s school, providing food in the household, and going to the 
hospital, forced migrants found out that the money disappeared in the blink of an eye, 
while they still owed part of it. However, the SJM staff never took action to force people 
to pay back the money, which seems to confirm what Inès said to me, that is, the money 
was not a loan although this was not revealed to the forced migrants in order to encourage 
them to work with it. As these narratives showcase, the loan was practical in helping the 
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beneficiaries with some fundamental needs, but it put people into debt and could not help 
them recover from their economic dispossession. The microcredit experience of the 
forced migrants reflects Feldman (2010) who argues that projects such as self-help and 
others that were meant to transform often ended up looking more like relief projects. 
However, above all, I suggest that the engagement of the displaced people in the informal 
economy, in general, produces social lives beyond economic logic (Moodie 2008). These 
dynamics are translated in a philosophy I call “ti degaje or m’ap degaje m” that infuses 
their daily lives with meanings and dynamics. 
 
4.6 “Ti degaje, M’ap degaje m:” the philosophy of life of the forced migrants 
“Ti degaje, m’ap degaje m” is a common expression in Haitian larger society that 
basically means “a little something, I am doing a little something to survive.” People 
often resort to this expression to convey that they are coping with life despite 
fundamental challenges. For example, when I saw Manrèz and asked her how she was 
doing, she answered: “n’ap longonni.” Manrèz undoubtedly wants to highlight that things 
are hard but she is keeping going. “N’ap Longonni” is literally that life is agony for her, 
as a forced migrant who entered Anse-à-Pitres with almost nothing where she has to 
settle or start from scratch. However, this does not mean she is a defeatist. On the 
contrary, she clings to her new environment with all her strength as an agentive woman. 
The vigor in her became visible to me when I noticed all that she was undertaking despite 
the weight of her age: buying items with that little money she had, carrying her business 
on her head, and always on the move, even though people bought her products on credit 
and did not pay her. This expression translates a willingness to survive at any cost or 
making a living in bad times. This can be understood with a migrant who, for example, 
124  
said: “Si nou pa degaje nou (if we don’t do a little something), the children won’t eat.” 
Degaje is “making do,” a rule of survival, a philosophy of life. You cannot be loafing 
around. You “gotta” move yourself. For Titine, when she received financial aid from the 
IOM to rent a place, she started a ti degaje with it (a small business) in order to provide 
food for her family. 
“Degaje” can be equated to debrouillardism, a concept used by Browne (2004) to 
express the capacity for one to use his or her intelligence to transform possibilities into 
opportunities. When forced migrants received a little financial loan, their first goal was to 
start a ti degaje (small business) enhancing their debrouillardism, their capacity of 
management and entrepreneurship. For those who did not receive any loan, they did not 
hang around but looked for a ti degaje (small jobs). Maude is an example of someone 
who felt disappointed, as she could not get any support for her life while she was hungry 
in her new place of settlement. Her life story is telling. Maude is the mother of seven 
children, who are spread throughout Anse-à-Pitres. She was living with her youngest son 
when I visited her at her house. This son developed cholera when she entered Anse-à- 
Pitres in 2016, a period that reminds a bad memory to the Haitian people. Cholera killed 
some of the forced migrants after they settled in the camps in 2015 (Bonicet 2015). The 
vibrio virus responsible for cholera has been linked to the Nepalese UN battalion present 
in Haiti (Mazzeo and Chierici 2013), and was reported to have killed thousands of 
Haitians in the wake of the devastating earthquake of January 2010 (Schuller and 
Morales 2012). Fortunately, Maude’s son recovered from the disease. While living in 
Anse-à-Pitres, she walked to the camp of Maletchipe, which is three to four miles from 
home, almost every day, where she spent the entire day hoping that the aid apparatus 
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would stop by. When this strategy did not work, she looked for alternatives. She started 
to look for ti degaje (small jobs) in order to not starve. She then crossed the border to go 
to do laundry for Dominicans, an experience that is sometimes disappointing according to 
her: “They may say that they are giving you 300 pesos but they finally give you 150 
pesos. After two trips to this person’s house you still don’t get the rest of your money.” 
Despite fundamental challenges, hunger, poverty, insecurity, and uncertainty, forced 
migrants keep their spirits up and develop survival strategies to create and reconstruct 
livelihoods in their living communities, showing that human agency is not the property 
and privilege of political and economic elites, but an equal opportunity (Kottak and 
Kozaitis 1999). This is evidenced by Maude’s experience working for Dominican 
employers who profit from her situation of poverty and precarity, but she never gives up 
trying and is constantly moving across the border in an attempt to improve her life. 
Browne argues that Creole economics endows Martinicans with moral permission 
to violate (2004: 132), as it constitutes a means of survival for many people outside the 
formal economy. Similarly in Haitian culture, degaje has moral value when referring to 
the saying: Degaje pa peche, meaning literally doing something outside the formal to 
help ourselves is not a sin. For example, when people go to the Dominican Republic to 
look for wood, they know that they are violating a rule doing something that they should 
not. Some forced migrants think of that as stealing, but they have no choice. It is a means 
of survival. Anicia contended that “I entered here on June 11, 2015. I still go to 
Pedernales. I go to work as a housewife. My husband goes to do small gardens. It is 
stealing but he still does it. They haven’t run after him yet.” Richard Price (2006:64) 
wrote about how Martinicans assigned a double meaning to stealing when they talk about 
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their past history: “Over and over, in speaking about the recent past, people stressed that 
it was stealing from poor people, from other rural folk, that was criminal. Taking from a 
sugar factory, or from any béké or white folks’ enterprise, was seen rather as getting 
one’s due.” This way of thinking of stealing as not simply a means of survival, but also as 
a due compensation may have the same resonance when talking about forced migrants’ 
illegal crossing to gather, for example, a package of wood in the Dominican Republic. 
Under pressure, threat and fear, the forced migrants left all their belongings and goods 
behind, sometimes to those who used to be their bosses and who exploited them. Stealing 
may morally mean getting something back for them in a context of total dispossession. 
As stated in the framework of the chapter, it is also important to refer to colonial history 
in order to really understand the meaning of these strategies employed by the forced 
migrants. Similarly, when studying the economic activities of former slaves, historians as 
well as archaeologists have found evidence of a slave underground economy that 
consisted in the trading and marketing of products that came from their independent 
gardens, and also of articles stolen from the plantations where they were working. Forret 
(2004) describes how slaves of the rural Carolinas supplemented their inadequate diets 
with produce from their gardens, but also with foodstuffs secretly taken from their 
masters or their neighbors, which they also sold to poor whites. These practices, that are 
part of marginalized people’s survival strategies, can better be compared to what Scott 
(1985) called the ordinary weapon of the weak, which is a constant struggle for them to 
create livelihoods, but also to resist those who worked to extract their labor. 
127  
Conclusion 
Finally, in addition to being a philosophy of life as it guides people in their daily 
actions, ti degaje can also be considered a means of survival, as it pushes people towards 
micro-entrepreneurship and economic engineering. Far from discouraging them, the lack 
of support and state abandon motivated them to create and mobilize resources for self- 
reliance. They try everything that lies in their power to create livelihoods in Anse-à-Pitres 
showing a lot of debrouillardism and dynamic. One forced migrant contended that he 
went to the seaside, gathered stones, and sold them to local residents, who exported them 
to the Dominican Republic. Another migrant bought a motorcycle using the financial aid 
he received from one organization and gave it to someone to ride. When the driver paid 
him, he managed to buy food for his household. Others went to the garbage where 
wholesalers threw away the zaza (unwanted second-hand clothes), salvaged them and 
resold them to make a little money. This is the case of Felicia, who lives in Parc Cadeau 
#2. Felicia was born in the Dominican Republic, but did not hold any Dominican 
documentation when she was forced in a truck to Haiti by Dominican soldiers. She 
categorically refused to leave because she had never been to Haiti before, but she was 
powerless to resist the soldiers. People informed her about the camp and she made a 
small tent in which to stay. Her worry can be understood for someone who was born in 
the Dominican Republic and had to leave everything behind to go to a new environment 
where she does not even know how to locate and mobilize resources. In such a 
complicated situation, her only weapon remained her capacity for agency, which she 
never hesitated to make the best of. Even though she is far from recovering from her 
displacement, she has never given up trying to make ends meet. One of her strategies is 
to collect zaza (the unwanted second-hand clothes by wholesalers of Anse-à-Pitres) and 
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resold them at the Haitian-Dominican border; she said: “I went to sort out old pants, old 
shirts, old things and I made a big package. I went to the door (the border); I sold small 
pieces for 20 or 25 Haitian HT gourdes.” People call this very small activity ti degaje or 
vire men meaning something that is worth almost nothing. “Ti degaje” is about showing 
debrouillardism, exercising agency by finding disjunctures or holes in the formal 
economy in order to transform very few possibilities into opportunities. As these 
examples show, the economic practices of the forced migrants is not about how much 
someone makes for their survival, but about how people learn to be agentive, resilient, 
and to live with hope amid social and economic precarity, insecurity and uncertainty. 
They live because of the philosophy that is behind everything they do in their daily lives. 
This philosophy makes sense and when combined with local and moral values, it simply 
constitutes a form of social capital for forced migrants. Survival for the forced migrants is 
not simply about earning a lot of money, but a state of mind or a philosophy. 
The forced migrants are aware that the Dominican Republic offered them better 
economic activities than Haiti. However, they were under constant fear of persecution 
and deportation. Therefore, they considered that they were not free. It is only in Haiti that 
they felt a sense of freedom despite hunger, precarity, insecurity and uncertainty of life; 
as Charles put it: “For me, I feel that my country is better even though when I was in the 
Dominican Republic, I found work more easily and I ate better. You were in a place 
where you were eating well but you couldn’t sleep well. Each time you were sleeping, 
you were thinking.” Like Charles, many other forced migrants express their sense of 
being independent in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, even though limited economic resources are 
available to them. The creation of ODRA (Organization for the Defense of the 
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Repatriated of Anse-à-Pitres) is set to rally their interest and formalize their claims for a 
descent life. The forced migrants have goals and know what they want for their lives. 
Living a precarious life in Anse-à-Pitres does not take away their sense of being 
emancipated and liberated. Their multiple ways of creating living strategies suggest that 
they are not hopeless people or victims, but agents of their self-development. Getting 
involved in neoliberal enterprises through micro-credit or self-help programs, gardening 
on Dominican plots of land, and doing other casual work selling their labor allows them 
to exercise some kind of agency and set goals for their self-reliance through a philosophy 
of life ingrained in a series of expressions, such as ti degaje, degaje pa peche, vire men, 
found in Haitian larger culture. Their tactics and ingenuity for survival despite constraints 
appears in their engagement in everyday labor mobilities between Anse-à-Pitres and 
Pedernales. 
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CHAPTER 5: EVERYDAY LABOR MOBILITY: FORCED MIGRANTS ACROSS THE 
HAITIAN-DOMINICAN BORDER 
 
“It is because of a lack of economic resources. If I had the resources, I 
wouldn’t cross to the Dominican Republic. I was supposed to be working at home 
(Anse-à-Pitres). In the same way as I am going to work in the Dominican 
Republic, I would be working at home. I would cross only a day but not the way I 
am crossing to the Dominican Republic morning and afternoon. It wouldn’t be 
like this.” 
 
Louman clearly describes his experiences with border jumping between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic. Louman is from Tête Source, which is very close to the region of 
Pedernales, specifically Lamencer, where he had been living since he migrated to the 
Dominican Republic. After his displacement, he continued to return to Lamencer to 
work, moving back and forth between Tête Source and Lamencer. Louman’s story 
demonstrates three dimensions of our study in this chapter: mobility, forced mobility, and 
place. First, his story shows how someone’s life can involve daily back and forth 
movements across borders translatable in a local expression monte desann (literally going 
back and forth) that describes the constant instability and mobility of the displaced people 
for labor purpose. Their engagement in daily mobility evidences their capacity to make 
decisions to transform their lives. I consider this a form of power and agency. Second, his 
story shows that mobility is not something that people feel free to choose but something 
that they are forced into because they do not have viable alternatives with which to build 
lives. Therefore, mobility is also about constraint. Third, Louman suggests that he would 
not go to the Dominican Republic should he have better choices. He would stay in Anse- 
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à-Pitres. This means that mobility does not eclipse the importance of place, which 
symbolizes not only immobility, but also stability and settlement for the forced migrants. 
In this sense labor mobility is important in order to help them acquire the resources to 
achieve this goal of getting settled. 
In this chapter, I am concerned with mobility as something imposed upon the 
forced migrants (Gill, Caletrio, Mason 2011) and as a form of power which is reflected in 
the capacity of the displaced people to transform and act in the world despite dangerous 
obstacles. Accordingly, mobility is undertaken under constraints that can be explained by 
the risks it entails. Despite all constraints, the forced migrants make labor mobility a 
significant livelihood strategy. I argue that the engagement of the forced migrants in 
everyday labor mobility is an exercise of agency and power. Building on Miller and 
Tilley (1984), I refer to this form of power that consists of relying on mobility in order to 
pursue specific goals in their lives as “power to” that constitutes the precondition of 
agency (Thomas 2002). This form of power describes the ability of these people to take 
actions. For both the men and women of the displaced population, everyday mobility 
becomes a means to create survival strategies and an attempt to settle in Anse-à-Pitres, 
which is a new place to most of them. If generally, men are seen as the agents of 
mobility, among the displaced people, in the same way as men, women draw upon 
mobility as a resource with which to pursue income for their households, which 
empowers them and increases not only their visibility in labor migration, but also their 
agency. 
Besides using mobility as a means to survive from day to day, forced migrants 
also have long-term goals that include buying a piece of land to establish themselves in 
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Anse-à-Pitres; mobility sits side by side with place that symbolizes immobility and 
emplacement. This notion of emplacement is underexplored in the mobility literature 
(Chell 2000), which, I suggest, may be an outcome of a new mobility paradigm that 
undermines theories that conceive of place as normal stability (Sheller and Urry 2006), 
and which is reinforced by the world’s celebration of a liquid modernity that redirects 
research away from static structures of the modern world (Bauman, 2000). However, 
mobility is never simply about moving across borders, it is also about regrounding 
(Ahmed et al. 2003 cited by Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006 ), reterritorialization 
(Laguerre 1998), and attachments of various kinds (Hannam, Sheller, and Urry 2006 
citing Shurmer-Smith & Hannam, 1994; Sheller, 2004a). Therefore, both mobility and 
place have meaning in the displaced people’s lives. 
Forced migrants’ involvement in labor mobility was visible to me when I went to 
the camps. During visits in the camps, especially in the morning, I mostly found children, 
sometimes with women. Many people were absent because they went to work in the 
Dominican Republic. Some people may go and stay for a short period of time, especially 
if they are plowing fields or harvesting their gardens. Many people stated that they often 
went in the morning and came back in the afternoon. Effectively, in the afternoon, there 
was a more vibrant life in the camps. At this time, I often saw people who were coming 
back from work wearing used clothes, a pair of boots, machetes in a sheath, and other 
digging tools, with sometimes a package of wood or a sack on their back. Later, some 
people sat down in groups socializing, playing dominoes while listening to the music. On 
the other hand, women were preparing food in a small kitchen made of bundles, rags, 
pieces of cloth, and twigs with the rise of smoke. Sometimes, they had to prepare food so 
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that the husband could find something when he came back from work. Some women 
complained when they could not do that. For example, Yverose’s husband supports the 
house through his agricultural labor. Like her, many women attested that the household 
or the kindred was maintained by their husband’s agricultural work in the Dominican 
Republic. Polòn, who was born in the Dominican Republic but now finds herself in the 
camp of Parc Cadeau is clear about how much the husband’s labor mobility weighs in the 
maintenance of the family, as she is doing nothing herself. She said: “I don’t have money 
to do a small business or to cultivate a garden. I have nothing. If the man (husband) 
doesn’t go down there (in the Dominican Republic) where soldiers are running after 
them, you won’t get a Haitian gourde. I feel that I am not at ease because if the man 
doesn’t give you five gourdes, you don’t eat and you don’t drink.” As indicated in these 
narratives, men are at the forefront of labor mobility in most families of the forced 
migrants. However, women are also actors and increase their visibility through their 
movements across borders. In the end, nothing can stop forced migrants from getting 
involved in crossing the border between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales to go to work 
regardless of facing violence, arrest, and deportation. 
Despite constant surveillance, border patrol, and the establishment of checkpoints 
by the Dominican state in order to control the movement of illegal migrants across the 
Dominican-Haitian border, forced migrants manage to be hypermobile between the 
Haitian city of Anse-à-Pitres and the Dominican city of Pedernales. Even though their 
everyday border crossings aim to fulfill many functions in their lives, the nature of their 
mobility is mostly economic; they go to sell their labor in the Dominican Republic. While 
they move daily to the Dominican Republic to work in different sectors, such as domestic 
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work and selling goods, agriculture constitutes the main sector in which they work. In 
their agricultural practices, the displaced people continued to work as waged day laborers 
and according to the system of sharecropping regulated by Dominican landowners. 
Besides working on a particular land, forced migrants also sell their labor working, just 
during a day, for a person, who pays them in cash on the spot, or may owe them the 
money. All of them are engaged in the same types of job they had before they were 
displaced from the Dominican Republic. The lack of jobs in Anse-à-Pitres forced them to 
undertake these labor practices in order to meet the daily challenges of their lives. The 
mobility of the forced migrants constitutes both a form of agency and constraint. On one 
hand, their involvement in labor mobility expresses their capacity to challenge 
marginalization and forced displacement. In this sense, it is an expression of power 
which, in a way, constitutes a form of agency. On the other hand, the forced migrants 
long for a stable life in Anse-à-Pitres and conceive of their border crossings as a form of 
constraint considering that mobility is a risky adventure into which they are forced as it 
represents the only option available for them to create survival strategies. 
In the first section of the chapter, I examine everyday labor mobility as an 
exercise of power and agency for the forced migrants because it shows their ability to act 
in the world. 
In the second section, I show that mobility is not an expression of freedom for the 
forced migrants, but something that is imposed upon them and that they manage to use to 
improve their lives. 
Finally, I demonstrate that forced migrant men and women gain agency using 
corporeal mobility across borders in an attempt to support themselves and their families. 
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Their risk-taking is an expression of their ability to make choices despite constraints and 
of combativeness when it comes to fulfilling their households’ multiple needs. 
 
5.1 Everyday labor mobility as an exercise of power and agency 
With contemporary global dynamics, millions of people are involved in 
movements across border; Urry and Sheller (2006) proclaim that all the world seems to 
be on the move. Creswell (2006) makes a similar observation by arguing that mobility is 
everywhere. In the mobility literature, mobility has different meanings. For instance, 
mobility is sometimes construed as an expression of progress, freedom, or liberation from 
space and place (Sheller and Urry 2006). It is also conceived of as a resource that 
reinforces power (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 2006 citing Skeggs, 2004; Morley, 2002) and 
that implies forms of social control described in a concept of power geometry (Gogia 
2006; Massey 1994). This means that mobility constitutes a resource to which not 
everyone has an equal relationship (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 2006). For instance, Gogia 
(2006) demonstrates how the mobilities of Canadians travelling to Mexico for tourist 
purposes and those of Mexicans migrating to Canada for labor purposes are not created 
equally because of unequal juridical regulations that shape the ways these people move. 
These latter attributions convey a Marxist meaning of power as something associated 
with domination and what the archeologists Miller and Tilley (1984) refer to as “power 
over,” as opposed to “power to.” 
I draw on this literature regarding mobility, but with an understanding of mobility 
as an expression of power and agency. However, the power I am engaging in this chapter 
differs from its association with coercion or domination. Power is an expression of the 
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capacity of forced migrants to initiate actions that engage their everyday lives in spite of 
marginalization. Miller and Tilley (1984) conceive of this form of power that enables 
people as “power to,” which, according to them, constitutes an inherent component of all 
social interaction and also a feature embedded in all social practices. This form of power 
differs from power over, for example, that is embodied in the exercise of the legitimate 
means of violence by Dominican soldiers. As such, unlike “power over,” “power to” 
describes the ability of the displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres to draw on everyday 
mobility to make decisions that impact their daily lives. Forced migrants’ practices, 
which include crossing dangerous borders even if it means being arrested, fined, or killed, 
are expressions of power and agency because they evade established border power. As 
suggested by Foucault (1982 cited by Miller and Tilley 1984), this form of power that 
enables people to act is something that belongs to everyone and that forced migrants 
exercise through daily movements across borders despite surveillance and “illegality,” 
following several ‘devious paths’, which avoid official checkpoints in the border zone in 
order to avoid state officials at the entry and exit point (Musoni 2016). 
The engagement of displaced people in everyday labor mobility is a matter of 
being in charge of their own lives and being self-reliant. It represents a strategic resource 
for the forced migrants to carry out their goals of surviving in Anse-à-Pitres whatever it 
takes. Most forced migrants I talked to recognize the danger involved in crossing the 
border to go to work in the Dominican Republic, but they maintain that this choice is 
imposed upon them. Taking actions in the face of threats to safety and menace is what 
defines forced migrants’ labor mobility as a form of power and agency. Frequent 
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movement to pursue labor in the Dominican Republic shows how their lives are 
intertwined with constant mobility and instabilities. 
Despite the absence of juridical and spatial conditions that could facilitate their 
mobility across the border (Gogia 2006), the forced migrants manage to make mobility a 
defining factor of their daily lives. The ability to move beyond geographical borders 
represents the daily experience of various categories of the population of the forced 
migrants, young and old, men as well as women. The continuous moving back and forth 
for daily accomplishment and goals appears in a forced migrant’s statement: “For any 
small thing, it is in the Dominican Republic to go to look for it; from the small piece of 
wood, it is over there to go to look for it. To sell a day of labor to feed the children, it is 
over there to go.” These words come from Renaldo, who lived at the camp of Parc 
Cadeau# 2 with eight children to feed; he conveys that his life is an everyday experience 
of constant mobility which he relies upon for economic purposes. The daily dynamics of 
forced migrants describe not only the instability of their lives, which are not located in 
particular spaces or within particular boundaries (Verstraet, T Cresswell 2002 citing 
Malkki 1992), but also “power to” that enables them to take actions and use labor 
mobility as an imposed choice according to their own will. Moving on a regular basis is 
the materialization of “power to” and creates life dynamics, which is expressive of the 
local expression “monte desann.” 
 
5.1.1 Monte desann as “power to” 
Forced migrants’ everyday labor mobility is translated in the common expression 
of “monte desann” meaning “coming and going back and forth.” The lives of the forced 
migrants are a daily exercise that monte desann, as a process of labor mobility, describes. 
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Monte dessann is “power to” because it is about being active in order to stimulate change 
in their lives. This exercise requires people to develop the ability to run so that they can 
be ready to run away any time circumstances require them to do so. For example, during 
a focus group with some forced migrants who had relocated to downtown Anse-à-Pitres, 
people were talking about how making charcoal in the Dominican Republic is not safe 
and sometimes they have to abandon their charcoal and run away. A woman in her fifties, 
Alouna, made people laugh as she maintained that: “my husband can’t run, neither can he 
speak Spanish.” Alouna’s story demonstrates the risks of getting involved in those 
practices that require physical strength and the capacity to negotiate with Dominican 
soldiers, who can catch them in the forests. Even though her husband still goes to the 
Dominican Republic to work, his incapacity to run obviously limits his labor mobility. 
Monte desann also means that even though forced migrants are able to connect with 
Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales thanks to their corporeal mobility, neither of these two 
places offer them security or stability. Anse-à-Pitres lacks opportunities, so they cannot 
create a stable life there, and the Dominican Republic is a dangerous place for them in 
which they are only a bird of passage. Therefore, their life is more a construction of the 
in-between than a construction of one specific place, because of constant back and forth 
movements across the border to locate opportunities. 
Living close to the border contributes to the instability created by monte desann, 
which, despite everything, constitutes a strategy of empowerment for forced migrants. 
Louman is a forced migrant who lives at the camp of Tête Source. Originally from 
Mapou, another part of Haiti, but in the same geographical department as Anse-à-Pitres, 
he recognizes that the proximity to Tête Source is essential to his major activities across 
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the border. For five years, he has been in a process of monte desann, i.e., a back and forth 
movement between Tête Source and the mountainous region of Pedernales, in search of 
making a living: “M’ap monte desann (I am coming and going). I come to Haiti but there 
is no work; I am going back and forth in the Dominican Republic to look for an activity 
(work). I am coming and going back and forth between the two sides of the border to see 
what life has in its store.” As Louman explained, his life is tied to these back and forth 
movements which change the dynamics of his previous life when he was in Mapou: 
“when I was in Mapou, I stayed put.” His statement suggests that he was not used to such 
frequent labor mobility, let alone connecting with places across borders. Being in Anse-à- 
Pitres endows him with this capacity of movement, which becomes an integral part of his 
habitus and his subsistence strategy. 
Back and forth movements across borders and the expressions that forced 
migrants use, such as monte desann, to describe their daily labor mobility demonstrates 
their determination in pursuing their goal to change their lives in a world of economic 
precarity and uncertainty. Everyday labor mobility is a way for them to create a glimmer 
of hope using their corporeal and mobile ability as agents amid their precarious social and 
economic conditions in a place that does not offer them much. The everyday mobility is 
constitutive of “power to” in that it is used as a resource by the forced migrants with the 
aim of being self-reliant and sustaining their lives. As Urry (Gogia 2006 citing Urry 
2000) argues, mobility is becoming the defining factor in the reconstitution of social life. 
This is reflected in the way that the forced migrants embrace mobility as a vital resource. 
However, mobility for them is not an expression of freedom, but something that is 
imposed upon them, which is discussed in the next section. Here, I make a distinction 
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between freedom and agency. I do not consider the movement of the forced migrants an 
expression of freedom because getting involved in labor mobility is risky and dangerous 
for them. Rather, labor mobility is a form of agency because it goes against established 
structures such as border power and is used according to the forced migrants’ own agenda 
in order to create survival strategies in Anse-à-Pitres. 
 
5.2 Mobility as constraint and a survival strategy 
 
Forced migrants do not engage in labor mobility because the Dominican Republic 
is attractive to them, but because of life’s demands. While mobility expresses a form of 
power and agency as I demonstrated, it is also the result of a form of constraint. This can 
be explained in various ways. Considering past working conditions, the kinds of 
relationships they developed with Dominican owners, and the risks that their mobility 
across the border entails, returning to the Dominican Republic for labor purposes simply 
represents a necessary evil for the displaced people. Their previous experiences do not 
encourage them to go back to the Dominican Republic. 
According to some former workers, Dominican bosses needed only their labor 
power. For instance, if they were sick and were not productive, they were not taken care 
of, but sent to Haiti to finish their days. In a sense, this indicates that while Haitian 
workers were contributing to increasing the wealth of Dominican landowners and 
boosting Dominican economy, they were not provided with the means to maintain and 
reproduce themselves, something that is related to Marx (1867)’s criticism of the 
capitalist system whereby workers are simply used as commodities. Simmons (2010) has 
described the situation of Haitian agricultural workers as horrible. Haitians were reported 
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to be living in the worst conditions in the Dominican Republic with no basic 
infrastructure such as potable water, electricity, no means of waste disposal, constant 
surveillance and policing by Dominican authorities, and endemic diseases such as 
dengue, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and malaria to name a few (Simmons 2010:11). 
Before being displaced in Anse-à-Pitres, the forced migrants experienced all the awful 
working conditions in the Dominican Republic where they did not have any form of 
social security in the workplace. Tiva exemplifies how Haitian people’s bare lives were 
totally exposed to all forms of danger and torture. In the Dominican Republic, Tiva was 
working and living with his wife and children on Sergo’s estate. Sergo is a Dominican 
landowner. One day, a stone hurt Tiva’s leg while he was working in the field and he 
could not stand up. His child’s godmother took him to the hospital in a distant city called 
Barahona where he had surgery. People at the hospital, sometimes patients’ families, 
shared their food with him and gave him a little money during his stay at the hospital. 
When he left hospital, a pastor paid the trip for him and he went back to the estate where 
he was working and living with his family. However, Sergo, the Dominican boss, was 
totally indifferent to him and forced him to leave for Haiti. Tiva explained to me: “My 
child’s godmother who was working on the same estate as me took me to Barahona. I had 
no one, no family to help me. People in the hospital helped me. When I was leaving the 
hospital, a Dominican pastor paid the bus for me to go to Pedernales. There, I took a taxi 
to Aguas Negras. When I arrived at the estate, Sergo (the Dominican boss) said that he 
was not keeping me and he sent me to Haiti.” As a result, he had to be separated from his 
wife and his children who stayed on the estate. I visited him twice during my research in 
Anse-à-Pitres; he was living alone and was still in pain. Because of the lack of money, he 
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was never able to return to the hospital. The lack of social and legal protection for these 
workers makes the workforce the most vulnerable to mortal accidents in Dominican 
society, which, for the most part, result in temporary incapacity (Baez Evertsz 1985 cited 
by Simmons 2010). In the end, the relations between forced migrants and Dominican 
bosses deteriorated during their last days on Dominican soil, even though there were 
exceptions whereby some landowners tried to hide them in the bateys (plantations) in 
order to not be sent to Haiti. Some people I talked to admitted that they left the 
Dominican Republic because their landowner forced them to do so. For example, after 
her 33 years living in the Dominican Republic, Jezula understood that she had to leave 
after a message communicated to her by the Dominican boss: “if you don’t live, you go 
to hide instead, I’ll be in prison and I’ll have to pay 50,000 pesos.” These words could 
not be clearer to Jezula. Besides past experiences that are not conducive to undertaking 
labor mobility to the Dominican Republic, there is also the securitization of the border 
that instills fear in the forced migrants. 
Going to the Dominican Republic is one of the most humiliating experiences for 
forced migrants; it is a place where they are exposed to all kinds of danger, violence, 
torture, and even death. Many people admitted that Dominicans never treated them well. 
To put it another way, forced migrants are not welcomed in the Dominican Republic, and 
they are under constant fear of having to run; sometimes they worked for Dominicans but 
did not get paid. Calixte, a young man in his mid twenties, and a woman mentioned to me 
respectively that they were the victims of one or another of these kinds of abuse. Calixte 
contended that “sometimes, I work, they delay in paying me or I may finish working with 
them, they may take the little money, they don’t give it to me.” The woman talked about 
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the violence that her husband suffered at the hands of Dominicans: “They took my 
husband in the neck and beat him with machetes.” These experiences are discouraging, 
and they give evidence that people are simply forced into labor mobility. According to 
Cresswell (2001 cited by Gogia 2006) corporeal mobility is embedded in specific 
geographies and economic conditions that produce how people move and are received 
differently across the globe. Forced migrants’ corporeal mobility is a result of not only 
political institutions that work to push them down, but also of economic precarity that 
produces how and why they move. 
Effectively, the lack of economic opportunities in Anse-à-Pitres constitutes a 
significant push factor that explains the displaced persons’ labor mobility. Many 
maintained that they would not go to the Dominican Republic should they be able to 
build their lives in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. Due to the lack of resources in the communities 
where they are displaced, they are forced to turn towards the neighboring country in an 
attempt to improve their lives. To summarize, life circumstances oblige them to get 
involved in everyday labor mobility. The determination to cross the border is shown by 
Roussell, who insisted that “I will always cross the border looking for a better life until 
they kill me.” For forced migrants involved in labor mobility, their lives do not exist 
outside the activities they are undertaking. For Resias, the Dominican Republic is at the 
center of her survival, as it is the place of economic activities for Haitians in Anse-à- 
Pitres: “Well, there is no life in Haiti. I can say that there isn’t even food. So you must go 
to the Dominican Republic; everything is in the Dominican Republic.” In this context, 
people, who are engaged in daily movements across the border, have little to no choice. 
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Rejected and abandoned by the Dominican and the Haitian state, and with the 
withdrawal of many nongovernmental organizations, forced migrants can only rely on 
themselves and what they have at their disposal as resources, which demonstrates their 
capacity to challenge displacement, marginalization, and statelessness in the form of 
“power to’. This situation leaves them little choice about how to sustain their livelihoods. 
For many of them, the choice is either staying in Anse-à-Pitres where their existence 
remains a gray area or risking their lives crossing to the Dominican Republic. Either 
choice is evil; many choose to draw upon forced mobility and exercise a form of power 
by acting in an uncertain world to strive for improvement and stability. Everyday labor 
mobility for them is a matter of survival strategy. Their mobility is forced and risky, 
something in which they would not get involved should they have a better situation in 
Anse-à-Pitres. Louman expressed: “If I had resources here in Anse-à-Pitres, I wouldn’t 
cross to the Dominican Republic. I would be working at home. I wouldn’t have to cross 
to the Dominican Republic every morning and evening.” His everyday labor mobility is 
not a deliberate choice, but something imposed upon him in an attempt to improve his life 
and that of his family. 
In this way, many forced migrants maintain that if they do not pursue labor 
opportunities in the Dominican Republic, their children or the family will not eat. Gilo, a 
man in his late fifties, had spent almost his entire life in the Dominican Republic where 
he was brought by his father as a child, and came to Anse-à-Pitres in June 2015. During a 
focus group, the stories he shared demonstrated the ways in which his life intertwined 
with everyday labor mobility and how it was essential to support his family: 
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“It is in the Dominican Republic to do all you have to do to find a little 
food to give to the children and to earn a little money to buy small soaps. I can 
say that I work on Dominican land. All I can do now is on Dominican land in 
order to earn two HT gourdes. Me, as a poor, it is on Dominican land I make a 
living to give something to the children.” 
Gilo’s experience tells us what labor mobility means in the attempt to survive. Despite 
being undocumented and not legally authorized to cross the border, the life of his family 
depends on his clandestine trips to the Dominican Republic, particularly in the 
mountainous region of Pedernales, to work in the agricultural fields. Therefore, labor 
mobility represents the most viable yet imposed choice for forced migrants to support 
themselves and their families. 
The role of everyday labor mobility for families hanging by a thread is described 
by Molina, a roughly 20-year-old girl, who still lives with her parents in Tête-à-l’Eau. 
Molina underlines the importance of those crossing practices for the family or the 
household when she maintained that “I live badly. If my parents don’t go out as day 
laborers to give us food, we don’t find food.” This example shows that these labor 
practices offer a double challenge to the agent, both changing their life and that of the 
whole family. When the man goes to the Dominican Republic to sell his labor, the rest of 
the family waits. For many families, it is a daily routine. Their daily bread is the fruit of 
the man’s labor mobilities. While forced migrant women contribute to maintaining the 
household either by their labor mobility or by their unwaged labor in families and 
households that produce laborers themselves (Collins 2013), they acknowledge the 
weight of the movements undertaken by their husbands, who maintain the whole family. 
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Solène, a woman, who lives in the camp of Tête Source, felt tired of life after 
losing all her means of livelihoods in the Dominican Republic, and she now has nothing 
with which to generate income in Anse-à-Pitres. She is one among so many other women 
who are living with fear for their husbands who have to cross the border for labor 
purposes, but also who have to sit down on the threshold of their small tents every 
evening to wait for the family’s daily bread. As Solène said, she could only rely on her 
husband’s everyday labor mobility: “If the man doesn’t go to look for a place to sell his 
labor, we can’t buy a can of rice. Merchants won’t sell us a can of rice.” Even though the 
Dominican Republic seems to have become repulsive to Solène after her forced removal 
and the loss of her possessions, she is being fed by her husband’s forced labor mobility. 
In that sense, the role of labor mobility in the lives of the forced migrants is reminiscent 
of Fouron’s experience, a scholar of transnationalism who shows how a migrant can 
become a central support to their family. Fouron experienced this firsthand as an 
immigrant in the United States; while he was living abroad, he considered himself a 
support for both his family and his nation by contending that “I represent the whole 
nation, not just my family. Your obligation to the nation begins with the obligation to 
improve yourself and your family (Fouron 2001).” In this sense, the men’s labor mobility 
aims to improve the whole family’s lives, as they do not have other economic 
alternatives. 
As shown through these examples, forced migrants use mobility as a resource 
with which to create livelihoods, because for many, mobility is the unique thread to 
which they hold. The upkeep of the family depends on those trips to the Dominican 
Republic, in activities such as gardening, gathering wood, making charcoal, selling their 
147  
labor, and selling goods in the street. This mobility was imposed upon Roussel. He was 
born in Los Arroyos, Dominican Republic and raised by a Dominican who did not 
provide him an identity document, which led Dominican migration agents to deport him 
to Anse-à-Pitres in 2015. Since then, he has taken residence in a small house that he built 
himself with wood and straw at the camp of Parc Cadeau, a place in which he has to 
make a living. He does not know anyone in Haiti to whom he could reach out for help. 
With all the fundamental challenges of living in the camp, he has no choice other than 
sharing his life between Haiti and the Dominican Republic through labor mobility. 
Despite humiliation and threat by Dominicans, forced mobility to the Dominican 
Republic becomes his strategy to survive: “It is on the Dominican side you have to go to 
make a living. You will always find Dominicans who will do unpleasant things to you but 
you have to fake that you accept the shame. When this happens, you feel bad but it is on 
the Dominican side that you have to go.” Forced migrants are in a very different position 
from privileged travelers who may see mobility as freedom or liberation from space 
(Sheller and Urry 2006). The push factors of the everyday labor mobility of the forced 
migrants are located in their poor economic conditions and the lack of viable alternatives 
in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. 
 
5.3 Women in everyday labor mobility: peddlers and other informal activities 
 
Among forced migrants, as I have described in previous sections, men tend to 
move more than women in order to work in the Dominican Republic. The unequal 
frequency of mobility between genders may be explained by the danger involved in 
crossing the border illegally. However, a few women also rely on everyday labor 
mobility as a resource for empowerment. These women do not get involved in everyday 
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mobility as "followers" of their migrated husbands and male relatives, but they go out on 
their own to find work, leaving their families behind (De Regt 2010). Their daily 
movements show their willingness to escape the patriarchal structures that make them 
subjects of male dependency (Anthias and Lazaridis 2000) and attest to the great 
responsibilities they assume in supporting their households (Rasmussen 2002). Their 
involvement in everyday labor mobility as an attempt to meet the needs of their daily 
lives challenges studies that often describe labor mobility as an activity dominated by 
male breadwinners who migrate to save or remit money home (Paerregaard 2012). In 
Anse-à-Pitres, the experience of women in labor mobility is diverse, as they cross the 
border to do different work in the Dominican Republic. They cross the border to go to 
sell their labor in agricultural work, to do domestic work, or to sell their own 
merchandise by turning themselves into mobile merchants. The diversification of their 
work gives more space to women's agency in terms of how they make choices and the 
strategies they employ to improve their living conditions (De Regt 2010). 
Similar to forced migrant men, but at a much lower scale, a few women cross the 
border to the Dominican Republic in order to work in gardens. Many women used to 
work in the Dominican Republic prior to their displacement in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. They 
did not stay at home, as, when they did not run their small businesses at home, they 
usually accompanied their husbands to the agricultural fields. In Haiti, they participate in 
labor mobility, not in relation to men, but in their own right, which demonstrates their 
capacity to make independent choices and look for practical solutions to their precarity. 
Luciana, a woman in her late forties, was displaced in Anse-à-Pitres after having spent 31 
years in the Dominican Republic, where she used to do agricultural work. At the camp of 
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Parc Cadeau, she was getting through a natural calamity when she arrived. The roof of 
her small makeshift house became a watering can when it rained, which prevented her 
from sleeping at night and attending to the household tasks during the day. As a woman 
who already had experience working in the Dominican Republic, she was obliged to 
cross the border, despite having to face the danger of crossing illegally, in order to sell 
her labor so that she could repair her small house. It was through monte desann, a 
constant back and forth movement across the border, that she earned money to 
materialize her project of repairing her small house. She reported this to me during an 
interview: “I don’t get wet thanks to God because I, as a woman, made this old house 
crossing the border to sell my labor to Dominicans for 200 pesos every day so that I 
could cover it with some sheets of metal.” As this example demonstrates, women are 
equally agents of everyday labor mobility. They experience the same challenges as men 
taking the risks of crossing the border, which shows their ability to exercise forms of 
agency drawing upon everyday labor mobility. 
In addition, women draw upon labor mobility to create not only survival strategies 
but also self-autonomy. In many cases, women are struggling but do not want to depend 
on other people. They use their able-bodies to make and remake their lives. Through 
hardship, suffering, and precarity, they try to ‘make do’ braving the danger and risks of 
crossing the border in order to reach the Dominican Republic through corporeal mobility. 
This situation describes the experience of Manchina in the camp of Parc Cadeau #2. Born 
in the Dominican Republic, she was raised watching her father do agricultural work and 
her mother run a small business. When Manchina became older, she started to manage a 
small business, like her mother, in the Dominican Republic. Unfortunately, her business 
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did not last; she was a victim of racism from Dominican people yelling at her telling her: 
“Morena (dark-skinned woman), go to your country.” She could not spend all her life 
hiding in her home to avoid being discriminated against. With the abrupt removal of her 
Dominican citizenship and her displacement by the Dominican state, she decided to 
follow other forced migrants, and she became displaced in Haiti at the camp of Parc 
Cadeau where she built a small tent to be able to sleep with her six children. Without any 
help, Manchina had to find ways to support herself and her children. She was forced to 
return to the Dominican Republic, but this time it was not as a resident of the country she 
was born in. Rather, it was as a transnational woman whose life became entangled with 
everyday labor mobility across borders to go to do domestic work for Dominicans as she 
explained: 
“I still go to the Dominican Republic even though you go secretly as you 
can’t make a living over here. For instance, me, I have six children with me. I 
don’t have a husband. I must still go secretly to find something to give to the 
children. Sometimes, I go to do laundry for Dominicans; they give us small food.” 
Manchina was forced into everyday labor mobility to help her household and assume her 
responsibility as an independent woman. The women involved in domestic work are 
often the victims of abuse by not being paid by their employers. For instance, a woman I 
call Kerline, who crossed to work with Dominicans, maintained that: 
“I worked with many Dominicans. Some people you work for pay you, but 
others don’t pay you. When they don’t pay you, you look for another work. After 
you finish working, the person may say that they couldn’t pay; they don’t have 
money. If you go to the police, they won’t say anything.” 
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Kerline raised an important issue when she underlined that even though they report the 
abuse to the state, no further action is taken. The denial of these women’s claims is 
because their work takes place in the informal economy and is based upon verbal 
agreements with employers. This gives room to the employers to control the labor power 
of female domestic workers; migrant domestic workers are not just "victims of 
globalization" but also of power dynamics involved in paid domestic labor (De Regt 
2010). However, besides domestic labor, women draw upon mobility to develop other 
strategies to sustain their livelihoods. For instance, many women rely on their 
experiences back in the Dominican Republic and everyday mobility to run small 
transnational businesses. 
Despite limited economic resources available to them, some women find ways to 
start small transnational businesses going from Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti to Pedernales, 
Dominican Republic. They may go to sell their goods at the binational market on the 
Dominican-Haitian border on Mondays and Fridays or turn themselves into peddlers 
wandering the street of Pedernales with their products on their head. For example, one 
day as I was in Pedernales with two friends, Mirta and Inès, we met with a woman 
walking with a bundle of merchandize displayed on her arms and her head. She mainly 
had clothes and belts. That was her small business. It was a transnational woman who 
crossed the border trying to attract buyers in the streets of Pedernales. Usually, these 
women go to the Dominican Republic on an everyday basis, except during market days, 
when they can stay and sell their products at the binational market. That is also the 
strategy used by Mata, a long-term female resident of Anse-à-Pitres, but also a temporary 
migrant. I met her for the first time at the binational market and continued to see her 
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twice a week on market days. She became a seller from whom Inès and I bought 
vegetables such as carrots, onions, cabbages, garlic, and pepper. Originally, some of 
those products that she was selling were bought in Port-au-Prince; she had to hide these 
products because Dominican soldiers watch the type of products being sold at the market. 
Mata does not stay in one place because during other days of the week, she turns 
herself into a mobile merchant and keeps moving. Her whole life and that of her family 
depend on those everyday mobility practices to keep going. Even though her situation as 
a long-term resident is quite different from many forced migrant women, as a migrant 
and a transnational woman, her back and forth movements and her combativeness show a 
lot of similarities with forced migrant women who are involved in everyday labor 
mobility. Mata’s description of her mobile life across the border can be considered a 
summary of what being a transnational migrant in Anse-à-Pitres is, and how those 
women straddle two spaces simultaneously through everyday corporeal mobility in an 
attempt to create survival strategies. Mata explained what everyday labor mobility does 
for her and the family: 
“Monte desann (coming back and forth) between Anse-à-Pitres and the 
Dominican side is not bad for me. It is from that, with my basin, I pay the school 
of the children. They are always mistreating men. They may have some 
consideration for you as a woman. It is better that you, as a woman, go for this 
fight.” 
Despite humiliation and stories of violence and torture against Haitians in the Dominican 
Republic, nothing prevents Mata from expanding her life across the border. Being a 
transnational woman requires a lot of strength and perseverance. When Mata compares 
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these movements of monte desann (back and forth) as a fight, she means that everyday 
labor mobility for a woman is about determination, combativeness and bravery to face 
dangerous situations, which symbolizes the power and agency that those women exercise. 
These labor mobilities are constitutive of power and agency. Their unsettled lives 
produce new forms of social life (Hannam, Sheller, Urry 2006) and challenge ideas of 
dependency and resignation to despair and uncertainty. This is the form of power that 
describes the ability of these women to act in their daily lives using corporeal mobility as 
a reliable resource. By pointing to all the risks that those daily practices imply for a 
woman, Mata’s example shows that mobility is not an expression of freedom, but only a 
strategic tool that is imposed upon forced migrants and that they are required to use 
according to their agendas to attempt to reconstruct their lives. When the situation really 
gets worse and they are forced to stay away from the border, it is a hard blow to these 
women who live off everyday labor mobility. Everyday mobility remains an imperative 
to them to weave in and out between small spaces that become their battlefield and their 
field of economic activities. While getting in mobility increases their agency, there is a 
price that comes with it, which is assuming the main responsibility for their own and their 
children’s survival (Pauli 2008), because most of these women are either single mothers 
or wives who must complement their husbands’ meager income if the their husbands ever 
had income. Therefore, everyday labor mobility is the strategic tool for these women to 
accumulate the necessary resources to meet their multiple needs, which include 
improving their lives, feeding their children, and sustaining the livelihoods of the whole 
family. 
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Conclusion 
Everyday labor mobility defines the way of life for many forced migrants living 
in Anse-à-Pitres. Their daily crossings constitute the choice imposed upon them as they 
attempt to create new ways of life in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti and allows them to exercise 
some kind of power and agency. In addition, these dynamics lead to a form of 
emplacement, that is, re-territorialization as opposed to displacement, which is 
deterritorialization. I conceive of this emplacement as a form of immobility in 
comparison to a need to be constantly moving under constraints and threat. As such, both 
place and mobility have meaning in the lives of the forced migrants. 
Furthermore, their involvement in labor mobility shows how the forced migrants 
are engaged towards shaping the direction of their lives, something that is attested by 
their creation of an alternative form of citizenship that I conceive of as substantive 
citizenship. 
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CHAPTER 6: FORCED MIGRANTS AND CITIZENSHIP FORMATION BEYOND THE 
SCOPE OF THE JURIDICO-LEGAL 
 
“To me, I am Haitian but I can say I am half Dominican and half Haitian 
because I drink water in Haiti and I eat in Saint Domingue. I eat in Saint 
Domingue and I drink in Haiti, too. Even though I am in Haiti, I still go (to the 
Dominican Republic) because I don’t have any job to do here. If I found a job, I 
wouldn’t go. But it is in Saint Domingue that you earn a living. Even though 
Panyòl (Dominicans) are humiliating you, it is there you can have a better life.” 
During my fieldwork in Anse-à-Pitres, I made weekly visits to the camp of Parc Cadeau 
#1 but one day I decided to have one-on-one interviews with individuals in order to have 
more insight into their experiences. It was on that occasion that Medi made the point I 
highlighted above. Medi was born in the Dominican Republic, but he did not have the 
right to a Dominican birth certificate or a cedula (Dominican ID). Yet, at his age (he was 
in his forties), he should have automatically been considered a Dominican citizen, 
according to the Dominican constitution that was in force before 2010, which recognized 
the jus soli. The exclusion of children of Haitian parents by the Dominican state 
prevented him from having legal citizenship. Despite not having legal citizenship, Medi 
feels a sense of belonging in Haiti, but also in the Dominican Republic. This sense of 
belonging is part of a kind of citizenship construction outside the legal category that may 
be conceived of as substantive citizenship. There is an important transnational dimension 
in what Medi said: “I am half Dominican and half Haitian.” Therefore his sense of 
connection is not only with Haiti but also with the Dominican Republic, with which he 
develops a form of economic citizenship. Moreover, considering this shifting in social 
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and economic belonging between the two countries, this is a transnational substantive 
citizenship. It is this notion of substantive citizenship that this chapter examines, 
particularly how Dominican-Haitians, who have been the victims of a politics of 
exclusion put in place by the Dominican state, create citizenship beyond the legal 
category though personal and collective practices in Anse-à-Pitres. 
In its legal aspect, citizenship is generally referred to as a set of duties and 
political rights granted to an individual by a state. Accordingly, the state has the capacity 
to regulate its population and to define who belongs and who does not belong to the 
national territory. In its regulation of legal citizenship, the state often adopts a political 
asymmetry, excluding many people residing within its territory. Therefore, legal 
citizenship, at its most basic level, constitutes a mechanism for inclusion and exclusion, 
and thus a means for establishing or prohibiting membership in political entities that 
varies in scale from supranational to local (Somers 2008: 21). These mechanisms of 
exclusion can be seen in societies such as France and Italy, where legal citizenship 
encourages inequality, racism, and exclusion. 
Silverstein (2008) demonstrates how, historically, French citizenship has been 
exclusive. While citizenship was determined by the principle of jus soli, which allowed 
someone born in French territory to become a French citizen, the process for obtaining 
this citizenship was guided by a logic of morality and loyalty. For example, in colonial 
Algeria, Silverstein contends that Muslims were denied French citizenship on the basis of 
their religious “local civil status” in spite of the fact that Algeria was part of France after 
1880 and thus subject to the same juridical regime as the metropole (2008: 27). Today, 
racial exclusion is still manifest where discourses of race are an integral part of processes 
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of belonging to the French nation-state (Danahay and Brettell 2008). Distinctions 
between white rooted French and racialized French or paper French remains a mainstay 
of French political discourse, which outlines different forms of political belonging for 
first- and second-generation, as well as other racially or ethnically hyphenated men and 
women (2008: 25). Similarly, Stanley (2008) demonstrates how italianness is used to 
define belonging in Italy and broadly in the European supranational territory. 
Following Stanley (2008), italianness has become a marker to distinguish not only 
Italian identity, but also legal and political belonging, which is expressed through the 
exclusion of those who do not look and act Italian, especially, non-Italian and non- 
European immigrants. As a result, if one’s nationality is assumed to be non-Italian, then 
one is most likely to be not only a non-Italian noncitizen but also a non-European 
noncitizen. 
Divisions around the racial line and discourses such as these exclude people from 
nation-states and from citizenship. Dominican-Haitians were the victims of similar kinds 
of exclusion in the Dominican Republic, where the state adopted a constitutional 
amendment to officially strip people of Haitian origin of their Dominican citizenship and 
displace them to Haiti. 
In my examination of these people’s building of citizenship, I go beyond the legal 
category in which citizenship is considered to relate someone to a state, extending the 
definition of citizenship to include people’s daily practices and their acts of organizing 
themselves in their communities as an expression of being in common. I use the notion of 
substantive citizenship to conceptualize this alternative form of citizenship that is not 
granted by the state, but results from people’s experiences that attest to their belonging to 
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society. This substantive citizenship is an alternative form of citizenship that is built by 
the forced migrants in a collective and individual making process. The collective 
substantive citizenship making happened with the creation of ODRA (Organization for 
the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres) that serves as a voice for them to express 
themselves as concerned citizens. In its role of disciplining and training, ODRA sets to 
educate its members as substantive citizens for society. ODRA negotiates with local and 
international organizations in order to make the displaced people’s claims heard. This 
provides these people with some recognition. On their own making, stateless people take 
actions, whereby they resist systems of power, particularly the local state that wanted to 
arbitrarily displace them from the camps. Through these social dynamics, stateless people 
create substantive citizenship rather than formally through the enactment of law. 
In this chapter, first, I look at the daily practices of the stateless and displaced 
people living in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti and how their actions demonstrate a kind of 
substantive citizenship. 
Second, I demonstrate that these people meet and interact with local and 
international organizations, which not only provide them with assistance, but also 
incorporate them in their activities. This process contributes to legitimating their 
substantive citizenship. 
Third, I show that while the organizations on the ground participate in the 
 
legitimization of the forced migrants’ substantive citizenship, they also contribute to 
making them unequal substantive citizens through the creation of inequality and 
processes of exclusion. 
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Finally, through their involvement in practices that go beyond their communities 
in Anse-à-Pitres, I show that these people are transnational substantive citizens. This 
transnational substantive citizenship is defined by a mitigated feeling of belonging to 
Haiti, their new country of residence and to the Dominican Republic. 
 
6.1 Substantive citizenship through people’s practices 
People lacking legal citizenship create substantive citizenship through exercising 
socio-economic and cultural rights (Holston 1999, Vora 2013). For instance, Vora (2013) 
has shown how the impossibility of obtaining legal citizenship for members of Dubai’s 
Indian diaspora places them outside of the Emirati nation. However, the economic rights 
they acquire through their participation in the formal economy, forms of narratives and 
practices of belonging, and their claims to historic-cultural and geographic impacts in the 
city of residence produce forms of substantive citizenship. In the context of stateless 
people in Anse-à-Pitres, their substantive citizenship follows a different logic. It is based 
on narratives of belonging but also on claims to rights to the city, protests, and the 
recognition these people receive from organizations. I understand belonging as both a 
human and a social right for the displaced people in that it involves the enjoyment of a 
certain freedom of being in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, but also the claim to the right to 
participate in the city life like other legal citizens. According to Bloch (2014), citizenship 
is culturally contingent and inextricably linked with ‘partial citizenship’ or 
‘noncitizenship’ and ideals about belonging. According to this logic, forced migrants’ 
substantive citizenship is an outcome of social practices (Isin and Wood 1999) that result 
from personal and collective enterprises that express belonging to and engagement with 
their living communities. 
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Stateless people in Anse-à-Pitres create substantive citizenship through the 
informal and outside of the juridical or political realms of citizenship (Canning 2008). 
This substantive citizenship is a complex bundle of practices that includes the forced 
migrants’ attestation of membership in the community and a common vision (Lazar 
2013), even though they lack political rights (Holston 2001). Unlike Indian substantive 
citizens in Dubai, forced migrants cannot draw on the formal economy to enjoy special 
social and economic rights. Their creation of substantive citizenship is an individual and 
collective making process of which they are the initiators and the finishers, meaning that 
they are the ones who seek to establish new social cultural orders that allow them to 
assert a presence in society (Olwig 2005). Therefore, this alternative citizenship is 
defined by the displaced people’s actions and formed through daily experiences and 
narratives that ensure them an “absent-presence” (Witberger 2014) within the public 
space, i.e., the city, their resistance to projects of displacement and relocation that are 
imposed from above, and the collective actions undertaken through their organizations 
that make them visible to other non-governmental organizations and agencies that work 
with them. By transcending both Haitian and Dominican society, these personal and 
social actions challenge discreet boundaries around what it means to be a citizen of a 
single state (Bloch 2014). In what follows, I outline the facets of substantive citizenship 
as a personal and collective action, starting with the creation of ODRA (the Organization 
for the Defense of the Repatriates) which attests to the displaced people’s sharing of a 
common vision, then their actions to protest local systems of power, and the visibility 
they acquire through other organizations. 
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6.2 Networking and organizing as a claim of citizenship: the Organization for 
the Defense of the Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres (ODRA) 
A few weeks after I arrived in Anse-à-Pitres, I went to visit the Catholic Church 
and found myself talking with Evanès and Cator, two young men serving at the church. It 
was about 5 p.m. and suddenly, I saw a group of people coming and gathering in the yard 
of the church. Evanès told me they are people who usually come to see Father Leconte, 
who frequently organized food distribution for them. I approached them, presenting 
myself and asking them some basic information. I found that they were migrants. That 
day, they stayed a long time but Father Leconte did not come out. They showed a strong 
interest in me when they learned that I was doing research with the displaced people. One 
man I will call Miguel told me: “you have to come to our organization; I am the founder 
and the promoter.” He gave me a phone number and the address where they gathered. 
Later I met him one day in a meeting at the organization. It was through Miguel, a sixty 
year-old man, that I discovered the forced migrants’ organization created in 2016. 
On a Sunday afternoon, I was dropped off by a moto taxi driver in front of a 
relatively nice, pink and white church made of concrete, with a spacious yard that also 
houses a restaurant. I was already some minutes late, so I inserted myself gently and took 
a seat at the back. I remember the first words I heard from a committee member “We 
have to be dynamic. If we are a part of an organization, we have to help one another. If 
we have an organization, other organizations (international) will collaborate with us and 
help us. We have same ideas, same thoughts, and same words. We have to behave well if 
they have to help us.” 
162  
The assembly applauded but I could also hear the murmur from the attendees that 
followed. While I paid attention to these first words, during my first visit I was mostly 
concerned about taking a look at the physical space. The church is very spacious and well 
ventilated thanks to its doors and windows that let the fresh air in and help with the 
sweltering heat and the dust. The church is arranged in two rows. During the meetings 
women sit on the left row and men on the right. I cannot determine why the physical 
space is gendered, but according to what I have seen, this way of distributing people was 
at least helpful for members of the committee when they are selecting between men and 
women for external meetings. ODRA stands for Organization for the Defense of the 
Repatriates of Anse-à-Pitres and it was the only migrant organization I noticed in Anse-à- 
Pitres during my research between 2016 and 2017. Even though the name of the 
organization states “repatriates,” the organization also includes stateless Dominican- 
Haitians. Talking about repatriates in this context may be problematic as many 
Dominican-Haitian forced migrants have never been to Haiti and cannot be considered as 
repatriates. Most members of ODRA live in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, where they 
relocated after the IOM granted them the financial support to rent a room. The 
organization has a board composed of five members: a president, a vice-president, a 
secretary, a treasurer, a counselor, and a delegate. The president is not a migrant. He is a 
well-known citizen of Anse-à-Pitres. According to members, they chose him because of 
his support when they were living in the camps where the organization began its first 
activities. The president, who is a pastor, is the owner of a church and allowed forced 
migrants to gather in the premises, for free, every week. Therefore, the organization 
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meets at the church based on the existing relationship that was built in the camp, not 
because the forced and relocated migrants were members of the church. 
The speech I heard during my first visit highlighted three dimensions that can 
help understand the raison d’être of the organization. First, the statement demonstrates 
that the organization constitutes a way for forced migrants to be socially productive and 
dynamic in their community. Second, members expect that the organization will give 
them some visibility through, for example, collaborating with international organizations. 
Third, the organization is set to articulate members’ vision and form them as citizens for 
society. As such, ODRA serves as a place to meet and to network, but also to coherently 
put their life goals together. 
As far as networking is concerned, many forced migrants have lived all their lives 
in the Dominican Republic and do not have ties in Haiti. It is one of many reasons they 
stayed in the camps. For instance, Matilda was born in Abila, Dominican Republic and 
arrived in Haiti on June 2015. During an interview, she said: “I don’t have any contacts 
with people in the Dominican Republic. I didn’t have contacts with people in Haiti before 
I came here.” When I met Matilda, she had already left the Dominican Republic about 
one year ago, so she had lost her Dominican contacts. She still found it difficult to 
identify herself with Haiti, except with the Haitian flag. She considered herself a lost 
sheep in this new country. She added: “What makes me feel I am at home it is because I 
am under my flag but I am not in my land.” In fact, this lack of identification with the 
country is in part due to the fact that Matilda was not born and raised in Haiti. Like her, 
many Dominican-Haitians remain marginalized in Anse-à-Pitres by living apart and not 
being integrated into the larger community. As a consequence, they do not develop any 
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networks with local citizens. Their isolation is reinforced by long-term residents, who 
have accused forced migrants, particularly those who reside in the camps located on the 
main road that lead to the entrance gate of the city, of being an element of insecurity or 
physical attacks against passengers going to the city. This criminalization of the forced 
migrants contributes to destroying their reputation and narrowing their network to fellow 
forced migrants who were in the Dominican Republic and who also experienced 
statelessness and displacement. In such a situation of loneliness and marginalization, 
ODRA offers opportunity for the forced migrants to network and interact with fellows 
and eventually with outsiders. 
The organization represents a second family to many members. Some forced 
migrants I interviewed said that ODRA is the only group they attend. For example, I 
visited Jean Mars, a man in his early fifties who is on the committee, to talk about his 
experience in Anse-à-Pitres, a new place for him. He lives in a small house, which I 
found empty and dark, with one door, but without windows, and with no furniture except 
a small bed. According to him, ODRA is the only place he goes to besides church. He 
showed me his church card and said: “I don’t have families here. That’s why I go to 
church and ODRA.” Jean Mars is not from the city of Anse-à-Pitres and is alone there. 
Often, he went to spend time at the SJM office or at a friend’s house. This lack of 
community led many displaced people like him to become a member of the organization. 
At the ODRA meetings, men and women of the displaced population gather every 
Sunday and socialize among themselves in a very congenial atmosphere. Getting together 
encourages people to have informal conversations with each other and share basic 
information. People often share stories about the Dominican Republic, informing each 
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other of potential risks and threat. Following meetings, many people would look for a 
friend to talk with before going back home, or would seek to make acquaintance with a 
new person. Some people would wait for me and come to speak with me in a corner at 
the church or outside. I walked around to greet and meet people and sometimes 
accompanied them to their home. People were always asking me to visit their homes. The 
networking role of the organization is emphasized by a board member I called Brevil. He 
sees the organization as an important place for forced migrants to define their goals and 
compensate for the absence of ties in Haiti. He states: “The organization is for the 
repatriates who have nobody, no father, and no mother. When we are members of an 
organization, we are one family.” Like Jean Mars, Brevil conceives of the organization as 
a family. I would go further to perceive the organization as a way to build relationships 
with others and create community. For Caglar (2004), the community and the relationship 
that exists between members of society are fundamental to the construction of 
citizenship. For the stateless people, ODRA offers them a space to build this citizenship 
by being able to gather and put their goals together. 
6.2.1 The goals of ODRA and the agency of citizenship 
 
Through ODRA, the forced migrants define their goals, which include having 
legal documentation, education for their children, housing, and jobs in Anse-à-Pitres. 
They identify those elements as the fundamental needs to realize their potential as human 
beings. The president justifies those goals in a statement he made during an ODRA 
meeting: 
“The most important thing to consider is the person. The biggest problem 
 
is having a home and helping the children. Food is also important but education 
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and a place to live are important. These people are human beings. They deserve to 
live like everybody. These migrants are workers. They were working in 
agriculture, construction, and hotels. Dominicans would like to have them again. 
The state has to invest in construction, land, beaches, and the environment. If 
 
there is work, these problems will be solved. If they are working, there won’t be 
any problem.” 
These are the main claims of ODRA; forced migrants want to avoid dependency and give 
evidence that they believe in long-term development. Despite their limited economic 
resources, the forced migrants contribute towards this achievement by mobilizing their 
own scant resources through raising money during ODRA meetings. ODRA asks each 
member to pay a contribution of five Haitian gourdes (USD 0.083) with the aim of 
creating a fund for the organization and appealing to other organizations’ generosity. 
Even though displaced and stateless people have to solve their problems of housing and 
food insecurity in the short-term, they understand that the improvement of their lives can 
only be the result of a durable project that differs from being provided with little food. 
Establishing specific goals demonstrates their role as responsible citizens, who feel the 
right to live as decent human beings. 
ODRA is the only significant space of freedom where many forced migrants can 
express themselves like legal citizens and decide their future. The creation of this 
organization emphasizes their agency in carrying social projects to change their lives. 
They do not want others to define their goals and seek to avoid intruders among them. 
The president warns the organization against including false migrants among them, 
stating: “be careful of people you are putting on your list. There are so many false 
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repatriates. Their house is here in Anse-à-Pitres and they go to sleep at the camp of Parc 
Cadeau. They are abolochos (false migrants).” As the president said, I learned about this 
situation where long-term residents often go to build their tents at the camps in order to 
benefit from humanitarian aid. The critical poverty in which people are living and the 
lack of economic opportunities in Anse-à-Pitres encourage this behavior, whereby people 
are trying to take advantage of the migration crisis that led to statelessness and 
displacement. Above all, by grouping themselves and displaying their vision about their 
future in Anse-à-Pitres, the forced migrants think of themselves as agents of their own 
destiny and show their sense of responsibility and their willingness to be autonomous in 
their movement. This autonomy is defined by the organization as the possibility for 
forced migrants to work in order to have resources and be self-reliant. For instance, they 
want to force the state and organizations to create job opportunities for all the forced 
migrants. This claim is expressed by committee members: 
“The international organizations should create jobs. Those people (forced 
migrants) practiced agriculture when they were in the Dominican Republic. They 
should help people in these kinds of activities: job creation, education, housing 
etc. It is not just giving them little food. When you receive a salary each 15
th
 of 
the month, you expect something. You can go to a bank and borrow money. 
That’s what the state and organizations have to do. If you don’t have 250 HT 
gourdes to go to Thiottes, you are not independent. You are not free. It is when 
you have money that you are autonomous.” 
In accordance with the committee’s definition of autonomy, being independent for forced 
migrants is tied to an increase in their ability to make decisions over their lives, such as 
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enjoying the same rights and economic opportunities as legal citizens. Even though 
forced migrants are conceived of as unauthorized in the community (Sassen 2002), 
ODRA offers them some kind of freedom that allows them to make their voice heard by 
the state and demonstrate their valuable membership in society. ODRA does not simply 
provide a place for members to make claims on basic human rights (such as having the 
opportunity to educate their children, to work, and to have a place to stay), but it also 
works towards making its members better substantive citizens through disciplining them. 
As such, ODRA’s focus on the development of the person does not reduce well- 
being to material belongings; the organization also works to discipline its members in 
order to make them better citizens. The organization, through its actions and its 
discourses, exercises some forms of power over its members. The members become 
dependent subjects that can be managed, disciplined, or simply ignored (Striffler 2002) 
by the organization. For instance, one of the committee members reveals the disciplining 
and punishing role of the organization when he maintains: 
“If you don’t have discipline, you can’t be a member of an organization. 
In the organization, you must be respectful. You are under control. If you aren’t, 
we will take the member badge from you. When you are a member of an 
organization, you can’t do whatever you want. If you have a problem, before 
going to the court, you have to talk to the founder of the organization. We will 
judge you. If you do things on your own, we will reject you.” 
 
As a result, ODRA can be defined as a space of citizen-making. ODRA’s goal of 
educating, managing, and controlling people is central to the building of their substantive 
169  
citizenship. Members have become more dependent on ODRA than the local state, with 
which they seem to have a distant relationship in Anse-à-Pitres. 
ODRA seeks to make people new citizens by providing them training based on 
church ethics. Accordingly, members are expected to attend church services to be imbued 
with moral guidance that will form the proper social conduct desired by the organization. 
For instance, the president contended: “We do training for people on how to live in 
society. I will tell you farewell if you don’t want to go to church and I won’t be part of 
the board of the organization. If you are church people, you don’t fight. You must report 
your conflicts to the organization and the church.” As such, the training offered by the 
organization is deeply rooted in moral principles. The implications of this coercive 
attitude of ODRA constitute a way of making forced migrants into new people, 
substantive citizens, or responsible subjects for society (Zigon 2010). This appears in a 
statement made by a member of the committee: “When people come at the organization 
such as the mayor, they are observing us. We must behave well if they have to help us.” 
ODRA members understand their role in substantive citizenship making, which includes 
working on the self in order to become docile, respectful, and thus, better citizens. This 
way they can prove they have the sense of responsibility for themselves and for their 
community. This also shows that members seem to support the organization in its leading 
role and its goal of impacting their lives in the external world, influencing decisions they 
are making and negotiating on their behalf. 
The organization wants to be the representative of members in negotiations with 
outsiders by being their voice and speaking on their behalf. Some migrants went to see 
the local priest, who usually organizes food distribution at the Catholic Church. When 
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they heard this, board members of ODRA were not happy because the priest dealt with 
forced migrants directly without consulting ODRA. The president stated: “He (the priest) 
could meet with the committee of the organization. We would give him a list of migrants 
and he would prepare food Kitts for them. But if going to his office, people are being 
whipped, it is not good. People are already in misery. They can’t be whipped. People 
have to be respected.” In this respect, I have assisted with food distribution at the 
Catholic Church; I did not see people being whipped, but there were three police officers 
who were reprimanding people and forcing them to stay in line. ODRA attempts to 
reduce people’s autonomy and also promotes a form of paternalism, whereby the forced 
migrants’ well-being can only be decided by ODRA. First, forced migrants must submit 
themselves to the authority of the organization, which then exercises power and 
domination over them. Second, ODRA members are advised against making decisions 
themselves, which makes them dependent subjects. The ODRA board requires members 
to inform the organization of all potential negotiations with outsiders about projects or 
programs from which they can benefit. The constant need to inform ODRA of personal 
activities reinforces the subjectification of forced migrants towards the organization. 
However, the organization’s attempt to reduce the freedom of the forced migrants does 
not prevent the forced migrants from making independent choices; displaced people 
continue to look for aid without informing the organization. By acting deliberately as 
autonomous individuals the displaced people demonstrate that they have obligations 
towards a bigger community than ODRA, a society of which they are part as equally as 
legal citizens, even though they do not enjoy the same rights. While ODRA plays a 
significant role as a maker of substantive citizenship through disciplining and training 
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people to prepare them for society, forced migrants also act independently to make 
themselves substantive citizens, such as when they opposed a relocation project imposed 
by local authorities, thereby resisting a form of power. 
 
6.3 Resisting displacement and relocation: the making of substantive citizenship 
The forced migrants, especially those who resided in the camps, found a way to 
break their silence and raise their voices by refusing to collaborate with local authorities 
on a project that aimed to displace them from the camps, demonstrating that they have 
rights to the city of Anse-à-Pitres just the same as other local citizens. In 2017, the SJM, 
in a partnership with the City Hall, proposed a project to relocate the forced migrants 
from the camps of Parc Cadeau #1 and Parc Cadeau #2. Project goals included helping 
the residents of these camps to travel to their places of origin in Haiti and settle into a 
new life there. While the SJM was in charge of carrying out the program on the ground, 
UNICEF, USDOL, and Cross International were listed as the potential sources of 
financing. With vulnerable migrant families as its target, the project aimed to improve the 
conditions of the migrant population, which had already been displaced from the 
Dominican Republic. The project envisaged offering socio-economic support to 67 
vulnerable migrant families in the two aforementioned camps in order to enable them 
travel to their places of origin in Haiti. The City Hall, with which SJM partnered in the 
program, was responsible for providing the technical support on the ground. National 
representatives of the SJM from Port-au-Prince went to Anse-à-Pitres to discuss the 
project with the City Hall, specifically who would benefit from the project and how much 
money would be allocated to the selected persons. The City Hall answered these 
questions and provided its responses to SJM. 
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First and foremost, there is the issue of identifying the recipients of the project. In 
the description of the project, SJM listed people in the camps of Parc Cadeau #1 and Parc 
Cadeau #2 as the potential beneficiaries and intended to reach 67 vulnerable families. 
However, after meeting with ODRA president, the City Hall also included forced 
migrants living in downtown Anse-à-Pitres who, in 2016, had been relocated by the IOM. 
The City Hall promised to provide these people with the financial assistance needed to 
renew their expiring rent as IOM had withdrawn from helping them. Through ODRA, the 
mayors invited the relocated people to produce a document with their names and the 
receipts with which they were provided by their landlords. The president of ODRA then 
informed the relocated forced migrants of the agreement about the renewal of their rent 
with the City Hall. However, this conclusion between the two parties is in conflict with 
SJM’s definition of the recipients of the project. 
The second issue is that while SJM wanted to provide socio-economic support to 
people, it did not stipulate the amount of money assigned to relocation funding. 
Therefore, it remained at the discretion of the City Hall to decide how much to allocate to 
each person being displaced from the camps. In the description of the project, the SJM 
stated that the project would cost USD 27,143 and that they had requested USD 25,000, 
but the amount allocated for each recipient was not confirmed. The City Hall calculated 
allocation amounts to reflect the transport fees for a forced migrant to travel from Anse-à- 
Pitres to their place of origin, but this did not match the goal of the project, which 
originally intended to help people improve their lives. One of the mayors simply 
imagined an amount that each person should be given for their displacement, but it was 
not realistic, as people complained that the sum of money announced did not cater to their 
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transportation need, let alone help them live in a place they had left many years ago and 
where they often did not have any ties. 
In addition, there are stateless displaced people among forced migrants, who have 
never been to Haiti and who did not have any connection with a place in Haiti that they 
would consider their place of origin. People in this category seem to have no other choice 
than to stay in the camps. After the difficulties to put the project into operation, the City 
Hall became the sole true executor. 
6.3.1 Execution of the project 
 
The relocation process did not go the way SJM intended in its project roadmap; 
there were many contradictions between the project described and what the local state did 
on the ground. 
First, while the project emphasized the two camps of Parc Cadeau #1 and Parc 
Cadeau # 2 as beneficiaries of the program, the City Hall decided to displace only people 
of the camp of Parc Cadeau #2, maintaining that people in Parc Cadeau #1 were from 
Anse-à-Pitres and were not migrants. Hence, according to the City Hall, they could 
return to their homes. 
Second, according to a few residents I talked to at the camp of Parc Cadeau #2, 
the City Hall adopted an arbitrary method to expel people from the camp instead of 
relocating them. People claimed that the city hall came unexpectedly to the camp with a 
minibus and a driver. They prepared envelopes that contained about 3,000 Haitian 
gourdes (USD 50) each and gave one to each person, forcing them to get on the minibus. 
One of the goals of the City Hall through the project was to prevent the re-construction of 
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the camp or the construction of new tents once the forced migrants left. People 
maintained that the City Hall hired people and burnt their small tents after the forced 
migrants had been given the envelope containing their money. I talked to a group of 
people who stayed at the camp and they contended: 
“The City Hall came to expel us. They gave each of us 3,100 HT gourdes 
(USD 52) and burnt our houses. They came with gas. They said that the owner of 
the land asked for it. Each person they gave the money, they destroyed their 
house. They said that the money was for transportation and they would give extra 
money but they didn’t do that.” 
Thus, the project of relocation has become one of expulsion. The way the event occurred 
meant that the City Hall’s only goal was to get rid of the forced migrants. Some people 
explained that they were expelled from the camp because the camps projected a bad 
image of the city of Anse-à-Pitres. They were informed of this allegation by 
representatives of the City Hall, who said: “We are worried because people are saying 
that the city has problems.” For the city hall, this relocation had nothing to do with 
supporting the displaced persons and improving their lives. Relocation simply 
represented a way to destroy the camps in order to erase the image of desolation and 
poverty of the city of Anse-à-Pitres. The project went from “resettlement with 
compensation” to “resettlement with impoverishment” (Cernea and Maldonado 2018). 
Despite the City Hall’s pressure to displace camp residents, the forced migrants opposed 
the project. 
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6.3.2 Collective consciousness or substantive citizenship engagement 
 
The forced migrants’ reactions to contest the power of the local state enhanced 
their agency and their status as substantive citizens. Some of the forced migrants refused 
to take the money and get on the minibus that was set to take them to their place of 
origin. Others, who took the money, did not go, despite pressure from those who were to 
displace them, because they did not believe in the project. A group of people, who chose 
to stay in the camp and did not get money from the city hall, maintained: 
“From the 3,100 HT gourdes, the driver took 1,000 HT gourdes. He was 
going to drop us in the middle of the road. The driver pulled out his weapon and 
threatened us. They were forcing us to get on the minibus. Everybody got off the 
bus. They kept the money. They didn’t give the 1,000 HT gourdes back to us.” 
The local authorities used a top down approach, making decisions for the beneficiaries 
without consulting them. This resulted in violence, and the residents totally objected to 
their forced displacement from the camps. 
The residents of Parc Cadeau #2 blocked the road as a way to protest, causing 
tensions between them and people who were hired by the City Hall to displace them and 
destroy the camp. A group of residents explained the situation, “the same day, we 
blocked the road to traffic. In order to open the road, a man offered us 10 boxes of rice. 
He and the driver also offered us 7,500 HT gourdes but we didn’t take them. The driver 
pulled out his weapon at us.” On the surface, this way of displacing the residents while 
the state pretended to welcome them when they first arrived in the city is reminiscent of 
the expulsions of Haitians from the Dominican Republic that took place not only in 2015, 
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but also in past decades. In the 1990s, for example, while conducting a round-up, 
Dominican police and soldiers forcibly took many Haitians from their houses and 
violently pushed some of them onto buses destined for Haiti (Camejo et al. 1992). This 
brutality was also repeated in 2015 and led to the forced migration to Haiti. These 
experiences suggest that the everyday life of these people, whether in the Dominican 
Republic or in Haiti, has always been rife with challenges. 
The camp residents also resisted by taking the money from the city hall and 
faking going to their place of origin. After a few days, they returned to the camp from 
which they were evicted and started to rebuild their tents. A young man in his late 
twenties has parents from Jacmel, a Haitian main city located in the southeast but far 
from Anse-à-Pitres. He took the money and he traveled to Jacmel, but returned quickly to 
the camp. He explained: “They gave me 4,330 HT gourdes. The same day, I went to 
Jacmel. I returned because I have my friends and my activity in the bush where I can 
gather wood. Here, the bush is public but in Jacmel, you can’t cut down trees.” The 
strategy employed by this young man demonstrates his ability to circumvent the power of 
the local state, which attests to a form of personal agency. 
I met with residents of the camp Parc Cadeau #2 in order to learn more about their 
refusal to leave, despite the intervention of the local state. They gave many reasons. First, 
the money offered to them was not enough to pay for transportation when they needed 
support so that they could start small businesses in their new homes. Therefore, people 
preferred to stay in the camp so that they could continue to take advantage of border 
activities. Melia lived in the Dominican Republic all her life, but had been in Parc 
Cadeau #2 since she came to Haiti. She said: 
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“When you left a small land 27 or 28 years ago, what do you know about 
it? Wherever you are you can live. They say they will give us 3,000 HT gourdes, 
which can’t even buy sandals. Where will I put in a day of work in Marouge, my 
place of origin? Here my husband can put in a day of work in the Dominican 
Republic. If I have some money, I can buy a small land. I can do business to give 
food to the children. 3,000 HT gourdes are nothing. When the money was higher, 
people didn’t leave, and now they expect them to leave for 3,000 HT gourdes. I 
come from very far; the transportation fee is more than 3,000 HT gourdes. 
According to me, 3,000 HT gourdes are like 15 Dominican pesos considering my 
responsibilities.” 
Melia’s statement summarizes the arguments made by many camp residents to explain 
their opposition to the project of dislocation. People expressed a feeling of being settled 
in the camp in comparison to going to a place they left many years ago and where they 
would have to start from scratch to make a living. 
Second, forced migrants who were born in the Dominican Republic or who 
arrived in the Dominican Republic when they were a child, like Melia, doubted that their 
families in Haiti would welcome them without money, something revealed in Yanick’s 
statement: “I prefer to live among foreigners than to live among family. The family loves 
you as much as you have something.” Despite their challenges, the displaced people 
avoided having a project imposed upon them when that project did not contribute to their 
human development. 
We may refer to the forced migrants’ forms of resistance—that include refusing to 
take the money that is offered to them, blocking the road, faking displacement, or 
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responding negatively to local authorities—as a way to boycott the dislocation project as 
outright protest. The reactions of the stateless and displaced people express both a social 
and a human right that translates the desire of belonging to the city of Anse-à-Pitres as 
members like legal citizens and the freedom to live in a place of their choice by refusing 
choices that the local state attempts to impose on them. By these dynamics, the displaced 
and stateless people also express their capacity to take actions that come from a collective 
consciousness the same way as any other citizens of the city. This is what may be 
conceived of as the agency of citizenship (Lazar 2013. Their substantive citizenship has 
found some recognition from organizations that attempted to negotiate and collaborate 
with them. 
 
6.4 The role of organizations in legitimating the stateless people’s substantive 
citizenship 
 
Indeed, forced migrants’ substantive citizenship has been validated by 
organizations that collaborated and negotiated with them and by the local state in the 
personage of the mayors who also entered into discussions with the displaced people 
before intervening to displace them. In this section, when referring to NGOs, I am simply 
considering at how NGOs endow the forced migrants’ substantive citizenship with some 
form of recognition. For instance, the SJM sought to establish direct contact with the 
forced migrants, inviting them to their meetings, supporting them in the defense of their 
human rights, and working for their social and economic integration. The president and 
the vice president of ODRA took part, stood up, raised their voices and asked questions 
in meetings organized by the SJM. Both ODRA representatives asked SJM to make a 
plea for the force migrants. In the course of the documentation program, PwoKontram, 
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representatives of the SJM from the national office headquartered in Port-au-Prince 
organized focus groups with the forced migrants, asking them for advice in order to serve 
them better. In this way, ODRA is considered an important participant in the execution of 
the documentation project in Anse-à-Pitres with SJM. The participatory approach that 
included sitting with the SJM attests to the role that forced migrants play in the 
community and, specifically, in their own development as substantive citizens. 
The SJM is not the only organization that met and negotiated with the forced 
migrants as a way of legitimating their citizenship. One day, during a usual meeting, two 
representatives of GARR on behalf of UNHCR came to meet with ODRA members to 
discuss a project that aimed to reunify separated families and decrease the global number 
of stateless people. Representatives of ODRA also met with the City Hall in order to 
negotiate the future of the forced migrants. The president of ODRA had met with local 
authorities many times before the execution of the relocation project, when many forced 
migrants started to be expelled by landlords in Anse-à-Pitres. ODRA intervened to help 
the tenants, assuming its leading role in the migrant community and seeking an 
alternative to the IOM’s refusal to renew the forced migrants’ rent. Furthermore, ODRA 
has a delegate, who can represent the organization in meetings. However, the delegate is 
not authorized to make decisions on behalf of ODRA. The delegate is only responsible 
for reporting to the board and to members of the organization. Although these actions did 
not bring a solution to the problems of the forced migrants, they contributed to helping 
the stateless and displaced people become engaged in negotiating and renegotiating their 
lives, despite their lack of legal citizenship. These examples attest to forced migrants 
impact upon communities and the recognition of a limited form of citizenship for them. 
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The capacity of the forced migrant organization to expand their claims beyond the 
local community illustrates the refusal of the forced migrants to restrict themselves to a 
state of illegality and their ability to renegotiate statelessness. The rapport they built with 
a society outside their world of displacement has brought some small victories; after 
meeting with representatives of organizations, they have obtained various kinds of 
support. According to the president of ODRA, Fondasyon pou Lapè (Foundation for 
Peace) has provided financial aid, which he confirmed during an ODRA general meeting: 
“Fondasyon pou Lapè gave us 12,000 Dominican pesos, and Dr. Lamothe also helped us. 
We (as the head of a local school) paid school fees for 100 children and we gave 4,000 to 
4,500 Haitian gourdes to teachers. This is how we get money to pay teachers for the 
children.” The organizations, such as the SJM, IOM, and Fondasyon pou Lapè, which 
negotiated with forced migrants, granted them a significant form of collective agency, 
giving them the ability to act together and to plan their future, and also endowing them 
with certain visibility and recognition in the community of Anse-à-Pitres; this may be 
considered a form of limited citizenship. The possibility of earning citizenship through 
contexts other than the law has also been demonstrated by Tsuda (2006) in his study of 
local citizenship in countries such as Spain, South Korea, Japan, and the like. He shows 
that in Japan, for example, the national government is more concerned with controlling 
its borders than integrating immigrants defined as temporary residents and considered as 
not assimilated enough within the nation-state. As a result, it falls to local governments 
and NGOs to take care of these immigrants by granting them limited rights such as health 
care, language classes, and public housing. Unauthorized immigrants experience poor 
working conditions and low wages; they lack standard worker rights and protection, and 
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have no access to adequate medical insurance or care because the local government does 
not recognize them. While they are unrecognized by the local government, NGOs do 
provide these undocumented migrants with basic services such as human rights 
protection, which grants them a limited form of local citizenship. I suggest that while 
nongovernmental organizations play a significant role in supporting stateless people in 
their absence of legal citizenship, they are also instrumental in promoting inequalities in 
the lives of poor people through, for example, their role as administrators of humanitarian 
aid to refugees. 
NGOs have been subject to criticism that views them as increasing inequalities 
among the population they are serving, creating economic elites (Yarrow 2011), who 
appropriate resources based on the idea that they are the skilled ones. For example, in 
Haiti, Schuller (2016) examines how Haitians working for NGOs were aware of socio- 
economic inequalities between them and their foreign counterparts with the latter 
enjoying great economic privileges and also seeking to exercise their power. The power 
of NGOs in Haiti has been prevalent after the 2010 earthquake. Foreign donors have 
chosen to rely on NGOs and contractors to lead the reconstruction of the country, for 
which 9,9 billion dollars were pledged, while the state only had to vet projects, inspect 
progress, and resolve land-title disputes (Farmer 2012). According to Farmer, leaving 
reconstruction solely in the hands of private contractors, including large international 
NGOs is to continue the same dysfunctional cycle. The only way that money was 
reported to move from the donors to survivors of the earthquake was through the creation 
of jobs. However, the UN reported that agencies only created only thirty-five thousand 
jobs while five hundred thousand or more were needed (Farmer 2012). In this sense, 
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money does not always go to those in need. In Anse-à-Pitres, the relationship that the 
stateless people build with organizations in the field help them earn a limited form of 
citizenship or a kind of “local citizenship,” which is part of their substantive citizenship 
construction, but the NGOs, at the same time, make these people unequal substantive 
citizens. This was evidenced by the inclusion of some forced migrants in local projects 
and the exclusion of others even though, in some circumstances, this process was 
inevitable. 
 
6.5 Producing unequal substantive citizenship 
Unequal substantive citizenship results from the unequal treatment of citizens that 
become officially or unofficially institutionalized in a nation-state. For instance, the state 
has recently developed a new type of citizenship tied to “firms and markets, located not 
in individuals or citizens, but in global economic actors” (Hansen 2005; Sassen 1996, 
38). Ong (2006) explores this form of economic citizenship and the role of the state in 
promoting inequality among its citizens, examining how the nation-state has realigned 
itself with market-driven institutions in order to promote an economic logic and at the 
same time define and redefine citizenship. As a result, citizenship has become something 
less fixed, or more flexible, and able to incorporate the disruptions and flows of 
globalization. This rupture in citizenship or disaggregation, according to Ong, is related 
to the dynamic and varied conditions engendered by mobile neoliberal technologies of 
governing and self-governing (16), which is done in many ways. One way is the 
intervention of the state, which practices a politics of differentiation towards its 
population by deliberately favoring certain categories of subjects over others. According 
to Ong, through this approach, only bearers of marketable talents can enjoy special rights 
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and benefits. Those who are not marketable are excluded. Hence, being simply a member 
of the polity as a legal citizen does not guarantee one the access to these special rights 
and benefits. This neoliberal logic has reconfigured the territory of citizenship. In Anse-à- 
Pitres, one may also observe a process by which people are making differential citizens, 
but with a different logic, which is established not only by a state that treats its population 
unequally, but also by organizations on the ground. These organizations provide forced 
migrants with some support, but at the same time create inequalities among them. In 
addition, the capacity to mobilize resources also differentiates the forced migrants. By 
examining how both external and personal factors contribute to this process of 
differentiation, my research develops an understanding of differential citizenship as 
something both created and involuntarily self-provoking. 
First and foremost, differentiation among the displaced people begins with the 
IOM and its program of relocation. In 2016 in downtown Anse-à-Pitres, the IOM 
relocated about 200 forced migrants, according to the local community and ODRA. 
Despite its efforts, the IOM program neglected many displaced people, who were living 
in the different camps, but in the same conditions as those who were selected. I had not 
yet arrived in Anse-à-Pitres when the program was implemented. However, I found many 
residents in the camps, who complained about the arbitrariness of a program that did not 
explain the rationale behind its choices. Even though some forced migrants contended 
that they were not selected because they were absent on the day of the census, others 
believed they deserved the IOM assistance in the same way as those who received the 
assistance. Standing in front of the SJM office one afternoon, I met a Dominican-Haitian, 
a man in his late thirties, who resided in the camp of Maletchipe close to the camp of 
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Parc Cadeau #2. During a short conversation, he told me: “We were nine families in 
Maletchipe. Then IOM relocated three, and six of us were left in the camp. I have four 
children; two are with me and two are with their mother. Their mother left me because 
she saw that things were not good.” This man was not unique in complaining that he was 
left out of the IOM relocation program. Other residents in the camps made the same 
remark, maintaining that they may have been working outside their homes when the IOM 
staff passed through the camps, and false migrants were selected in their stead. A worker 
from another organization also pointed out the fact that some false migrants were selected 
to benefit from the program of relocation. He stated: “There is some money being given 
but I don’t know anything. We (our organization) were here before the IOM. When they 
were giving the money, they put us out and put in false migrants.” As this example 
denotes, financial aid does not always go to whom it is intended and may divide the 
population. In Anse-à-Pitres, almost everyone is poor and vulnerable, which may explain 
why many long-term residents seek to take advantage of aid opportunities using a false 
migrant identity. However, at least these people belong to the land and appear to be in a 
slightly better situation than the forced migrants, who are experiencing displacement and 
statelessness. In this sense, helping the poor can sometimes produce unexpected results, 
such as inequalities in excluding impoverished people. The inability of the IOM to satisfy 
all the forced migrants’ needs contributed to differentiating them. Other organizations 
serving people in the camps also received criticisms by the forced migrants. 
Some forced migrants contend that some organizations favored one category of 
people over others in their programs of assistance. They cited physical appearance and 
being a woman as privileged criteria for receiving support. When visiting the camp of 
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Parc Cadeau #2 some residents reported: “In the camp, beautiful women eat and good- 
looking men eat. Ugly women and ugly men don’t eat. GARR gave 10,350 Haitian 
gourdes (USD 172.5) but only the beautiful women got this money. The project is for 
women.” A man was more direct, when he stated that: “IOM and GARR came and gave 
some money, but it was based on partisanship.” These reports suggest a double standard 
or gender inequality promoted by the two organizations. My presence on the ground did 
not allow me to confirm these people’s statements and this gender inequality because 
these programs no longer existed by the time of my arrival. However, I heard from 
workers of organizations that financial support has not always been fairly distributed, 
maintaining that many needy residents in the camp were excluded. I did observe that the 
majority of people of Anse-à-Pitres are involved in everyday migration, which 
complicates the task of organizations to distinguish recently displaced migrants from 
long-term resident migrants. In this sense, creating inequalities through giving financial 
assistance may result when organizations use a top down approach, do not use local 
people to help them identify the recently displaced people, or when they do not explain 
the rationality behind their choice. Even though these organizations may not intend to 
create differentiation among people, their approach, lacking rationality and transparency, 
promotes this process and encourages unequal substantive citizenship. 
The creation of differentiation also arose with the micro-credit program, launched 
by the SJM. When I arrived in Anse-à-Pitres in 2016, SJM was one of the most loyal 
organizations to the forced migrants. While the mission of this organization is to 
accompany and defend the rights and dignity of migrants and those who are the victims 
of assaults, abuse, and violence, it also gives economic support to the forced migrants. 
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Through the micro-credit program, SJM granted loans of 10,000 HT gourdes (167 USD) 
to a few forced migrants in order to start small businesses. Those who did not benefit 
from the program were not happy, considering that they were qualified to receive the loan 
but were snubbed. I met two board members of ODRA and they showed concern about 
not being selected as beneficiaries of the program. They discussed the matter with me and 
one said: 
“I heard that people have received money. There are some people who 
can’t do business, who don’t know how to manage the money. Unfortunately the 
givers don’t work with ODRA. We could have told them who could be a good 
person to manage and work with the money. I deserve to have that money because 
I have a large family and I can work.” 
Individuals frequently try to differentiate themselves from others in order to justify why 
they should be the selected beneficiaries. In this example, the two forced migrants 
expressed their capacity to manage a business while ignoring others’ capacity to do the 
same thing. In this way, differentiation is not only created by the organizations, but it is 
also created by the people, who see themselves as different substantive citizens from 
others. The state also played a role in promoting inequalities and differentiation among 
the displaced and stateless people, especially through the program of relocation, of which 
it was the executor on the ground. 
The relocation program sought to displace forced migrants from the camp of Parc 
Cadeau #1 and Parc Cadeau #2. When it came to implementing the project, the City Hall 
decided to exclude residents of the Parc Cadeau #1 maintaining that they were from 
Anse-à-Pitres and could return to their home without any economic support. While this 
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may have been true for some residents in the camp considered as false migrants, there 
was no survey that clearly said who the true and false migrants were and where they were 
from. Moreover, the hyper-mobility of people in the region to the Dominican Republic, 
especially to Pedernales, made it difficult to distinguish migrant status in Anse-à-Pitres. 
The majority of people in Anse-à-Pitres are in the same precarious economic condition 
and draw upon practices of everyday ‘border jumping’ in order to create livelihoods. The 
decision to include one camp and exclude another appears to be arbitrary and aims to 
create differential substantive citizens among the displaced. Most people who were 
excluded had been in the camps for a long time and have been facing the same social and 
economic challenges as people in Parc Cadeau #2. 
As a matter of fact, the development of differentiation among the displaced 
people is inevitable, as organizations are not generally able to satisfy everyone’s needs. 
As Fassin (2010:51) argues, referring to nongovernmental workers, “we therefore cannot 
hold these groups entirely responsible for the complex tensions and insurmountable 
problems with which they are confronted. But we can expect them to be more clear- 
sighted than they often appear.” In this sense, SJM and IOM have limited resources and 
are only filling a gap left by the state, which has contributed to promoting differentiation 
among citizens. By considering that residents at the camps are factors of insecurity in the 
city, the state qualifies them as undesired people, or people out of place, who are not 
equal to the long-term citizens of Anse-à-Pitres. Throughout Anse-à-Pitres, rumors have 
also spread that some long-term residents have a positive reaction concerning the burning 
and the destruction of the small houses of forced migrants in the camps. I talked to 
residents of the city informally have heard them articulate that people living in the camps 
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are the cause of insecurity and theft in the area; in this sense, the differentiation among 
citizens can be the result of how the displaced people are perceived compared to others. 
Differentiation is also an outcome of where one stands economically in society; some 
forced migrants were able to respond to displacement better than others, which is visible 
among the residents in the camp of Parc Cadeau #1. 
Some forced migrants do better than others because of their ability to mobilize 
and manage resources in order to improve their lives. This differentiation is reflected in 
the residents’ small houses in the camp of Parc Cadeau #1. While the majority of houses 
are made of straw and cardboard, there are a few houses that are bigger and covered with 
iron sheets. Some of these houses are located on an isolated piece of land and they are 
inhabited by a very small group of forced migrants. They are bigger and better built than 
those on the rest of the main camp. While some people explain that they were given iron 
sheets by an organization, which makes their houses look different than others in the 
camp, I learned that a few people bought their pieces of land from someone they consider 
to be the owner of the land. Josemar whom, people consider the head of the camp, has his 
house on this secluded piece of land, away from the main camp, although I consider it an 
extension of Parc Cadeau #1. During a visit, I stopped at the first yard where there was a 
garden of corn, a big house, and a small tent in front of which I met Karl, who is the 
home owner. Karl was in the main camp and benefited from the IOM relocation program. 
He explained, “When IOM gave me the little money, I didn’t eat it (spend). I bought this 
piece of land. I moved from the camp to here. People who are providing assistance don’t 
know this area. They don’t come because they say that people who live here are well off; 
they don’t need help.” Moving from the main camp meant two important things for Karl. 
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First, it equated to a social and economic mobility, which in turn guarantees his 
independence and some kind of stability. Second, this mobility puts Karl in a position 
that allows him to enjoy substantive citizenship to a different degree from the rest of the 
displaced and stateless people living in the main camps. Furthermore, Karl extended his 
activities to the Dominican Republic, as he said: “I continue to go to the Dominican 
Republic. I make gardens. I plant squashes, which I sold to build this house.” This 
transnational aspect of Karl’s life is significant, as it is extended to two different realities 
involving two distinct societies, making him a transnational substantive citizen. 
 
6.6 Transnational substantive citizenship: A continuum between life in Anse-à- 
Pitres (Haiti) and Pedernales (Dominican Republic) 
 
Forced migrants’ lives are split between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It is 
difficult to define belonging for forced migrants because of their everyday “jumping 
border” practices. While many assert that they feel better in Haiti because they are not 
running to escape soldiers, they continue to go to work in the Dominican Republic on a 
daily basis. Their constant movements between the two countries make it difficult to 
locate them in a specific space where they belong. Even though their feelings are 
important in defining their belonging, we cannot ignore the significance of their daily 
practices in making them substantive citizens. As Lazar (2013) suggests, citizenship is 
tied to what people do in their daily lives. Indeed, the daily activities of the forced 
migrants are intertwined with both Haitian and Dominican societies. This makes them 
transnational substantive citizens, which suggests a sort of belonging that is defined 
through their being subject to both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Schiller (2005: 52) 
argued that the adoption of dual citizenship by an impressive number of states has 
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contributed to the development of a transborder form of citizenship (transnational 
citizenship) that also goes beyond legal citizenship into the subject of cultural and social 
citizenship and its transnational extensions. Similarly, the displaced people’s 
transnational substantive citizenship is formed outside the legal category, but expressed 
in two ways: first, through residing in Haiti, a country that offers them a sense of freedom 
and second, through crossing to the Dominican Republic, where they go for their 
survival. 
The forced migrants feel at home in Anse-à-Pitres because this is the place that 
guarantees them a sense of physical security. In the Dominican Republic, many contend 
that they were worried about their lives because they were persecuted by soldiers and 
Dominican civilians. While leaving the Dominican Republic was involuntary, some 
migrants feel less worried about their lives since their arrival in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. 
Zalo, a young man in his twenties, was born in the Dominican Republic, but had never 
been able to obtain a Dominican identity card (called cédula). According to him, living in 
the Dominican Republic was an experience of insecurity and fear, as Haitians were 
constantly attacked in the street and at their homes. For Zalo, coming to Haiti was a 
relief; he said: “I feel good where I am now. I feel good because I sleep at ease. I get up 
with happiness and I go to sleep with happiness. No one will tell me ‘go to your home.” 
The feeling that being in Haiti gives Zalo is one of belonging to Anse-à-Pitres because 
the city offers him security for his life. In this sense belonging equates to freedom, which 
can be considered an element of substantive citizenship for Zalo, who became stateless 
after he was stripped of his citizenship by the Dominican state. His experience of 
belonging is inflected by his experience residing in the city and his identity, something 
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that is directly related to citizenship (Bloch, 2014). Zalo, who lived his whole life in the 
Dominican Republic, did not reject his past experience, though, as he considers himself 
half Haitian, half Dominican. Even though he said that he felt better in Haiti, he has still 
kept a door open to the Dominican Republic. He said: “I can say that I am not on my land 
but I feel at home.” Being on “his land,” for Zalo, would mean being in the Dominican 
Republic, where he was born. When considering Zalo’s notion of land and home, it is 
possible to deduce that the meaning of Haiti as a place of freedom, belonging, and home 
can be perceived differently by people. 
For some people, being free also means feeling at home in Anse-à-Pitres. Resias 
was born in Barahona, Dominican Republic but did not have a Dominican cédula. Since 
the Dominican state adopted the 2010 migration law that led to displaced people’s 
statelessness, being born in the Dominican Republic is no longer a condition to be 
Dominican. Like other people who became “illegal”, she was not allowed to reside in the 
Dominican Republic; she became displaced in Haiti. When I asked her in an interview if 
she felt at home in Anse-à-Pitres, she answered: 
“Well, we feel that we are at home because we are all together. In the 
Dominican Republic they are threatening us. When someone crosses and comes 
over here (Anse-à-Pitres), you feel a little bit more peaceful. In the Dominican 
Republic, each time there is something happening. When there is a tumult, you 
are not at peace because Dominicans do not care about you.” 
Resias describes her feeling toward Anse-à-Pitres through an expression of being at 
home that is synonymous with peace, which may, in a certain way, be interpreted as a 
sense of belonging. 
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For another group of people, feeling good or free in Anse-à-Pitres does not mean 
being at home. This is the case for Renaldo, a Dominican-Haitian, who considers being in 
Anse-à-Pitres only an object of peace. He contends: “I am not at home. As I am in my 
country, this makes me a bit quiet but when I am over there (Dominican Republic), I feel 
more at ease. Here (in Haiti), I am just suffering.” Whatever feelings people develop 
about their presence in Anse-à-Pitres, their impact as temporary residents participates in 
the creation of substantive citizenship. In the same vein, Vora (2013) showed how 
members of the Indian diaspora, who are denied Emirati citizenship, participate in the 
history of the country through being residents in Dubai, which makes them worthy of the 
status of substantive citizens.  Despite the fact that displaced people do not share the 
same opinion of their relationship to Anse-à-Pitres, almost all of them have something in 
common. Their lives continue to be a continuum between Anse-à-Pitres and Pedernales. 
Anse-à-Pitres represents a place of residency that attests to their belonging to Haiti, 
regardless of their feelings toward this place, and Pedernales, where they cross every day 
to sell their labor, depicts a place of economic influence for them. While going to the 
Dominican Republic is considered a survival strategy for the forced migrants, their 
border jumping is also constitutive of substantive citizenship. 
Although the displaced people consider that being in Haiti gives them a sense of 
physical security because they are not being harassed by Dominican soldiers and 
civilians, the Dominican Republic still plays an important role in their lives. Manchina 
was born in the Dominican Republic. After living her whole life in the Dominican 
Republic, she struggled to adapt to life in Haiti. While she likes Haiti, the country of her 
parents, she missed the Dominican Republic, where she still feels she belongs. She said: 
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“I am at home. That’s true because I am in my country. However, I am more familiar 
with Dominicans. My moves are with Dominicans. I can’t humiliate my country but the 
true place I come from is Abila (Dominican Republic).” Manchina’s belonging in Haiti is 
defined through her parents who are Haitian and her residing in Anse-à-Pitres, but her 
daily activities take place in the Dominican Republic. Even though she was rejected by 
the state of the Dominican Republic, she considers the Dominican Republic is still 
important to her. Similarly, Jadana, a Dominican-Haitian, who was in Haiti for the first 
time, is connected to Haiti through her Haitian parents. However, she expresses her 
attachment to the Dominican Republic, the country where she was born and raised, even 
though she does not legally belong there. She stated: “It seems that life is better in the 
Dominican Republic. Here, I don’t do anything. I want to return to St Domingue 
(Dominican Republic) because it is the country I know.” While Jadna resides in Haiti, she 
feels that the Dominican Republic offers more opportunities, especially for making a 
living. Her transnational substantive citizenship cannot be defined out of those two 
experiences. 
For the majority of the displaced people, the importance of the Dominican 
Republic resides in the role it plays in the creation of livelihoods. Jeannel, who was born 
in the Dominican Republic, feels better in Haiti because he feels free. However, he 
cannot erase the Dominican Republic from his life. Moving across the border to create a 
livelihood continues to be a prerequisite for him as he stated: “To have the resources to 
survive, you must go to the Dominican Republic. Haiti has no resources. If Haiti had 
opportunities, you would be so at ease. It is in the Dominican Republic one must create 
livelihoods. I still go. It is there I must go to put in a day of work. Haiti has nothing I can 
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do.” Crossing to the Dominican Republic is a way for forced migrants to make a living. 
Those daily practices also count as life experiences and show the impact they have on 
both Anse-à-Pitres and the Dominican Republic. Forced migrants undertake other 
significant activities in the Dominican Republic besides going to work. Fabioloa sent her 
children to school in Pedernales while she resides in Anse-à-Pitres. She crossed the 
border everyday with her children or asked someone to take them to school when she was 
blocked by soldiers on the border. Granting her children a Dominican education 
constitutes a way of preparing them for Dominican citizenship. Fabiola continued to go to 
the Dominican Republic to do domestic work. With these kinds of life dynamics and 
experiences, forced migrants actively participate in and contribute to both societies. 
Through forms of engagement such as going to work, selling, or sending children to 
school in the Dominican Republic, those stateless people residing in Anse-à-Pitres create 
substantive citizenship that goes beyond borders. This is why they can be conceived of as 
transnational substantive citizens. Transnational substantive citizenship is an outcome of 
the exclusion from legal citizenship that produces multiple logics of citizenship. What is 
at stake here is that being able to produce belonging in more than one society gives the 
displaced people some flexibility that they can take advantage of amid all the constraints 
that structure their lives. 
Finally, while the state may deploy multiple forms of governance to regulate its 
citizenry, it also proliferates several types of citizenship (Vora 2013: 21). Accordingly, 
the emergence of an alternative form of citizenship for the stateless people in Anse-à- 
Pitres is a consequence of a selective politics of the Dominican Republic that consisted of 
excluding people of Haitian backgrounds, but also of the failure of the Haitian state to 
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legally integrate these people into the Haitian state. As an alternative to the absence of 
legal citizenship, these people trigger actions that emanated from both personal and 
collective consciousness, such as organizing themselves and resisting the power system 
in Anse-à-Pitres, enhancing claims of belonging to the city, and freedom, all of which are 
social and human rights. These strategies produce a kind of substantive citizenship 
outside the juridico-legal category. Substantive citizenship, as something that can be 
formed by people’s social and economic actions in a city, shows how people can be 
productive members of society despite the absence of legal connection with the state. 
Furthermore, their involvement into two societies makes them transnational substantive 
citizens, which gives them some flexibility in a context where they are politically and 
socially constrained. 
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Conclusions 
In this dissertation, I have examined how displaced people mobilize resources 
within and across their communities as a survival strategy and how they create a form of 
substantive citizenship in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti. I have shown that in order to develop an 
understanding of the displaced people’s experiences of displacement and statelessness, it 
is fundamental to go to where their journey started: the Dominican Republic. Indeed, 
while the expulsion of thousands of people of Haitian background from the Dominican 
Republic was sudden, all the mechanisms that led to this brutal decision were already at 
work in Dominican society. A series of internal and external factors that have their origin 
in Dominican and Haitian history and in current world development need to be taken into 
account. Like many Caribbean countries, both Haiti and the Dominican Republic have 
been shaped as nations by shared experiences of colonialism, postcolonialism, slavery, 
class, racial and gender stratification. However, their two distinct colonial experiences 
make them not an undifferentiated whole. 
The two countries used to be one country, which belonged to Spain, before being 
separated with the introduction of France on the island. For more than one century 
(1600s-1800s), the two countries have been submitted to the fierce regime of the colonial 
system. Haiti proclaimed its independence from France in 1804, and the Dominican 
Republic proclaimed its independence from Spain in 1821, to then become occupied by 
Haiti from 1822 to 1844. Dominicans have not digested this Haitian occupation, which 
they refer to as “the Haitian Domination” (Martinez 2005), and which was central to the 
formation of a sentiment of “anti-Haitianismo” (antihaitianism). In this racial ideology, 
being Dominican has to come to be defined as not Haitian (Howard 2001). Racial 
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thinking has been used in the process of Dominican nation building by the dictator 
Trujillo, who finally opted for the elimination of Haitians through a state-sponsored 
massacre in 1937. In recent years, the removal of Haitians by the Dominican state has 
been achieved through the institutionalization of racial prejudice and the enactment of 
law, specifically the Constitutional court decision in 2013 that revoked birthright 
citizenship to thousands of Dominicans and forced them out of the country with other 
undocumented Haitian migrants. Even though these people were not massacred as 
citizens were during the Trujillo era, the process was still violent because it entailed the 
separation of families, the loss of means of livelihoods, material dispossession, and the 
forced displacement of people of Haitian backgrounds to Haiti, a country many had not 
known before or had left many years ago in search of a better life. 
These people entered Haiti, a country that had been devastated by the 2010 
earthquake and was struggling with continuous political and economic instability; their 
arrival in Haiti collided with grave social, political, and economic challenges including an 
absent or quasi-inexistent state, which could not even provide them with the ID papers 
they needed to enjoy, at least, some basic social and human rights. This means that from 
the Dominican Republic to Anse-à-Pitres, the displaced people found themselves 
between Scylla and Charybdis. In Anse-à-Pitres, the only real contact that the Haitian 
state developed with the displaced people was intervening in their lives, such as when 
local authorities were expelling them from the camp of Parc Cadeau #2 to erase their ugly 
image from the city. Legally, the state retreats from the well-being of these people, which 
makes them dependent subjects more of themselves than of the state. 
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Despite state marginalization, displacement, and statelessness, the forced migrants 
have strived to improve their lives by looking for opportunities where there seem to be 
none. As I demonstrated throughout this dissertation, they have undertaken many 
informal economic activities that include selling goods, selling their labor, taking 
microcredit loans, or going to do agricultural work in the Dominican Republic, drawing 
on daily labor mobility that I described in the expression of monte desann, in order to 
capture their back and forth movements between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. All 
these survival strategies are poor income generating activities for the displaced people. 
However, what counts in those practices is more the meaning they bring to these people’s 
lives than the money they earn from them. They endow them with a philosophy of life 
that is conveyed in expressions such as m’ap degaje m, ti degaje, and vire men, to 
describe their lives as not static but as an ongoing process towards achieving something 
with which to keep going. 
The forced migrants’ involvement in everyday labor mobility, even if it means 
facing the danger involved in crossing the border, is an example of their ability to carry 
out actions in the world, which allows them to exercise power and agency in and over 
their lives. The strength, resilience, agency and emancipation of these forced migrants 
through these practices appear in one forced migrant’s assertion: “What happens is that 
Haitians have something in them, wherever they are, they live. That‘s why we are here 
but it is not that we have a good activity.” This forced migrant man I call Charyba implies 
that the reason for their survival is not because they have a job or they are earning money, 
but it is because they are an enduring people who remain hopeful. 
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The conception of how people survive based on the hope that they feel can be 
understood in the light of Ortner’s (2016: 59) support for an inquiry “into what gives 
lives a sense of purpose or direction, or how people search for the best way to live—even 
in dire and hostile circumstances.” That is to say, for forced migrants in Anse-à-Pitres, it 
is more their agentive, stubborn, and energy-giving behavior that helps them survive day- 
to-day, rather than their income. The informal economy is, in this sense, a process, or an 
assemblage of practices that embrace their total life as humans. Their coping and survival 
strategies, through their informal economic practices, lead us to redefine a good life not 
as a state to be obtained but an ongoing aspiration for something better (Fisher 2014). As 
such, Fisher associates well being with non-material qualities that embrace the hopes, 
fears, and other subjective factors that define engagement with the world. Human 
development is not simply defined by the material resources or stable wages and salaried 
labor that are often touted as a condition of development process (Ferguson and Li, T. M. 
2018). In a context where stable-waged labor is disappearing, Ferguson and Li suggest 
that making livelihood is not defined by a proper job. They even argued for a renewed 
political-economic analysis of life beyond the “proper job” that is both global and 
differentiated. These ideas help understand the informal economic practices of the forced 
migrants not as something that guarantees a somewhat material well-being, but as 
something that helps them remain hopeful. This hope is expressed through the forced 
migrants’ collective actions that lead them to demand their right to the city of Anse-à- 
Pitres. 
Indeed, in the absence of legal citizenship, these stateless people forge a kind of 
substantive citizenship, which is defined beyond the legal realm through acting 
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personally and collectively in a way that demonstrates their valuable representation in 
their displaced communities. Their daily activities in Anse-à-Pitres, the change they bring 
to the demography of the city, what they do to build a durable life, the trial to get settled, 
and the narratives they produced daily are ways by which they build substantive 
citizenship. This limited form of substantive citizenship is also fed by feelings of 
belonging, formulation of claims through their organization (ODRA), forms of reaction 
and resistance to systems of power and daily live dynamics that have impacts in both 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which makes them transnational substantive citizens. 
By doing research with these displaced people in Anse-à-Pitres, Haiti, I have 
learned what it means to be displaced and stateless. Each time I observed them, met with 
them, or interviewed them, I had the opportunity to review their journey and the storms 
they have endured just to be there. Even though my understanding of their reality is very 
much limited because of my positionality as an outsider, after 14 months living with 
them, I have come to draw a new cartography of their lives in comparison to when I first 
arrived in Anse-à-Pitres for my research. My long-term immersion into their community 
has allowed me to develop a kind of cultural intuition in their lives such as understanding 
their expressions, that include n’ap longonni (to literally mean we are trying to survive) 
or mwen pa gen rele, mwen pa gen reponn (meaning I have no support). In this sense, I 
have carved out a niche for myself not only in their reality but also in their lives. It was 
evidenced in the simple words that people conveyed to me Apa w lage nou, i.e., you 
forgot about us. Listening to them has made me feel more indebted to them, a burden that 
weighs more than my back can bear. In the field, I was moved by their desire for 
something better, their agency, and their combativeness. I see their life through a binary 
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opposition that I translate as power in oppression, light in darkness, hope in despair, and 
potentiality in precarity and poverty. Their social and economic dynamics in Anse-à- 
Pitres exemplify this contrasting reality. 
This dissertation contributes to anthropological studies of displaced people and 
the anthropology of citizenship. First, often times, economic injustice and state laws and 
policies contribute to exacerbating marginalized and disenfranchised people’s 
vulnerability and precarity. These practices dehumanize these people, who are often 
accused of being a threat to the jobs (Lewellen 2002) of formal citizens in host countries. 
My work develops an understanding of these people as not being hopeless, passive, or 
inactive. Their engagement in socio-cultural practices and forms of informal or Creole 
economics as an outcome of being excluded from the formal economy provides them 
with the tools needed to develop survival strategies. Those practices attest to their agency 
to build self-reliance and self-development in the face of precarity and displacement. In 
this way, what I am developing in my work are theories that actually contest the 
anthropology of the “suffering slot” by showing how displaced people strive to create 
good in their lives (Robbins 2013). 
In addition, these people build an alternative form of citizenship that translates 
their capacity of taking actions in the world. I conceptualize this as substantive 
citizenship and it goes beyond the legal scope of citizenship. This citizenship is a 
personal and collective experience. First, it results from actions that people undertake in 
order to direct their lives. Second, it results from how people’s common vision in the 
nation-state produces actions that challenge established power structures. Through these 
informal, personal, and collective channels, stateless people in the world build 
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substantive citizenship that can also become transnational based on the multiple links that 
they maintain with others across the world. 
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Appendix: Interview Guides 
 
Interview Guide-English 
1- Do you have any contacts in Haiti and abroad, and how do you stay in touch 
with them? 
2- What kind of social or economic exchanges are you involved in with your 
contacts abroad and other members of the community? 
3- How do these practices help you make ends meet? 
4- In what ways are you still connected to the Dominican Republic? 
5- What is this process of making a living in Haiti like for you? 
6-  How do you compare your life back in the Dominican Republic to your 
current life in Haiti? 
7- What kind of support do you receive from NGOs? 
8-  In what kind of community activities are you engaged? How do you feel 
about them? 
9- Do you feel belonging here in Anse-à-Pitres and in what ways? 
10- How did you find out that you would have to leave the Dominican Republic 
because your citizenship had been revoked? 
B- Interview Guide-Creole 
1- Eske ou gen kontak ak moun an Ayiti oubyen aletranje e kijan oufè pou kenbe 
kontak avèk yo? 
2- Ki jan de echanj sosyal oswa ekonomik ou gen ak moun aletranje oubyen lòt 
manm nan kominote a? 
3- Ki jan pratik sa yo ede w nan lavi chak jou w? 
 
4- Ki fason ou santi ou konekte ak Repiblik Dominikèn? 
5- Ki jan sa ye pou ou mennen yon vi an Ayiti ? 
6- Ki konparezon ou kapab fè ant jan ou t’ap viv an Repiblik Dominikèn ak 
fason w’ap viv kounya an Ayiti? 
7- Ki sipò ou jwenn nan men ONG? 
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8- Nan ki aktivite ou patisipe nan kominote a? Sa w panse de aktivite sa yo ? 
9- Eske ou santi w lakay ou isit Ansapit ? Kòman w ka eksplike sa ? 
10- Ki reyaksyon w lè w aprann ke ou dwe kite Repiblik Dominikèn akoz yo 
retire nasyonalite w ? 
C-Inteview Guide-Spanish 
1- ¿Tiene contactos en Haití y en el extranjero, y cómo se queda Usted en 
contacto con ellos? 
2- ¿Qué tipo de intercambios sociales o económicos Usted tiene con sus 
contactos en el extranjero y otros miembros de la comunidad? 
3- ¿Cómo estas prácticas le ayudan a sobrevivir? 
 
4- ¿De qué manera está conectado con la República Dominicana? 
 
5- ¿Cuál es el proceso de fabricación de una vida en Haití para Usted? 
 
6- ¿Cómo se compara su vida en la República Dominicana a su vida actual en 
Haití? 
7- ¿Qué tipo de apoyo recibe de las ONG? 
 
8- ¿En qué tipo de actividades de la comunidad que se dedica? ¿Cómo se siente 
acerca de ellas? 
9- ¿Se siente que pertenece aquí an Anse-à-Pitres y de qué manera? 
 
10-  ¿Cómo se sentía cuando aprendía que tendría que dejar la 
República Dominicana debido a su ciudadanía que había sido 
revocada? 
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